Reed v. State Dept. of Labor
| Decision Date | 14 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. S-05-1473.,S-05-1473. |
| Citation | 717 N.W.2d 899,272 Neb. 8 |
| Parties | Beverly A. REED, appellant, v. STATE of Nebraska DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and Fernando Lecuona III, Commissioner of Labor, appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Riko E. Bishop, of Perry, Guthery, Haase & Gessford, P.C., L.L.O., Lincoln, for appellant.
John H. Albin, Thomas A. Ukinski, and W. Russell Barger, Lincoln, for appellees.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear) laid off appellant, Beverly A. Reed, early in 2004. Reed was eligible to apply for trade readjustment allowance (TRA) benefits under 19 U.S.C. § 2291 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) of the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act), a federal unemployment benefits program administered by the states to assist workers who were laid off because of foreign trade competition. Nebraska Workforce Development (Workforce Development) failed to notify Reed of her rights and eligibility under the Trade Act as an "oversight." Reed missed the deadline to apply for TRA benefits, as interpreted by both the state and the federal Departments of Labor, and Workforce Development denied her benefits application as untimely.
Reed appealed the denial of benefits, arguing that the plain language of the statute does not support the state Department of Labor's interpretation of the deadline and that even if it does, Workforce Development is equitably estopped from enforcing the deadline against her. We affirm the district court's order that Reed's application was properly denied as untimely because Congress, when adopting the new deadlines, rejected the interpretation which Reed advocates.
The facts are not disputed. Goodyear employed Reed from March 26, 1987, to January 31, 2004, when she was laid off. On January 29, 2003, the U.S. Department of Labor certified that employees laid off from Goodyear on or after December 18, 2001, would be eligible to apply for benefits under the Trade Act.
The U.S. Secretary of Labor appoints individual state agencies to administer the TRA benefits program; in Nebraska, the Secretary of Labor designated Workforce Development as that state agency. Paul Elkins of Workforce Development conceded at the administrative hearing that Reed's separation from employment fell "within the certification parameters." Elkins also explained that the Trade Act affirmatively requires his office to send notification letters to those eligible for Trade Act benefits even when the employer does not provide a list of affected employees. Elkins conceded that Goodyear had notified Workforce Development of Reed's separation, but that Reed received no notice. Elkins described this as an oversight. He explained that his office copies and files every notification letter sent to eligible employees and confirmed that the Goodyear file lacked a copy of Reed's notification letter.
Reed also confirmed that Workforce Development never sent her information about her rights under the Trade Act. She explained that she had heard from other Goodyear employees that "we may be eligible for benefits," but that Goodyear's human resources employee told Reed during her initial meetings about unemployment benefits and that Workforce Development would contact her if she was eligible for other benefits. Reed stated that she did not question the lack of correspondence initially because she knew she had 1 year in which Goodyear could recall her. She also admitted she did not press Workforce Development about further benefits because she experienced a family crisis that occupied much of her time and because the unemployment benefits she received enabled her to cover expenses without worrying about her financial situation right away.
In September 2004, Reed's family crisis abated and finances became a concern. She had still not heard from Workforce Development about additional benefits, so she contacted Workforce Development on September 23. After meeting with a Workforce Development employee on October 1, the employee informed Reed that she would have been eligible for TRA benefits but that the deadline to apply had passed.
Reed filed a training approval request form, initiating the TRA benefits process. Nonetheless, Workforce Development denied Reed's application for training approval because she had not applied for benefits within the "8/16 week deadline." Elkins explained that under the Trade Act, applicants have 8 weeks after the certification date or 16 weeks after their separation date to apply for benefits. Elkins explained that the only remedy the office has when an employee is overlooked is a 45-day extension for extenuating circumstances, but that Reed first contacted his office in the fall of 2004, which exceeded even the extended deadline. Elkins informed Reed of the appeal process, and Reed initiated this appeal. Reed stated that had she been properly informed, she would have taken the steps to meet the deadlines.
Reed assigns that the district court erred when interpreting the Trade Act and erred by concluding that equitable estoppel did not apply in this case.
An aggrieved party may obtain review of any judgment or final order entered by a district court under the Administrative Procedure Act. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0001 v. State, 260 Neb. 108, 615 N.W.2d 441 (2000). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 84-917(5)(a) (Reissue 1999) provides that "[w]hen the petition instituting proceedings for review is filed in the district court on or after July 1, 1989, the review shall be conducted by the court without a jury de novo on the record of the agency . . . ." Under such circumstances, the court may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the agency or remand the cause for further proceedings. § 84-917(6)(b).
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of the conclusions reached by the trial court. White v. White, 271 Neb. 43, 709 N.W.2d 325 (2006).
This case presents the question whether Workforce Development could deny Reed the opportunity to apply for TRA benefits for missing the training application deadline when the agency failed to inform her of her eligibility. The answer is shrouded in a fog of federal statutes and regulations.
Workforce Development and the state Department of Labor argue that 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(5)(A) provides explicit deadlines for applying for TRA benefits and that by failing to comply with those deadlines, Reed is ineligible for TRA benefits.
The Trade Act provides in relevant part:
(a) Trade readjustment allowance conditions
Payment of a trade readjustment allowance shall be made to an adversely affected worker covered by a certification. . . who files an application for such allowance for any week of unemployment which begins more than 60 days after the date on which the petition that resulted in such certification was filed under section 2271 of this title, if the following conditions are met:
. . . .
(B) has, after the date on which the worker became totally separated, or partially separated, from the adversely affected employment, completed a training program approved by the Secretary under section 2296(a) of this title, or
(C) has received a written statement under subsection (c)(1) of this section after the date described in subparagraph (B).
(Emphasis supplied.) 19 U.S.C. § 2291. Subsections 2291(a)(5)(A)(ii)(I) and (II) are commonly referred to as the "8/16 week deadline." The state Department of Labor argues that the petition certifying Goodyear employees as eligible for TRA benefits occurred before Reed's actual layoff, so Reed had until the last day of the 16th week after her layoff, May 22, 2004, to enroll in training or request a training waiver. Further, the state Department of Labor argues that even with the additional 45-day extension for extenuating circumstances, Reed missed the deadline because the 45-day extension would only extend the deadline to July 6, 2004, whereas Reed did not initiate contact with Workforce Development until September 23, 2004-124 days after the 16-week deadline.
The state Department of Labor relies on the assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of Labor Training and Employment Guidance Letter No. 11-02, change 1, 69 Fed.Reg. 60903 (Oct. 13, 2004), as support. The letter provides:
Section 114 of the 2002 amendments, which amended section 231(a)(5)(A) of the Trade Act, imposed a deadline by which a worker must be enrolled in approved training, or have a waiver of this requirement, in order to be eligible for TRA.
This deadline is either the last day of the 8th week after the week of issuance of the certification of eligibility covering the worker or the last day of the 16th week after the worker's most recent total qualifying separation, whichever is later (commonly referred to as the 8/16 week deadline). The "8/16 week deadline" applies to eligibility for all TRA, both basic and additional TRA. If a worker fails to...
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