Reed v. State

• Decision Date: 13 October 1972
• Citation: 295 A.2d 657
• Parties: William H. REED v. STATE of Maine et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 657

295 A.2d 657

William H. REED v. STATE of Maine et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 13, 1972.

Paine, Cohen & Lynch, by William S. Cohen, Bangor, for plaintiff.

John W. Benoit, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendants.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WERNICK, and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

WERNICK, Justice.

On May 20, 1965 petitioner was tried and found guilty by a jury in the Superior Court (Penobscot County) and was thus adjudged convicted of murder. Because he sought direct review of his conviction-and pursuant to the then requirement of 15 M.R.S.A. § 1701 concerning a conviction of an offense punishable only by life imprisonment-sentencing of petitioner (mandatorily to life imprisonment) was postponed until after a final decision had been rendered by the Law Court. On September 15, 1967, after decision of the Law Court had been produced, ¹ petitioner was sentenced to serve the remainder of his natural life in the State Prison. On the same day petitioner entered the State Prison.

During the approximately twenty-seven months between his conviction ² and the imposition of sentence petitioner had been continuously confined in the Penobscot County Jail.

Petitioner now maintains that he is entitled to have this time during which he was confined in jail taken into account in the determination of his eligibility for parole under 34 M.R.S.A. § 1672(3). ³

Since the Warden of the Maine State Prison refused to grant petitioner credit toward his parole eligibility for any time spent by him in the Penobscot County Jail prior to September 15, 1967, as an incident of which refusal petitioner becomes deprived of opportunity for good behavior time deduction computed on said time period, an actual controversy has arisen.

Petitioner's position in the dispute is that the denial of credit to him-in the accounting to determine his eligibility for parole-for the time spent by him in jail between his conviction and sentencing, as well as good behavior deductions in connection therewith, (1) renders unconstitutional 15 M.R.S.A. § 1701 (the statute which required postponement of petitioner's sentencing until after the Law Court's decision on its direct review of the conviction)-as violative of the federal Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, and (2) alternatively, results in a violation of rights conferred upon petitioner by changes of the law of Maine occurring effective December 1, 1965-when the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure went into effect and 15 M.R.S.A. § 1701 was repealed.

In an effort to vindicate his position in the controversy and to achieve legal relief, petitioner initiated a proceeding in the Superior Court utilizing as his operative vehicle, ostensibly, a motion for correction of sentence under Rule 35(a) M.R.Crim.P. ⁴ The Justice of the Superior Court, correctly viewing the issues of law involved as complex and important, reported the case to this Court for decision upon an Agreed Statement of Facts, under Rule 37A(a) M.R.Crim.P.

Rule 35(a) M.R.Crim.P., allowing for the correction and revision of any sentence, explicitly limits the time within which such action may be taken to the period within sixty days from the time the sentence was imposed. The limitation is operative even when the sentence was 'an illegal sentence or . . . imposed in an illegal manner.' Since the sixty day period of limitation had long since passed when petitioner instituted the proceeding, relief would be required to be denied petitioner under Rule 35(a) M.R.Crim.P.

We are of opinion, however, that the present proceeding, regardless of the formal designations petitioner has attached to it, may be treated, substantively, as invoking the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to afford collateral post-conviction relief. We so regard it. ⁵

In Green v. State, Me., 245 A.2d 147 (1968) this Court clarified that post-conviction remedy can be available through the vehicle of statutorily prescribed post-conviction 'habeas corpus', pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5502 et seq. (and implementing Rule 35(b) M.R.Crim.P.), even though the relief appropriately requisite to be afforded goes beyond

'. . . release of the petitioner or corrections of errors of law appearing on the face of the record, . . . (and) includes relief beyond the sphere of remedial action . . .' (p. 151)

and as might have been previously allowable under

'. . . remedies with . . . limited and fixed common law connotations, . . ..' (p. 150)

This Court further elucidated in Higgins v. Robbins, Me., 265 A.2d 90 (1970) that 'habeas corpus', as provided by 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5502 et seq. and Rule 35(b) M.R.Crim.P., is not the exclusive mechanism under which the Superior Court has jurisdiction to afford post-conviction remedy. Such relief is also available by resort to the 'declaratory judgment' jurisdiction of the Superior Court, in accordance with 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951 et seq. Higgins v. Robbins, supra, explained that even though the statutory post-conviction 'habeas corpus'

