Shreve v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

Citation166 F.Supp.2d 378
Decision Date25 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. AMD 00-2162.,CIV.A. AMD 00-2162.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
PartiesJames A. SHREVE and Nancy Shreve, Plaintiffs v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY and MURRAY, INC., Defendants

Marshall N. Perkins, Charles J. Piven, Charles J. Piven, P.A., Baltimore, MD, for plaintiff.

Jack L. Harvey, Victoria Herbert Wink, Wharton, Levin, Ehrmantrout, Klein & Nash, Annapolis, MD, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

DAVIS, District Judge.

                                                          Contents
                  I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................386
                 II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................386
                III. DR. JOSEPH SHELLY IS NOT A QUALIFIED EXPERT UNDER THE
                      CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, AND HIS OPINION TESTIMONY
                      IS NOT ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE HIS OPINIONS WERE NOT RELIABLY
                      DERIVED FROM SOUND SCIENTIFIC OR ENGINEERING
                      METHODOLOGIES; NO SUCH INFIRMITIES APPLY TO THE
                      DEFENDANTS' EXPERTS ...............................................................390
                     A. Dr. Shelly Lacks Relevant Qualifications Under the Circumstances of
                          this Case .....................................................................391
                     B. Although Dr. Shelly Has Identified Valid Scientific/Technical Methodologies
                          and Has Applied Appropriate Labels to his Analytical Protocol
                          He Failed to Employ those Methodologies in a Scientifically or Technically
                          Valid Manner and Has Therefore Failed to Derive Reliable and
                          Valid Engineering Conclusions .................................................394
                        1. Dr. Shelly's Causation Opinions Do Not Reliably Arise From His
                             Fault Tree Analysis ........................................................395
                        2. Dr. Shelly's Opinions As To The Discharge Chute Do Not Reliably
                             Arise From A Valid "Risk Utility Analysis"..................................400
                        3. Dr. Shelly's Opinions About Adequacy of Warnings Are Not
                             Admissible .................................................................402
                     C. Defendants' Experts Are Qualified and to the Extent Their Opinions May
                          Be Relevant, They Are Admissible ..............................................403
                 IV. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
                      LAW AS TO ALL THEORIES EXCEPT STRICT LIABILITY BASED
                      ON DESIGN DEFECT AND IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
                      PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
                      AS TO ANY THEORY ..................................................................405
                     A. Summary Judgment Standards ......................................................405
                     B. Strict Liability Claims .........................................................406
                        1. Manufacturing Defect Claim ...................................................410
                        2. Failure to Warn Claim ........................................................413
                        3. Design Defect Claim ..........................................................415
                     C. Maryland Consumer Protection Act Claim ..........................................416
                     D. Breach of Warranty Claims .......................................................420
                        1. Express Warranty Claim .......................................................420
                        2. Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claim ....................................421
                     E. Loss of Consortium ..............................................................422
                
                  V. MOTION TO AMEND AND RELATED MOTIONS ................................................422
                 VI. CONCLUSION .........................................................................424
                

This is a personal injury damages action based on Maryland products liability law. It is a unique case in that the claims arise out an alleged defect which disabled the very safety apparatus — a form of "dead man" lever — that was designed into the product — a snow thrower — as a result, in part, of prior products liability claims. The particular alleged failure of the safety feature had never been reported in a prior accident and the alleged failure never has been replicated, in either a controlled experiment or in the ordinary use of any snow thrower. "[S]ometimes truth is stranger than fiction."1 It will fall to the jury to determine whether that venerable maxim applies in this case.

