Reed v. Long
| Decision Date | 10 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:19-CV-385 (MTT) |
| Citation | 506 F.Supp.3d 1322 |
| Parties | Christopher REED, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gary LONG, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Mark A. Begnaud, Decatur, GA, Mark Yurachek, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.
Terry E. Williams, Jason C. Waymire, Buford, GA, for Defendants Gary Long, Jeanette Riley.
Jason C. Waymire, Buford, GA, for Defendant Scott Crumley.
On September 24, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Butts County Sheriff's Office's practice of placing warning signs at the residences of registered sex offenders before Halloween. Doc. 1. The Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, and the Court granted that motion in part.1 Docs. 6; 17. Now the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Docs. 50; 51. And the Plaintiffs have moved to permanently enjoin the Sheriff's Office from placing signs in front of their homes, or, in the alternative, a new preliminary injunction barring sign placement for Halloween in 2020.2 Doc. 50-1. For the following reasons, the Plaintiffs' motions (Doc. 50; 50-1) are DENIED , and the Defendants' motion (Doc. 51) is GRANTED .
When Corey McClendon was 17 years old, he had sex with a female who was under the age of 16. As a result, he was convicted in 2001 of statutory rape. He now lives with his 6-year-old daughter and his parents, who own the home where they all reside. Shortly before Halloween 2018, two Butts County Sheriff's deputies appeared at McClendon's door to inform him that the Sheriff's Office would be placing a sign in front of the McClendon home. The sign conveyed a "community safety message" from the Sheriff's Office "warning" that there could be no trick-or-treating at the McClendon home. Upset that the Sheriff's Office was calling his home dangerous and worried about the consequences of that, McClendon voiced his disagreement.
One of the deputies agreed that McClendon should not "be on the sex offender registry," but posted the sign anyway. McClendon claims his fears were realized; his home was vandalized after the sign was posted, and someone appeared in his neighborhood "looking for me saying that I was a really bad person, a sexual predator." Doc. 48 at 24.
"Sex offender registry" refers to a Georgia statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, which imposes lifetime restrictions on "sex offenders." Statutory rape is one of many offenses covered by the statute. Among other things, the statute requires Georgia to classify sex offenders based on a determination whether they pose an increased risk of again committing a sexual offense. None of the plaintiffs have been so classified. On the contrary, they have, by all accounts, been rehabilitated and are leading productive lives.
Reed and Holden have similar stories. Both were previously convicted of sexual offenses and are registered sex offenders. Docs. 39 ¶ 15-16, 22-23; 40 ¶¶ 15-16, 22-23. Holden was convicted in 2004 in Florida of lewd and lascivious battery for an incident that occurred in 2001. Doc. 39 ¶ 22. Reed was convicted of sexual assault in 2007 in Illinois. Doc. 39 ¶ 15. Reed is a war veteran who works as a truck driver. Doc. 49 at 8:21-24, 22:4-13, 54:3-55:1. He lives with his 83-year-old father in his father's home. Id. at 9:5-10:5. Holden has owned a home in Butts County since May 2017. He lives by himself and works as a warehouse coordinator. Doc. 47 at 8:2-21.
This is the sign the Sheriff's Office placed in front of the Plaintiffs' homes:
Docs. 51-3 ¶ 1; 56-1 ¶ 1. The deputies also tacked to the front doors, or gave to the Plaintiffs, this leaflet:
Doc. 12-4. Riley, the officer in charge of the signs, testified she intended to place them only in the rights-of-way in front of the Plaintiffs' residences. Docs. 51-1 ¶ 4; 20 at 70:23-71:7.
The Sheriff's Office does not contend that the sign is necessary because of any indication that the McClendon home, the Reed home, or the Holden home pose a particular danger to the public. Rather, the Sheriff's Office placed its "danger" signs in front of the homes of all sex offenders in the county without regard to any consideration of whether those offenders posed a particular risk.
Holden found the sign when he returned home from work. He telephoned Deputy Riley, whom he understood to be "the enforcement officer," to ask why the sign had been placed on his lawn without his knowledge or permission. Doc. 20 at 13:7-14. Holden told Riley the Sheriff's Office had no right to place the sign in his yard and that he had removed the sign. Doc. 47 at 16:12-24. Riley "responded that movement of the sign or destruction of the sign would be considered destruction of county property and that I could be arrested." Id. Holden put the sign back up. Id.
Reed first saw the sign in front of his home on a Sunday morning as he and his father were leaving for church. Doc. 49 at 19:8-15, 21:15-22:13. He says he feared for his safety but was concerned more about the safety and health of his elderly father, who was highly agitated. His father called the Sheriff's Office to have something done about the sign. Id. at 22:17-23:6. The sign remained.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), a court " ‘can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists’ " and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. , 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tippens v. Celotex Corp. , 805 F.2d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1986) ); Gray v. Manklow (In re Optical Techs., Inc.) , 246 F.3d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001). When the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant holds the initial burden to establish there is no genuine dispute concerning whether the elements of the claim or defense have been met. See United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. , 941 F.2d 1428,1438 (11th Cir. 1991). In response, the non-movant may defeat summary judgment by producing "significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.’ " Id. (quoting Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc. , 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991) ) (alteration in original).
In contrast, "[w]hen the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim.’ " Id. at 1437 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). The movant "simply may show ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the [non-movant]'s case." Id. at 1438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Assuming the [movant] has met its burden, the non-movant must then show a genuine dispute regarding any issue for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial." Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. , 281 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).
A factual dispute is genuine so as to defeat summary judgment "only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta , 281 F.3d at 1224 (quotation marks omitted). When determining if there is a genuine dispute, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). And "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. When both parties have moved for summary judgment, the standard of review does not change. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States , 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). "Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed." United States v. Oakley , 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court will consider each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. , 408 F.3d at 1331.
As amended, the complaint asserts three claims: that the Defendants compelled speech from the Plaintiffs in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that they trespassed in violation of state law, and that they committed an unlawful taking of the Plaintiffs' property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court first considers the Defendants' sovereign immunity defenses, then the property claims, then the First Amendment claims.
The Eleventh Amendment protects a state or an arm of the state from being sued in federal court without the state's consent. Manders v. Lee , 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). "To receive Eleventh Amendment immunity, a defendant need not be labeled a ‘state officer’ or ‘state official,’ but instead need only be acting as an ‘arm of the State,’ which includes agents and...
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