Reed v. Muncipality of Taylorsville
| Decision Date | 15 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV710TSL-LRA |
| Parties | TABITHA REED PLAINTIFF v. MUNCIPALITY OF TAYLORSVILLE, MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendants Brad White and Gabe Horn, in their individual capacities, for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Plaintiff Tabitha Reed has responded in opposition to the motion. The court, having considered the memoranda of authorities, together with attachments, submitted by the parties, concludes the motion should be granted in part and denied in part, as set forth herein.
On February 10, 2017, plaintiff Tabitha Reed was arrested by defendant Brad White, an officer with the City of Taylorsville Police Department, and Taylorsville Police Chief Gabe Horn, and charged with possession of controlled substances. She filed the present action on July 23, 2017, against the City of Taylorsville, and against Chief Horn and Officer White, in their individual and official capacities, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful search and seizure, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and reckless investigation, all allegedly in violation of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.1 She also asserted a § 1983 claim against Chief Horn for failure to train/supervise.2 White and Horn have now moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.3
On the date of Reed's arrest, Chief Horn learned there was an outstanding arrest warrant from Smith County for Davin Clark, who he had just seen at Reed's residence, which is just down the street from the police station. After obtaining a copy of the warrant from Smith County, Chief Horn contacted Officer White, and the two went to Reed's residence. Reed's daughter answeredthe door when White knocked. When asked, she informed White that her mother was not home; and in response to his inquiry, she stated that Clark was not in the residence. At White's request, the daughter telephoned Reed, who verbally consented to allow the officers to search the home for Clark. They entered the home, called out for Clark and looked around for a minute or two but did not find Clark.
Soon after leaving the residence, Officer White received a call on his cell phone from a woman named Charlotte who worked at the Ward's restaurant where Reed was employed. Charlotte told White that Clark, in fact, had been at Reed's residence, hiding, when they first went there to look for him and that he was still there. White called Reed and asked for permission to search the home for Clark again. Reed agreed. The officers returned to the residence and again spoke with Reed's daughter, who answered the door. White asked whether Clark was in the home; she said no. He asked whether anyone else was in the home; and although she said no, White heard a toilet flush in the master bathroom as they were speaking. He and Horn proceeded through the master bedroom and into the bathroom, where they found Clark hiding in a cabinet. Officer White ordered Clark to come out, which he did. White laid him face down on the end of the bed and handcuffed him behind his back. White patted Clark down, and found a glass pipe in his pocket,which White handed to Horn. Horn turned to set the pipe down on a nearby dresser and noticed what appeared to be loose marijuana and a baggie containing what looked like marijuana in a "glittery" make-up-type box on the dresser and a "blunt" lying next to it. White then looked around and noticed a box resembling a shoebox on the floor nearby. He opened the box and found a needle, one or two spoons and a small clear bag of crystallized substance that looked like crystal methamphetamine. Both substances were field tested and were determined to be marijuana and crystal methamphetamine, respectively. When asked, Clark denied that either belonged to him.
Reed was subsequently picked up and arrested, charged with possession of marijuana (a misdemeanor) and possession of methamphetamine (a felony). At the time of her arrest, Reed had recently cashed her tax refund check and was in possession of $3,073. This cash was seized in connection with her arrest pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 41-29-153(a)(5) and (7). Ultimately, the money was returned after plaintiff enlisted the aid of an attorney at the cost of $1500.
Chief Horn and Officer White assert they are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 'clearlyestablished' statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-step analysis. Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). "A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Mullenix v. Luna, --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). While there does not need to be a case directly on point, "existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (quotation omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is required when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Typically, on a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of agenuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the moving party demonstrates an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). However, a government official's good faith assertion of a qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof. Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005). Once the official asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to show there is a genuine and material dispute as to whether qualified immunity applies. Castorena v. Zamora, 684 Fed. Appx. 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). See also Thompson v. Upshur Cty., TX, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
When evaluating whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court considers "all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co.v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). In so doing, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, even on a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. See Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) ().
The Fourth Amendment ensures that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." The Supreme Court has thus held that "'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)). See also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement."). Three exceptions are implicated inthe case at bar. First, a search is reasonable and no warrant is required when the subject consents. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)). Under this exception, "[t]he government does not need a warrant if it receives: (i) consent; (ii) that is voluntarily given; (iii) by someone with actual or apparent authority; and (iv) the search does not exceed the scope of the consent received." United States v. Freeman, 482 F.3d 829, 831-32 (5th Cir. 2007).
Second, a search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710. The Supreme Court has described the reasons for and scope of this exception as follows:
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