". . . comprehends and takes the place of all other common law remedies . . . heretofore . . . available for challenging the validity of a conviction and sentence . . ." (p. 92),

since

'. . . declaratory judgment is obviously not a common law remedy, . . .' (p. 92)

jurisdiction exists in the Superior Court, to be exercised with sound discretion, to provide appropriately requisite post-conviction relief through the mechanism of 'declaratory judgment' under 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951 et seq. (in addition to 'habeas corpus' procedures pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5502 et seq.).

The present proceeding may be molded, therefore, into a collateral post-conviction case under either the 'habeas corpus' route of 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5502 et seq. or the 'declaratory judgment' road of 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951 et seq.

We here confront a situation in which, to grant appropriate relief to petitioner if his rights are found to have been violated, we might be obliged to go beyond the post-conviction 'habeas corpus' extensions as reviously developed in Green, supra,-in which this Court required that credit be given in satisfaction of a sentence to the State Prison for prior time already served by the prisoner in the State Prison under another sentence held to be invalid. In the case at bar, we face the prospect that it might be necessary to adjudicate that time during which petitioner was confined in the Penobscot County Jail rather than in the State Prison shall be taken into account to allow a legally correct determination of when petitioner first becomes eligible for parole in the service of his sentence to life imprisonment.

For this reason, and although it is stated in Green, supra, that

'. . . post-conviction habeas corpus . . . must be given such reasonable flexibility within the spirit of the statutory enactment that it may be an effective procedural vehicle for collaterally reaching all fundamental defects in the administration of criminal justice.' (245 A.2d p. 150),

we believe it more consonant with the nature of the relief, if any, ultimately to be allowed petitioner in the instant situation that 'declaratory judgment' be utilized as the operative vehicle, rahter than statutory post-conviction 'habeas corpus.' ⁶

We, therefore, treat the present proceeding as one directed to the attainment of post-conviction remedy through the rendition by the Superior Court of a declaratory judgment, to be accompanied by such coercive relief as might be found appropriate-all pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951 et seq. Furthermore, we treat the report of the case upon agreed statement of facts (insofar as the case has become the report of a declaratory judgment proceeding) as being pursuant to Rule 72(b) M.R.C.P.

The postponement of the imposition of the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment upon petitioner (until after the direct review of his conviction had been decided by the Law Court) was, unquestionably, required by the prevailing law of the State as it had then been definitively established under 15 M.R.S.A. § 1701, as judicially interpreted by State v. Chase, 149 Me. 80, 99 A.2d 71 (1953) and State v. Rainey, 149 Me. 92, 99 A.2d 78 (1953). ⁷

As of December 1, 1965, however, this previously established law was definitively changed. Rule 32(a) M.R.Crim.P., effective December 1, 1965 required that in every case, without exception, 'sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay'; and to ensure that all statutory provisions would be consistent with the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, 15 M.R.S.A. § 1701 (allowing the exception for the special situation of sentences to life imprisonment) was repealed. (P.L.1965, Chapter 356, § 54). ⁸

A euphemistic characterization of the history of this case from and after December 1, 1965 is that there was oversight by all parties concerned,-the prosecuting authorities, the judiciary and the petitioner himself.

Although the law had been definitively changed, and it was explicitly provided by Rule 59 M.R.Crim.P. that the requirement of Rule 32(a) M.R.Crim.P. (for sentence to be imposed 'without unreasonable delay') shall apply to all proceedings then pending on December 1, 1965 unless it 'would not be feasible or would work injustice', petitioner remained unsentenced for a further period of more than twenty-one months-from December 1, 1965 until September 15, 1967.

Clearly, petitioner as of December 1, 1965, was involved in a proceeding which was 'then pending.' It was 'feasible' and, indeed, would have averted rather than worked injustice to have had petitioner brought before the Court for sentencing 'without unreasonable delay' after December 1, 1965.

We conclude that in the type of proceeding now before us, because of the nature of the case as aimed at collateral post-conviction remedy, we should avoid reaching the constitutional issues raised by petitioner and confine our decision to the effects of the alleged violation of...