Reed v. State

• Citation: 287 S.E.2d 205,249 Ga. 52
• Decision Date: 17 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 38197,38197
• Parties: Floyd William REED v. The STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 205

287 S.E.2d 205

249 Ga. 52

Floyd William REED v. The STATE.

No. 38197.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 17, 1982.

William Jerry Westbrook, Westbrook & Vines, Summerville, for Floyd William Reed.

D. L. Lomenick, Dist. Atty., LaFayette, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., for the State.

GREGORY, Justice.

Appellant, Floyd William Reed, was convicted in Chattooga County of murdering his wife, Ruby Reed.

Appellant and the victim lived in a trailer several hundred feet from Peach Orchard Road in Chattooga County. Prior to the date of the offense, the couple had been separated for about three weeks. On the morning of October 16, 1980, appellant met Melvin Burrage, the husband of the victim's niece, Wanda Burrage. Mr. Burrage told appellant that Ruby wanted to see him. According to Mr. Burrage's testimony, "[Appellant] said that if Ruby wouldn't live with him, he wasn't going to do nothing for her... [H]e said, I love Ruby with all my heart, but says, if I can't live with her, I'll kill her."

Appellant went to see the victim at her mother's house. He testified that a reconciliation took place. Later in the evening of the same day, appellant, the victim, and Mr. and Mrs. Burrage were all at the Reed's trailer, apparently to spend the night.

Around 10:30 P. M., while Mr. Burrage, who had been working on his truck, was taking a shower, appellant and the victim got in their car to leave. The victim, who was driving, told Mrs. Burrage that they were just going to the store to get something to make sandwiches. Mrs. Burrage watched from the porch as the car proceeded down the driveway. Almost 300 feet from the trailer the driveway turned 90? to the left. Just after the car reached this turn, Mrs. Burrage saw the car stop, back up, go forward, and then back up again. Mrs. Burrage assumed they had changed their minds about going to the store, and went inside the trailer. Five or ten minutes later, appellant returned to the trailer claiming he could not find Ruby and didn't know where she was. Appellant and the Burrages walked to the car, which was still at the curve in the driveway. The victim was not in the car nor could she be seen nearby in the darkness. The Burrages, thinking that the victim had perhaps become angry and had taken a walk to cool off, began walking toward the road.

Then, Mr. Burrage testified, "[we] heard Floyd crank the car up, and we seen him go into motion, trying to back up, and it wouldn't back up, and he gave it the gas. When it finally did back up, the back of the car raised up and fell down, and he did that twice; pulled up, backed up and started over the third time. That's when we got back to the car and stopped him." Mrs. Burrage discovered the victim lying behind the automobile. She appeared to be dead. Appellant went with the Burrages to a neighbor's house to call the police. Appellant told the Burrages it was an accident, that Ruby must have had a heart attack.

Dr. Larry Howard, who conducted the autopsy, found no evidence of a heart attack. The cause of death was a crushing injury to the chest. Dr. Howard noted abrasions on the victim's body that were obviously tire marks, and burns caused by an exhaust pipe. He concluded from his examination that Mrs. Reed had been run over at least twice before she died and at least once afterwards.

The evidence in this case meets the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). "A review of the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution convinces us that a rational factfinder could readily have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt..." 443 U.S. at 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2792.

(1) In his first enumeration of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in appointing the court reporter as interpreter.

Appellant suffers from a speech impediment which makes him difficult to understand. Appellant filed a motion requesting that appellant's sister be allowed to act as an interpreter during appellant's testimony. See Code Ann. § 38-1609. ¹ The State objected that appellant's sister might not be an impartial interpreter. The trial court suggested using the court reporter as an interpreter. Appellant's counsel agreed that would be a "very good" way to handle the matter.

"The use of an interpreter, and the extent to which he may be used in the examination of a witness, must necessarily lie within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Hensley v. State, 228 Ga. 501, 186 S.E.2d 729 (1972)." LaCount v. State, 237 Ga. 181, 227 S.E.2d 31 (1976). We find no abuse of discretion here especially in view of appellant's agreement to the procedure.

