Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

• Decision Date: 16 August 1996
• Docket Number: Civil No. AMD 95-1259.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: Owen L. REED, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., et al., Defendants.

934 F. Supp. 713

Owen L. REED, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. AMD 95-1259.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

August 16, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen Burgess Awalt, Towson, MD, for plaintiffs.

Matthew T. Angotti, Baltimore, MD, Joel D. Newport, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, MD, William B. Bergen, Jr., Timonium, MD, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

DAVIS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This products liability action arises out of an occurrence in which Kimberly Reed, eighteen months old, suffered serious injury when the glass of a full-view storm door shattered. Owen L. Reed, Jr. and Donna Reed ("the Reeds"), individually and as Kimberly's parents, seek damages based on theories of strict liability, breach of warranty and negligence against Sears, Roebuck & Company ("Sears"), the seller of the storm door; Chamberdoor Industries, Inc. ("Chamberdoor"), the door manufacturer; and Sterling Plumbing Group, Inc. ("Sterling"), which tempered the glass used in the storm door.

Sears has filed a motion for summary judgment, principally on the grounds of Maryland's "sealed container" law. Sterling has also filed a motion for summary judgment, which Sears has adopted, arguing that the plaintiffs lack the evidence necessary to support a rational finding in their favor as to several elements of each of their claims. The parties have fully briefed the issues presented in both motions, and they have been heard in argument at a hearing on the motions.

I conclude that Sears has made the requisite showing to invoke the statutory "sealed container" defense provided under Maryland law. Furthermore, although Sears' salesperson's actions and its written sales material arguably created express warranties in respect to the model of storm door at issue in this case, nevertheless, as a matter of law, plaintiffs' sole theory of liability excludes breach of any such express warranty as a proximate cause of Kimberly's injuries. Therefore, I shall grant Sears' motion for summary judgment. I shall deny Sterling's motion for summary judgment, however, because, giving plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences as required, genuine issues of material fact exist for determination by the jury.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying with specificity those portions of the opposing party's case ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue remains "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

When considering the motion, the court will view all facts and make all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994); Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S.Ct. 1018, 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1991). Mere speculation by the non-moving party cannot stave off a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985). In order to withstand the motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce sufficient evidence which "demonstrates that a triable issue of fact exists" for trial. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 798. See also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

III. FACTS

During the summer of 1991, the Reeds were interested in purchasing a storm door for the front entrance of their home, and they went to a Sears retail store in Salisbury, Maryland, in contemplation of making a purchase. As they examined various models on display, an unidentified salesman recommended a full-view storm door containing a large glass element. The Reeds indicated to the salesman that they had two young children at home, and that they were not interested in a full-view door because of a concern that the glass might break. The salesman assured the Reeds that children could not break the tempered glass in the door under examination and demonstrated the safety and strength of the glass by hitting it three to six times with a construction-type hammer, using "strong force." The salesman then remarked, "If I can't break it, what makes you think a small child can break it," or words to that effect.

Soon thereafter, in August 1991, the Reeds purchased the same model storm door recommended by the salesman, but through the Sears catalog rather than at the retail store. The Reeds contend that they relied on the salesman's representations and on the description of the storm door provided in the Sears catalog in making their purchase. It is uncontroverted that the door was properly installed (not by one of the defendants here) at the front entrance to the Reed's home.

After almost a year of ordinary use, on the evening of August 10, 1992, Kimberly was in the living room playing near the front of the house, out of view of her parents. The main door was open but the storm door at issue here was closed and locked. Kimberly's brother Owen was playing in the front yard, and he was able to observe Kimberly standing near the storm door with her hands on the glass. In a flash, immediately after Owen had turned his back to Kimberly, there was a crash of breaking glass. The Reeds immediately entered the living room to find Kimberly bleeding profusely and balancing at her midsection on the edge of a piece of broken glass that had remained in the frame of the storm door.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Sears' Motion for Summary Judgment

Sears contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because it acted solely as the seller of the storm door, and, in that capacity, Md.Code Ann.Cts. & Jud.Proc. § 5-311 ("sealed container defense") immunizes it from liability as to all of plaintiffs' claims. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

Elements of defense to action against product's seller. — It shall be a defense to an action against a seller of a product for property damage or personal injury allegedly caused by the defective design or manufacture of a product if the seller establishes that:

(1) The product was acquired and then sold or leased by the seller in a sealed container or in an unaltered form;

(2) The seller had no knowledge of the defect;

(3) The seller in the performance of the duties he performed or while the product was in his possession could not have discovered the defect while exercising reasonable care;

(4) The seller did not manufacture, produce, design, or designate the specifications for the product which conduct was the proximate and substantial cause of the claimant's injury; and

(5) The seller did not alter, modify, assemble, or mishandle the product while in the seller's possession in a manner which was the proximate and substantial cause of the claimant's injury.

Md.Code Ann.Cts. & Jud.Proc. § 5-311(b).

Sears contends that the sealed container defense was intended specifically to provide protection to retail sellers in situations similar to the one presented here. Sears argues that it does not manufacture any products, but only acts as a retail outlet for products manufactured by other companies. In the ordinary course of business, Sears receives products from manufacturers at its catalog warehouse and it then ships the products, in their original sealed packaging, either to local Sears stores or to customers. Sears asserts that the manufacturer's packaging of products sold through its catalog is not disturbed or altered in any manner; the products contained therein are neither inspected nor modified. As a result, Sears maintains that it has no actual or constructive knowledge of any potentially defective products.

With respect to the storm door in the instant case, Sears points out that the Reeds purchased the door through the Sears catalog and that they opted to have the door delivered directly to their home. Sears did not manufacture, produce, design or designate the specifications of the storm door ordered by the Reeds. Instead, Sears simply acquired the storm door from the manufacturer, Chamberdoor, and then resold the door in its unaltered, sealed packaging to the Reeds. Furthermore, Sears was not involved in the installation of the storm door. Thus, Sears argues that it could not have discovered that the glass was improperly tempered.¹ Sears contends that based on the evidence in the record and on the only reported case discussing the sealed container defense, Liesener v. Weslo, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 857 (D.Md.1991) (Smalkin, J.), all of the claims (asserted under theories of strict liability, warranty, and negligence) should be dismissed.

The plaintiffs do not dispute the factual basis for Sears' contentions, however, they dispute Sears' interpretation of the statute. They argue narrowly that the plain words of the statute limit the defense to products liability claims alleging "defective design or manufacture." In other words, according to plaintiffs, the statute does not provide a defense to claims for strict products liability based on "failure to warn," breach of warranty, or negligence.² I agree with Sears for the following...