Reed v. Retirement Bd. of Fireman's Annuity

• Decision Date: 29 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1-06-1710.,1-06-1710.
• Citation: 876 N.E.2d 94
• Parties: William REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF the FIREMAN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

876 N.E.2d 94

William REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF the FIREMAN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-06-1710.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

August 29, 2007.

Martin O. Holland, Evergreen Park, for Appellant.

Mary Patricia Burns, Vincent D. Pinelli of Burke, Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., Chicago, for Appellee.

Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff William Reed sustained a back, neck and shoulder injury while working for the Chicago Fire Department (the CFD) as a firefighter and subsequently sought duty disability benefits from defendant, the Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (the Board), pursuant to section 6-151 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Code) (40 ILCS 5/6-151 (West 2004)). Reed was denied benefits when the Board found that he was not disabled, and subsequently sought and was denied reinstatement by the CFD. Thereafter, Reed filed suit in the trial court seeking administrative review of the Board's decision and seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the CFD reinstate him or, in the alternative, ordering the Board to grant him disability benefits. While the complaint was initially dismissed with prejudice, Reed was later granted leave to replead.

Thereafter the Board refused to allow Reed to file an application for ordinary disability benefits pursuant to section 6-152 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/6-152 (West 2004)). Reed filed an amended complaint in mandamus seeking an order that the Board grant him an ordinary disability 1-06-1710 hearing. The trial court entered summary judgment in the Board's favor on the amended complaint, finding that the issue of Reed's disability had already been decided by the Board and that mandamus was an inappropriate remedy in this case. On appeal, Reed contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his original complaint and in entering summary judgment in favor of the Board on his amended complaint.

We find that Reed has waived his arguments regarding the propriety of the dismissal of his original complaint and that, waiver aside, his arguments are without merit. We further find that in denying Reed the right to file an application seeking ordinary disability benefits, the Board violated Reed's procedural due process rights. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in the Board's favor on Reed's amended complaint and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Reed in accordance with the opinion below.

Reed was injured on June 2, 2000, while on duty as a Chicago firefighter and subsequently received one year of paid medical leave. Reed was then dropped from payroll on June 2, 2001. Reed sought reinstatement with the CFD. Reed was examined by multiple medical specialists including the City of Chicago's medical officer, Dr. Isaac Morcos, who determined that Reed was disabled. Reed was consequently denied reinstatement.

On April 5, 2001, Reed applied for duty disability benefits from the Board. On May 25, 2001, Dr. Morcos certified Reed's disability to the Board. On that same day, Dr. Morcos sent a letter to Dr. George Motto, physician consultant to the Board, discussing Reed's injuries, Reed's 1-06-1710 consultation with multiple medical specialists and his conclusion that Reed was unable to perform his firefighter duties in full.

Following additional examinations by physicians, including Dr. Motto, the court held a hearing on Reed's request for duty disability benefits. During the hearing, the Board heard testimony and received medical records regarding Reed's condition. Several physicians found that Reed's subjective complaints of disability were not supported by their objective findings. Reed, himself, testified that most of the symptoms he suffered after his injury had been resolved and that he was able to engage in everyday activity, including maintaining a rental building he owned. Dr. Motto, who had reviewed all medical records received by the Board, examined Reed and heard all testimony presented to the Board, testified that Reed was capable of performing his duties as a firefighter and was not disabled.

On February 20, 2002, the Board entered an order finding that Reed did not suffer from any neurological or physical disability that would impair his ability to perform his duties as a firefighter and was, therefore, not entitled to duty disability benefits arising from his June 2, 2000, injury. The Board's order provided that Reed's "current condition is essentially normal and would allow him to return to active duty with the [CFD]."

In a letter addressed to Reed from the Board on February 26, 2002, Reed was informed that he must file for administrative review of the Board's decision within 35 days.

On March 12, 2002, Reed sought reinstatement as a firefighter with the CFD. After several medical examinations and tests, on April 8, 2003, the CFD informed Reed that he would 1-06-1710 not be reinstated as a firefighter because it had found that he was "unable to perform the essential functions of a firefighter."

