Reed v.
| Decision Date | 30 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0097-FC,2 CA-CV 2017-0097-FC |
| Parties | NATALIE REED, Petitioner/Appellee, and JEFFREY FARMER, Respondent/Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable James E. Marner, Judge
AFFIRMED
Solyn Law, PLLC, Tucson
By Melissa Solyn
West, Longenbaugh & Zickerman, P.L.L.C, Tucson
By Joseph Mendoza
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISIONPresiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eppich concurred.
¶1 Jeffrey Farmer appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in this paternity action. He argues the court erred by initially finding it lacked jurisdiction to rule on his motion. He additionally argues the court erred in its subsequent ruling on the merits of his motion by finding he had failed to establish appellee Natalie Reed's income and unreimbursed medical costs differed from the evidence presented at trial, and by awarding Reed her attorney fees and costs. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 Reed and Farmer are parents to three-year-old J.F. Reed filed a paternity action in November 2015, requesting a court order addressing child support, certain unreimbursed medical expenses, J.F.'s medical and dental insurance, and tax issues. In August 2016, following a one-day trial, the trial court issued a written ruling, which ordered, in part, that Farmer pay child support to Reed and reimburse her for certain medical expenses.
¶3 About two months later, the trial court denied Farmer's motion for reconsideration and clarification in an unsigned minute entry. Farmer then submitted a proposed ruling and order on his motion for reconsideration. The court "decline[d] to sign it," again in an unsigned ruling, noting that it had already ruled on the motion and it "neither requested nor desire[d] the proposed form of order."
¶4 After the trial court issued its ruling on Farmer's proposed order, he filed a notice of appeal. He then issued several subpoenas related to Reed's employment and medical records. At a hearing on Reed's motions to quash the subpoenas, the court found it lacked jurisdiction to enter a ruling because of Farmer's pending appeal.
¶5 In February 2017, Farmer filed a motion for relief from the August 2016 judgment pursuant to Rule 85(C)(1)(c), Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. He alleged that the trial court's previous finding as to Reed's income was incorrect and that he "reasonably believe[d]" Reed had committedmisconduct "by failing to produce her current income pay stubs and a current [affidavit of financial information]." He further argued Reed had committed misconduct by not disclosing "proper billing records from the hospital."
¶6 This court dismissed Farmer's appeal for lack of jurisdiction in April 2017. Later that month, the trial court, in an unsigned minute entry, denied Farmer's motion for relief from judgment, stating it continued to lack jurisdiction to enter a ruling due to the still-pending appellate proceedings. See In re Marriage of Flores & Martinez, 231 Ariz. 18, ¶ 10 (App. 2012) (). Farmer subsequently filed a notice of appeal from that denial. Our mandate issued in June.
¶7 After the mandate in the first appeal issued, this court suspended the appeal from the trial court's April ruling and revested jurisdiction in that court to enter a "final, appealable order on the merits" of Farmer's Rule 85 motion. The court did so, denying Farmer's motion, quashing the pending subpoenas, and awarding Reed her attorney fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(B). In so doing, it found that Farmer's motion "was not filed in good faith[,] . . . was not grounded in fact or based on law," and "was filed for purposes of harassment and to increase the cost of litigation for [Reed]." Farmer filed a supplemental notice of appeal from that ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
¶8 Farmer first argues the trial court erred by finding it did not have jurisdiction to rule on his motion for relief from judgment. But because the court did ultimately address the merits of Farmer's motion, and we do so on appeal, his challenge to the April 2017 ruling is moot. See Contempo-Tempe Mobile Home Owners Ass'n v. Steinert, 144 Ariz. 227, 229 (App. 1985) ().
¶9 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Clark v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, ¶ 10 (App. 2017). The court does not abuse its discretion unless the reasonsgiven "are 'clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.'" Ezell v. Quon, 224 Ariz. 532, ¶ 15 (App. 2010), quoting State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n.18 (1983).1 Because his motion was based on Rule 85(C)(1)(c), Farmer bears the burden of showing both that Reed committed misconduct and that he was precluded from presenting a meritorious defense based on that misconduct. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 85(C)(1)(c) (); Estate of Page v. Litzenburg, 177 Ariz. 84, 93 (App. 1993); see also Lawwill v. Lawwill, 21 Ariz. App. 75, 78 (1973) ().
¶10 Farmer argues the trial court erred in denying his motion based on Reed's alleged misconduct related to her income. In his motion, Farmer asserted that Reed had failed to produce her "current income pay stubs and a current [affidavit of financial information], result[ing] in the denying [of Farmer's] right to fully present his case on this issue of [Reed's] income." The court, however, found that Farmer had not presented "any evidence to suggest that the income information that was considered by the Court when calculating child support . . . was inaccurate." Further, it noted that Farmer had not objected to the admission of the exhibits related to Reed's income at trial, he had not filed a motion to compel further information related to her income, and had not "otherwise indicate[d] that there was insufficient disclosure" on the issue.
¶11 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Farmer's motion on this issue. See Ezell, 224 Ariz. 532, ¶ 15. Prior to and at trial, Farmer never disputed Reed's income. The court admitted, without objection, Reed's pay stubs from March 2015, and January through February 2016. Reed explained that she was a salaried employee and "nothing[ had] changed" to her income during the intervening time. It also admitted Reed's 2014 and 2015 tax returns. Further, both Farmer's and Reed's child support worksheets attributed the same monthly income to Reed, which the court relied upon to calculate child support. Farmer has not shown that the income considered by the court—with which he agreed—was in any way inaccurate. See Lawwill, 21 Ariz. App. at 78 ().
¶12 Farmer points to Reed's testimony on cross-examination acknowledging that he had requested more recent pay stubs, but she had been unable to retrieve them before trial.2 He contends this "admission . . . is enough to allow [him] relief under the rule." See Estate of Page, 177 Ariz. at 93 (). But Farmer did not subpoena Reed's employment records before trial, request that Reed be compelled to produce additional pay stubs, or argue that her failure to provide updated pay stubs interfered with his ability to present his case. Based on Reed's undisputed testimony that her salary had not changed from her most recently disclosed pay stubs, Farmer cannot show how the failure to provide more current ones "substantially interfered with [his] ability fully and fairly to prepare for, and proceed at, trial." Estate of Page, 177 Ariz. at 93, quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 926 (1st Cir. 1988); see Lawwill, 21 Ariz. App. at 78. Farmer's reliance on this testimony is therefore unavailing.
¶13 Farmer further argues that his own testimony suggested Reed received a bonus in 2016, despite her testimony that she had not. At trial, Reed testified she had received a bonus in 2014, but not in 2015 or 2016. Farmer testified that Reed's mother, at a custody exchange, stated, "[Reed] has almost burned through her entire bonus paying for these attorney's fees." But Farmer did not raise this issue in his Rule 85 motion below and has therefore waived it on appeal. See Cont'l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382, ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (); see also Romero v. Sw. Ambulance, 211 Ariz. 200, ¶ 7 (App. 2005). Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that Reed did receive a bonus in 2016, this was simply a determination of credibility for the trial court, and we will not revisit that assessment on appeal. See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, ¶ 13 (App. 1998).
¶14 Farmer next argues the trial court erred in denying his Rule 85 motion based on Reed's alleged misconduct related to the medical expenses associated with her pregnancy and J.F.'s birth. Farmer attached to his Rule 85 motion billing records from the hospital where J.F. was born. He argued the records demonstrated that Reed's medical expenses were far lower than what she claimed at trial and also that...
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