Reed v. Rhodes
| Decision Date | 27 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:73 CV 1300.,1:73 CV 1300. |
| Citation | 1 F.Supp.2d 705 |
| Parties | Robert A. REED, et al. Plaintiffs, v. James A. RHODES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Thomas I. Atkins, Brooklyn, NY, James L. Hardiman, Cleveland, OH, Dr. David Whitaker, Beachwood, OH, Michele Roquemore Comer, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiffs.
Wanda Arnold, Adrian Thompson, Margaret Cannon, Lisa Marie Ruda, Cleveland, OH, James Tassie, Christopher M. Culley, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Karin Rilley, Ohio Dept. of Education, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.
Richard Alston, Cleveland,OH, for OSMCOR.
On July 1, 1997, the Ohio State Board of Education and its Superintendent of Instruction ("State Defendants") and the Cleveland City School District ("District") filed a Motion to Declare that the State Defendants and the Cleveland City School District Have Achieved Unitary Status ("Motion for Unitary Status"). As part of their Motion for Unitary Status, the State Defendants and District ("Defendants") moved this Court to issue an order declaring that the Defendants have achieved unitary status and are released from all further remedial obligations, except those specifically designated in the Consent Decree which continue until July 1, 2000.1 The Plaintiff Class comprised of African-American students enrolled in the Cleveland Public Schools and their parents or legal guardians and the Cleveland Public Schools' Board of Education ("Board"), opposed the motion. This Court held a hearing on the motion which lasted five weeks, beginning November 3, 1997 and concluding December 4, 1997. Evidence produced at the hearing included testimony from several expert witnesses, the Superintendent of the District, various other administrators, teachers, employees and former employees of the District, an employee of the Ohio Department of Education, members of the Cleveland Board of Education, Plaintiff Class members, and parents/guardians of Cleveland City School District students. The Court has reviewed all of the testimony, the exhibits from the hearing, and the post-hearing briefs filed by the parties.2 For the reasons set forth below, this Court will grant the State Defendants and District's Motion for Unitary Status.
This case was originally filed with the Court on December 12, 1973, over 24 years ago. On August 31, 1976, the Court held that "defendant boards of education through their constituent members and their appointed superintendents violated Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the laws by intentionally fostering and maintaining a segregated school system." Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F.Supp. 708 (N.D.Ohio 1976)(Battisti, J).3 On February 6, 1978, the District Court reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that the State and District were liable for maintaining a de jure segregated school system. Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F.Supp. 546 (N.D.Ohio 1978)(Battisti, J), aff'd 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 1329, 63 L.Ed.2d 770 (1980). The Court cited over 200 specific constitutional violations, categorized according to the general techniques employed to effect racial segregation, including: boundary changes; conversion of board-owned facilities; optional attendance zones; assignment or reassignment of students; construction of new school facilities; additions to existing schools; busing; school closings; portable classroom facilities; changing grade structures; manipulation of school capacity; special transfers; and faculty assignment. The Court noted that "these numerous constitutional violations had systemwide impact entitling plaintiffs to a systemwide remedy." Id. at 550.
The Court's Remedial Order, also issued on February 6, 1978, adopted a plan to remedy this systemwide unconstitutional segregation. The Remedial Order addressed, inter alia, student assignments, educational programs, transportation, safety and security, management and financial considerations, and the role of the State. Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F.Supp. 569 (N.D.Ohio 1978)(Battisti, J). These original obligations were eventually expanded into fifteen remedial components. The fifteen remedial components are (1) Student Assignments; (2) Testing and Tracking; (3) Reading Skills Program; (4) Counseling, Career Guidance and Student Training; (5) Magnet and Vocational Schools and Programs; (6) Cooperation with Universities, Businesses and Cultural Institutions; (7) Extracurricular Activities; (8) Staff Development; (9) Student Rights; (10) School Community Relations; (11) Transportation; (12) Safety and Security; (13) Management Capability and Financial Integrity; (14) Staff Desegregation; and (15) Obligations of the State Defendants. Dr. Christine Rossell, a national expert who has studied desegregation for twenty-five years, testified that with regard to desegregation orders, the remedial obligations imposed upon the Cleveland City School District are more detailed and expansive than those of any other school district she has previously studied. This case imposes approximately two to three times the number of remedial obligations as compared to those imposed on any other school district subject to a desegregation order. (Vol.IV, 748, 788).4
From 1978 until the early 1990's, the Parties litigated the specific details and implementation of the Remedial Order and subsequent orders aimed at remedying these past intentional segregative practices. Finally, in March of 1994, the Parties entered into a Settlement Agreement with the intended purpose of bringing this case to an orderly and just resolution and supporting reformation of the educational processes in the Cleveland Public Schools. After conducting a Fairness Hearing, the Court issued an Order converting the Settlement Agreement into an enforceable Consent Decree. Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F.Supp. 1274 (N.D.Ohio 1994)(Battisti, J.).
