Reed v. White

• Decision Date: 22 March 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-MI-611
• Citation: 167 N.E.3d 739 (Table)
• Parties: Anthony Wayne REED, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Leann WHITE and Darrin Chaney, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

167 N.E.3d 739 (Table)

Anthony Wayne REED, Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.Leann WHITE and Darrin Chaney, Appellees-Defendants.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-MI-611

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED March 22, 2021

Appellant Pro Se: Anthony Wayne Reed, South Bend, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellees: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, David A. Arthur, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In 2015, Anthony Reed was an inmate at the Putnamville Correctional Facility ("PCF") in Greencastle, Indiana. Reed made four crosses attached to necklaces and attempted to send them to his family members. Clerical assistant, Leann White, discovered that three of the necklaces were returned due to insufficient postage, prompting Darrin Chaney, the internal affairs investigator and Security Threat Group ("STG") Coordinator at PCF, to confiscate the necklaces as contraband. Inmates at PCF are prohibited from possessing jewelry, as it may indicate gang affiliation. Reed felt that his personal property had been confiscated in an unfair manner and that he was entitled to its return in accordance with prison policy. Moreover, Reed contended that he had not received the proper, formal notice of the confiscation.

[2] After exhausting his administrative remedies, Reed filed suit in Putnam County Circuit Court. The trial court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and Reed successfully appealed. On remand, White and Chaney moved for summary judgment as to all claims, which the trial court granted. Finding that Reed's claims are unauthorized under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and that Reed has not asserted a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we affirm.

Issue

[3] Reed raises numerous issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to White and Chaney on all claims.

Facts

[4] The facts, as stated in Reed's prior appeal, follow:

On December 11, 2015, Reed, who was then incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Facility ("PCF"), mailed four handmade crosses to family members. However, on December 30, two envelopes containing three of the crosses were returned to PCF for insufficient postage. Reed was notified of the problem, but the crosses were not returned to him, and he was not able to resend them to his family members. Reed later learned that White, who worked in the PCF mail room,^[1] had confiscated the crosses.^[2] White, in turn, gave the crosses to Chaney, an internal affairs officer for the PCF Security Threat Group ("STG").^[3]

After Reed filed an informal grievance with PCF on January 20, 2016, he was informed that "STG policy 02-03-105 prohibits the possession, making or display of any handmade jewelry (rings, necklaces and bracelets) by [the] offender population as these items can be used to show STG [sic] affiliation by utilizing color and symbols." Appellant's App. at 13. Reed responded by stating that the colors used in making the crosses were "not in any way connected with any (known) Gang-memberships." Id. at 15. Reed then filed with the Indiana Department of Correction ("[ ]DOC") a Grievance Appeal, which was denied.

On June 13, Reed filed a tort claim notice with IDOC, and on October 26, Reed filed a complaint against White and Chaney with the trial court. In his complaint, Reed alleged that the reason given for White's confiscation of the crosses was invalid, White did not follow [ ]DOC policies governing the seizure of items in the mail, and White and Chaney committed "criminal conversion" when they took the crosses. Id. at 20. The trial court dismissed Reed's complaint, stating that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "as the Defendants were following [ ]DOC policies and procedures." Appellant's Br. at 12.

Reed v. White , 103 N.E.3d 657, 658-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[5] White and Chaney filed a motion to dismiss all claims, which the trial court granted on July 21, 2017. In an ensuing appeal, a panel of this Court reversed, finding that:

[T]he assertion of immunity is an affirmative defense, and dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is "rarely appropriate when the asserted ground for dismissal is an affirmative defense." Bellwether Prop., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind. , Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 464 (Ind. 2017). Here, if Reed had alleged in his complaint that White and Chaney were acting within the scope of their employment, dismissal under Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-2(a)(2) would have been appropriate. SeeBushong v. Williamson , 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 n.4 (Ind. 2003). But Reed makes no such allegation. Accordingly, looking only at the face of Reed's complaint, there is no basis to dismiss the complaint because of White's and Chaney's possible immunity defenses.