I. INTRODUCTION

The case is here on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction; it was instituted by James and Nancy Shreve in state court and timely removed by defendants. The Shreves seek damages for injuries James Shreve (hereinafter "Shreve") suffered while he used a Craftsman brand snow thrower, and for loss of consortium. Defendants are Sears, Roebuck and Company, from whom Shreve purchased the snow thrower, and Murray, Inc., the manufacturer of the snow thrower. Discovery has concluded and now pending are the following motions: (1) defendants' motion to exclude the testimony of the Shreves' expert witness; (2) the Shreves' reciprocal motion to exclude the testimony of the defendants' experts; (3) the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment; (4) the Shreves' motion to file a second amended complaint (and certain discovery-related motions arising therefrom); and (5) the Shreves' motions to compel.

The motions have been fully briefed and a hearing has been held, during which I examined the snow thrower with counsel. For the reasons set forth in Part III below, defendants' motion to exclude the testimony of the Shreves' expert shall be granted; the Shreves' reciprocal motion to exclude the testimony of the defendants' experts shall be denied. In Part IV below, I explain why defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted in part and denied in part, and the Shreves' motion for summary judgment denied. In the circumstances of this case, as defendants largely concede, even without their expert witness, the plaintiffs may nonetheless present their strict liability design defect claim, as well as their implied warranty claim, to the jury. In Part V below, I explain why I shall deny plaintiffs' motion to amend and the discovery motions, including the motions to compel.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Shreve is 56 years old and has been employed as a carpentry foreman for 32 years. He is right-handed. He has continued to work as a carpentry foreman since the events at issue in this case on the same terms as prior to the accident, but he experiences trouble completing carpentry tasks and other tasks of daily life.

On September 20, 1997, Shreve purchased a Craftsman brand snow thrower from Sears at a store in Baltimore County. The snow thrower was manufactured by Murray. The snow thrower is a walk behind, self propelled snow thrower with an eight horsepower gasoline engine. It is equipped with an electric/recoil start system, six forward and two reverse speeds controlled by a speed shift lever, and a throttle to control fuel feed.

The snow thrower is designed to remove snow from ground surfaces. It has a wide, rotating screw auger at the front that is geared to high speed rotating impeller blades. As the snow thrower is advanced into accumulated snow, the auger gathers the snow and forces it into the impeller blade chamber. The four impeller blades then capture the snow and thrust it out a vertical discharge chute. This chute has an adjustable deflector plate, and the entire discharge chute can be adjusted so that snow can be thrown to either side of the machine. The motor will not turn on unless the ignition key is in place.

The output shaft of the engine is fitted with two belt pulleys. One belt drives the road wheels. The second belt drives a shaft on which is mounted the impeller and a gear that drives the auger. The snow thrower is equipped with continuous activation engagement controls for both the traction and auger/impeller drives (hereinafter "dead man" controls or levers). Power to both of these mechanical drives is interrupted when the operator releases the "dead man" controls. A braking mechanism is also applied to the auger/impeller when the auger/impeller control is released. These levers are spring mounted on the handle bar of the snow thrower and are designed to be depressed when the person operating the machine is in the safest position for operation. In the idling position, the belt between the pulleys is slack and so is not turned by the drive pulley. When the "dead man" levers are depressed, they engage the idler pulley against the drive belt, which tightens the belt and causes it to have traction against the drive pulley and to turn. The lever on the left hand side of the handle bar controls the machine's traction drive. The lever on the right hand side controls the auger drive.

The auger and impeller blades grind the snow, and the impeller blades force the snow up through the discharge chute, expelling the snow from the machine. The discharge chute is located above the impeller blades and, as mentioned above, it can be adjusted to point either to the left or to the right, depending on the direction in which the operator wants to expel the snow. The chute is spherical and approximately six to ten inches in diameter. It is not fully enclosed but is open on one side. At the time it was manufactured and at the time Shreve purchased it, the snow thrower conformed to all applicable industry standards (and it so conforms today).

Shreve purchased the snow thrower for home use. He had not previously owned or used a snow thrower. The snow thrower came fully assembled. It was accompanied by an Owner's Operating Manual.2 Before he used the snow thrower, Shreve read the Owner's Manual, and he understood its contents. The Manual contained...

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