As noted in the Consent Decree in 1994, the District confronted severe financial problems. The financial condition of the District continued to deteriorate in 1995 as the District remained unsuccessful in its attempts to pass a levy, the proceeds of which were to help fund the Consent Decree. Prompted by this desperate financial condition, accompanying managerial problems, and the impact of these conditions on the District's ability to achieve uninterrupted implementation of the remedial desegregation orders and the Consent Decree, the Court directed the State Superintendent "to assume immediate supervision and operational, fiscal and personnel management of the District." (Order, 3/3/95, at 6)(Krupansky, J.).
On May 8, 1996, the Court granted the State's motion for a declaration of partial unitary status for the Student Assignment component of the Remedial Order and vacated portions of the Consent Decree requiring the use of racial parameters in assigning students.5
The motion at issue before this Court was filed pursuant to Section 15 of the Consent Decree which provides:
The Parties shall request, after appropriate evidentiary proceedings, that the Court enter its Order releasing the Defendants from all further obligations, except those which are defined herein for the period from July 1, 1997 to July 1, 2000 if it finds that:
c. The Defendants have otherwise demonstrated good faith commitment to their constitutional obligations.
As specified in this Court's Order of October 3, 1997, the Motion for Unitary Status will be examined pursuant to Section 15 of the May 25, 1994 Consent Decree as proposed by the Parties and adopted by the Court. The Court has previously stated that Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating compliance with the Consent Decree and all extant remedial orders to the extent practicable.6 The Parties were informed of the necessity to specifically reference obligations contained in the extant remedial orders and the Consent Decree. (Order, 10/3/97, at 3). Defendants relied upon the Compliance, Management, and Reporting Plan (the "Plan") for this purpose. Collaboratively, the Parties and the Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations ("OSMCR") developed this management plan in 1995 which contains the outstanding remedial obligations and the steps Defendants would take to comply with the orders.7
The Court instructed the Parties that it was "interested in determining Defendants present level of compliance with the extant remedial orders and the Consent Decree." (Order, 10/3/97, at 3). The Court noted that "the date of the Consent Decree should serve as the ultimate baseline," since OSMCR assessed Defendants' remedial compliance at that time and the Parties incorporated that assessment into Section 9 of the Consent Decree. The Court instructed Defendants, however, to use their own judgment in determining an appropriate date from which to enable the Court to adequately assess Defendants' present level of compliance. Id. at 4. Defendants chose the 1995-1996 school year as the date from which to establish compliance.
In addition to complying with the Consent Decree and the extant remedial obligations, Section 15 of the Consent Decree also requires that all vestiges of past discrimination and segregation be eliminated to the extent practicable. As noted in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 1448, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992), "[t]he vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied."
With regard to the burden of proof as to vestiges, it...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools
...K-6 Black enrollment." (Id.) Thus, CMS used a lower limit only as a self-imposed "aspirational" goal. 15. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F.Supp. 2d 705, 716 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (stating that "the common standard used throughout the United States" is "+/-20 percentage points of the percentage of b......
-
U.S. v. Yonkers Branch—Naacp
...v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 57 F.Supp.2d at 275; Manning v. Sch. Bd., 24 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1323 (M.D.Fla.1998); Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F.Supp.2d 705, 739 (N.D.Ohio 1998); Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F.Supp. at 477. According to Dr. Braddock, participation in a subsidized lunch program was even used ......
-
Hoots v. Pennsylvania, CIV A 71-538.
...standard of +20 percentage points." Coalition, 90 F.3d at 767, n. 21; Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 163 (5th Cir.1990); Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F.Supp.2d 705, 727 (N.D.Ohio 1998). This Court has never set forth a target percentage of minority hires in faculty and staff positions. Certainly 7.7% is......
-
Berry v. School Dist. of City of Benton Harbor, 4:67-CV-9.
...is distinct from a deficit caused by the practices of the school district. See Hoots, 118 F.Supp.2d at 600; Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F.Supp.2d 705, 744 (N.D.Ohio 1998), aff'd, 215 F.3d 1327, 2000 WL 687382 (6th Cir. 2000). Dr. Armor concluded that the performance gap between blacks and whites in t......
-
School Choice: Constitutionality and Possibility in Georgia
...156. See id. 157. U.S. Const, amend. I. 158. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,662 (2002). 159. Id. at 644 (citing Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Ohio 1998)). 160. Reed, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 710. 161. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975 (2006). 162. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.978(B) (2......