Reed v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-cv-01155-STA-jay
• Parties: SYMANTHA REED, CHARLES GOEZ, JAMES SPAULDING, GARY CRAWFORD, WENDY WHARTON, MICHELLE WHITEHEAD, Plaintiffs, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

SYMANTHA REED, CHARLES GOEZ, JAMES SPAULDING, GARY CRAWFORD, WENDY WHARTON, MICHELLE WHITEHEAD, Plaintiffs, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Defendant.

No. 21-cv-01155-STA-jay

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division

June 14, 2022

ORDER PARITALLY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PARTIALLY DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

S THOMAS ANDERSON CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Symantha Reed, Charles Goez, James Spaulding, Gary Crawford Wendy Wharton, and Michelle Whitehead filed this action in the Dyer County Chancery Court against their employer Tyson Foods, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Tyson Foods violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 3; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12010 et seq.; the Nuremberg Code; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3; the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq.; the Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103 et seq.; and Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-1-101 et seq., by requiring them to be vaccinated with the COVID-19 vaccine prior to November 1, 2021, or else go on unpaid leave 1 without the assurance of ever reclaiming their jobs. Plaintiffs also allege a state common law claim of assault. (Amd. Cmplt., No. 21.) Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief that Tyson Foods violated the THRA, TDA, and state tort law, and injunctive relief enjoining Tyson Foods from discriminating against employees by refusing to grant religious or health accommodations to its COVID-19 vaccine mandate as well as damages.

Defendant Tyson Foods removed the action on October 15, 2021, asserting that this Court has jurisdiction over the matter under diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332 and federal officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). (ECF No. 1.) On November 3, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to remand finding that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 18, 2021. (ECF No. 21.)

Defendant has now filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiffs have responded to the motion (ECF No. 32), and Defendant has filed a reply to the response. (ECF No. 37.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENIED.

Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint may be attacked for failure “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a Court will presume that all the factual allegations in the complaint are true and will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Total Benefits Planning Agency v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)). “The court need not, however, accept unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)).

Even though a “complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). Instead, the plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). That is, a complaint must contain enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim becomes plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the Court cannot “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but has not ‘show[n]' - ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id.

Analysis

Plaintiffs have brought twelve claims in their amended complaint. Many of those claims are based on the underlying premise that Defendant is a government or state actor, ^[1] specifically the claims alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (claim one); the RFRA (claim five); the FDCA (claim eight); the Nuremberg Code (claim nine); and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (claim ten). Plaintiffs rely, in part, on the Court's previous finding of federal officer jurisdiction in support of their contention that Defendant acted as a government or state actor during the events giving rise to this lawsuit while Defendant argues that removal under the federal officer removal statute did not transform it into a government actor. The Court will address this issue first.

A review of the Court's order denying Plaintiffs' motion to remand and finding federal officer jurisdiction is informative. In that order (ECF No. 20), the Court explained that the federal officer removal statute permits a defendant to remove to federal court a state court action for an act made while the defendant was acting under an agency or officer of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). That is, the removal statute applies to private persons when they “lawfully assist” a federal officer “in the performance of his official duty, ” Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 150-57 (2007) (quoting Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 600 (1883)), while the private party is “authorized to act with or for [the federal officer] in affirmatively executing duties under . . . federal law.” City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966). A Court will find federal officer removal to be appropriate when “the defendant (1) is a person within the meaning of the statute, (2) is acting under the United States, its agencies, or its officers, (3) is acting under color of federal authority, and (4) has a colorable federal defense.” Betzner v. Boeing Co., 910 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018).

In its response to the motion to remand, Defendant argued that it acted under a federal officer pursuant to President Donald J. Trump's April 28, 2020 Executive Order which expressly invoked the President's authority under the Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq. The Executive Order directed meat and poultry processing companies, such as Defendant, to stay open and continue operations, subject to the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture. See Food Supply Chain Resources, 85 Fed.Reg. at 26, 313, 2020 WL 2060381, at *1. Defendant reasoned that, because it is operating under the DPA and supervision from the Secretary of Agriculture, removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) was warranted. That is, removal was proper because Defendant is a “person” within the meaning of the statute who “acted under the direction of a federal officer” and its actions were for or related to acts performed under color of federal office. See Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1085 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that a defendant seeking removal under § 1442(a)(1) must establish that it is a “person” who “acted under” a federal officer). The Court adopted Defendant's reasoning, relying in part on Fields v. Brown, 519 F.Supp.3d 388 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2021), and Wazelle v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2021 WL 2637335 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021). Wazelle and Fields concluded that Tyson Foods (also a defendant in those cases) acted under a federal officer because it worked closely with the government to “guarantee that there was an adequate food supply” for the country. Wazelle, 2021 WL 2637335, at *4 (explaining that the Department of Agriculture and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (“FSIS”) “closely monitored Tyson Foods' meatpacking plants, staffing some employees onsite during the pandemic, ” and that “Congress even allocated additional funding to FSIS to ensure that they had the resources” to supervise meatpacking plants during the pandemic); Fields, 519 F.Supp. at 393 (same).

This Court also found persuasive the following reasoning of Wazelle and Fields. “When a national emergency was declared in response to the COVID-19 pandemic on March 13, 2020, Tyson Foods, along with other components of the Food and Agriculture Sector, was designated as critical infrastructure.” Fields, 519 F.Supp.3d at 392. From that point forward, Tyson Foods “interacted, ” “collaborat[ed], ” and “work[ed] directly with” federal officers to assist the U.S. government to fulfill the government's responsibility of “guarantee[ing] that there was an adequate food supply.” Id. at 293. “Accordingly, . . . [Tyson was] ‘acting under' the directions of federal officials” from the time of the national emergency declaration. Wazelle, 2021 WL 2637335, at *5.

Section 1442(a)(1) additionally requires that a defendant removing a case demonstrate that the alleged conduct by the defendant is for, or relates to, an act under color of federal office. A plaintiff's...