Reed subsequently filed a complaint in the trial court on May 9, 2003. Count I of the complaint sought administrative review of the Board's finding that Reed was not disabled. Count II, against the City of Chicago and the Board, asked that the court enter a mandamus order that the CFD reinstate Reed as a firefighter or, in the alternative, that the Board provide Reed with disability benefits.

The Board moved to dismiss the original complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Reed filed a motion asking that the trial court remand the cause to the Board with directions that the Board conduct an ordinary disability benefits hearing pursuant to section 6-152 of the Code.

On January 16, 2004, the trial court granted the Board's motion to dismiss with prejudice and denied Reed's motion to remand. The court reasoned that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Reed's original complaint because Reed failed to file for administrative review within 35 days of the Board's decision. The court also found that Reed's mandamus request in count II was an improper remedy because it asked the court to direct the Board to perform a discretionary duty. The court denied Reed's motion to remand because, since it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide Reed's claim for administrative review, it was further precluded from considering the merits of that motion.

In its January 16, 2004, order the court suggested that Reed request an ordinary disability benefits hearing pursuant section 6-152 of the Code directly from the Board.

On January 20, 2004, Reed wrote a letter to the Board asking that the Board grant him an ordinary disability benefits hearing. Specifically, Reed asked that the Board send him application materials for ordinary disability benefits. In his letter, Reed noted that the Board, during its earlier hearing and in its February 20, 2002, decision, had not considered whether Reed was entitled to ordinary disability benefits.

On February 24, 2004, the Board refused Reed's request to apply for ordinary disability benefits. The Board noted that Reed's claim for duty disability benefits arising from the same injury was pending in the trial court and stated that, "[u]ntil that claim is finally adjudicated[,] the Retirement Board will defer any hearing" on the request. The Board further noted that its letter was not a decision with respect to Reed's entitlement to ordinary disability benefits.

Meanwhile, Reed filed a motion in the trial court on February 10, 2004, to reconsider the January 16, 2004, dismissal of his original complaint.

In May 2004, Reed was reinstated by the CFD and the City of Chicago was dismissed as a party to the case. The City of Chicago is not a party to this appeal.

On July 29, 2004, the court denied Reed's motion to reconsider but allowed him to file an amended complaint.

Accordingly, on August 31, 2004, Reed filed an amended complaint asking that the trial court enter a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to grant Reed an ordinary disability benefits hearing under section 6-152 of the Code. The amended complaint alleged that Reed was injured on June 2, 2000, in the course of duty and that Reed requested a hearing on ordinary disability benefits but was erroneously denied a hearing on February 24, 2004. Specifically, Reed alleged 1-06-1710 that the Board had "violated the due process and fair hearing requirements for administrative agencies." According to Reed's attorney, an affidavit found in the record was attached to the amended complaint. In the affidavit, Reed averred that before he was denied reinstatement by the CFD on April 8, 2003, he repeatedly called the CFD regarding the status of his evaluations and was told to be patient and wait for a final decision from the CFD. Reed also averred that Deputy Commissioner Jackson, the CFD's second-in-command, advised Reed to wait for a final decision and refused to answer his questions regarding whether Reed had been, in effect, fired.

Thereafter, on February 1, 2005, Reed filed a notice appealing the trial court's dismissal of his original complaint on January 16, 2004, and denial of his motion to reconsider on July 29, 2004, in this court. On July 18, 2005, this court dismissed Reed's appeal of the trial court's ruling for lack of jurisdiction.

Back in the trial court, the Board moved for summary judgment on the amended complaint on January 12, 2006, and Reed filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 6, 2006.

The trial court granted the Board's motion and denied Reed's motion on May 26, 2006. The court found that because the Board had already adjudicated the issue of whether Reed was in fact disabled, Reed was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating the issue of disability at an ordinary disability benefits...