Second, taking the facts stated in Reed's complaint as true, as we must, there was no basis in any IDOC policy for White and Chaney to have confiscated the crosses. To the contrary, Reed alleges that the crosses did not violate the STG policy, and he maintains that White and Chaney's reliance on that stated policy was merely a "pretense" to obscure their alleged theft of Reed's personal property. Appellant's App. at 12. Reed's allegations may prove incorrect at a fact-finding hearing, but they state a claim.

In sum, taking as true all allegations upon the face of Reed's complaint, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint is sufficient under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-5(c) to require White and Chaney to respond thereto. SeeGuillen , 922 N.E.2d at 123 (reversing dismissal of offender's complaint alleging prison officials negligently or deliberately violated both the Indiana Constitution and prison mail rules).

Id. at 660-61.

[6] On remand, White and Chaney moved for summary judgment as to all claims. Reed filed a response. On February 6, 2020, without a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Reed now appeals.

Analysis

[7] Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party shows there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Erie Indem. Co. for Subscribers at Erie Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Harris by Harris , 99 N.E.3d 625, 629 (Ind. 2018) ; see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to designate appropriate evidence to demonstrate the actual existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Schoettmer v. Wright , 992 N.E.2d 702, 705-06 (Ind. 2013).

[8] When ruling on the motion, the trial court construes all evidence and resolves all doubts in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 706. We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we take "care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court." Id. "We limit our review to the materials designated at the trial level." Gunderson v. State, Indiana Dep't of Nat. Res. , 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. (citing Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 73 v. City of Evansville , 829 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. 2005) ). "... [B]ut [we are] constrained to neither the claims and arguments presented at trial nor the rationale of the trial court ruling." Manley v. Sherer , 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013) (citing Woodruff v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. , 964 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind. 2012), cert. denied ) ("We will reverse if the law has been incorrectly applied to the facts. Otherwise, we will affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by evidence in the record."); see also Wagner v. Yates , 912 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009) ("[W]e are not limited to reviewing the trial court's reasons for granting or denying summary judgment but rather we may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by the evidence.").

[9] With respect to prison contraband cases, the legislature has conferred upon the DOC, of which PCF is a part, the authority to determine which property an offender may possess. Ind. Code § 11-11-2-2. "When a prison notifies an offender of what items (s)he may possess, all other property that is not contraband becomes ‘prohibited property.’ " Yisrayl v. Reed , 98 N.E.3d 644, 646–47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Ind. Code § 11-11-2-2 ), trans. denied. "Contraband" is defined as "property the possession of which is in violation of an Indiana or federal statute"; and "[p]rohibited property" is defined as "property other than contraband that the [DOC] does not permit a confined person to possess...." Ind. Code § 11-11-2-1. "The [DOC] may conduct reasonable searches of its facilities and persons confined in them and may seize contraband or prohibited property." Ind. Code § 11-11-2-3(a). When the DOC seizes property, the DOC must "give ... written notice of the seizure," including the date of seizure, identity of the seizing party, grounds for seizure, and the procedure for challenging the seizure. Ind. Code § 11-11-2-4.

[10] The record reflects that Reed did not receive a formal notification including the date of the confiscation and reasons therefore, in contravention of DOC policy and the Indiana Code. Reed relies heavily on this fact. Chaney's explanation for lack of formal notice to Reed differs from the reason for confiscation: the crosses/necklaces were partially comprised of string, which could only have come from the prison itself, rather than being legitimately obtained by Reed from the commissary. Thus, Chaney reasoned, the necklaces were State property, and not offender property subject to the rule requiring formal notice.

[11] As a threshold matter, Reed first contends that this is a specific disputed material fact—namely, whether the necklaces were comprised, in part, of string. We do not find, however, that this is a material issue of fact. String or not,...