Appellant, however, contends the court reporter who reported his trial (not the one who had reported the hearing on his motion) was unable to act in the dual role of both court reporter and interpreter. The trial court instructed the jury that if anyone could not understand an answer, he should raise his hand. Despite these instructions, on two occasions a juror spoke up to indicate he could not understand an answer. Furthermore, on six occasions, a juror spoke up to interpret an answer of appellant's.

Appellant contends these actions by the jury resulting from the appointment of the court reporter as interpreter, amounted to jury participation in his trial of the type forbidden by Stinson v. State, 151 Ga.App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979), and require reversal of his conviction. We disagree.

First, most of appellant's testimony needed no repeating, ² and it is obvious that the jury was able to understand his testimony. Appellant was not, as he contends, deprived of his right to testify in his own behalf.

Secondly, Stinson involved jury interrogation of witnesses. See, also, Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252(4), 244 S.E.2d 833 (1978). The two jurors here who spoke up to say they couldn't understand an answer were not interrogating the witness, nor do the six instances of jury interpretation of appellant's testimony amount to jury interrogation. Those six jurors were not asking questions and eliciting answers from appellant; they were merely repeating an answer appellant had just given. Appellant does not now contend he was interpreted incorrectly, and in four of the six instances, appellant immediately agreed with the juror's interpretation. While the trial court might, as a better practice, have instructed the jury to let the court reporter supply the interpretations of appellant's answers, in view of appellant's failure at any time during the trial to object to the practice now complained of, we find no reversible error.

(2) Appellant also contends in his first enumeration of error that the trial court erred in failing to administer an oath to the court reporter prior to appellant's testimony. Since appellant failed to make a timely objection to the lack of an oath and since appellant shows no resulting harm from this failure, we need not consider this contention further. Rhodes v. State, 122 Ga. 568, 50 S.E. 361 (1905).

(3) In his second enumeration of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in-camera inspection. Appellant filed a four page pretrial "Motion for Discovery and to Compel Disclosure and Request for Documents" containing sixteen broad requests to disclose information and produce documents. His final request was for anything that might be exculpatory within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). At the hearing on appellant's motion, the State provided appellant with the specifically requested documents which did exist and offered to let appellant examine the State's files. Appellant then argued, as he argues here on appeal, that he believed an examination of the prosecuting attorney's files would be unproductive since it usually contains little material or potentially exculpatory information, whereas the prosecuting officer's file contains all the witnesses' statements and other material evidence which has been gathered in investigating the case and preparing for trial which could be exculpatory. Appellant requested an in-camera inspection of the State's files which the trial judge denied.

In Tribble v. State, 248 Ga. 274(1), 280 S.E.2d 352 (1981), we held that a "trial court is not required to conduct an in-camera inspection of the State's file in connection with a 'general' Brady motion unless, after the state has made its response to the motion, the defense makes a request for such an inspection." We did not explain what impact an offer by the prosecution to open its files to the defendant would have upon such a request. We did, however, in Division 2 of that opinion, explain that when faced with a "specific" Brady motion, a prosecutor could properly respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge. 248 Ga. at 276, 280 S.E.2d 352. Consistent with that reasoning, we now hold that the State may, if it chooses, avoid the necessity of such an in-camera inspection, where it is required following a "general" Brady motion, by opening the State's files to the defendant. We stress, however, that this is merely an option available to the State, and that there is no requirement that a prosecuting attorney must open his files to a defendant. See, Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970).

In any event, this appellant has not met his burden of showing how his case has been materially prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to make an in-camera inspection. Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 396, 207 S.E.2d 30 (1974). We adhere to this rule. Here, as in the case of Hill v. State, 248 Ga. 304, 305, 283 S.E.2d 252 (1981), the "appellant has not come forward with anything to suggest a suppression of material, exculpatory information by the State. The burden is on the appellant to establish a Brady violation; and this burden has not been...