Reed v. Wright, No. 06-03-00127-CV (TX 1/20/2005)
| Decision Date | 20 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-03-00127-CV.,06-03-00127-CV. |
| Parties | PETE REED AND WIFE, CARLA REED, Appellants v. PAULETTE WRIGHT, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court, Bowie County, Texas, Trial Court No. 02C0230-005.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CORNELIUS,* JJ.
Two roads diverged in the east Texas piney woods. In 1985, one of them, Goff Road, had been declared public. The other, Cherry Lane,1 the subject of this appeal and formerly the only way the public could access Goff Road, has now been declared private by the trial court after a nonjury trial between appellants, Pete and Clara Reed, and appellee, Paulette Wright. The uncontradicted evidence shows that, though Cherry Lane has not been heavily traveled,2 the public used it for many years—at least twenty-five years before either party entered the picture. And that makes all the difference. Because we hold the evidence conclusively proves Cherry Lane was impliedly dedicated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that Cherry Lane is a public road.
In 1983, Wright purchased a fifteen-acre tract of land from Richard and Mary Couch. Cherry Lane runs across that tract, along its north edge.3 According to the Reeds and other neighbors, Cherry Lane had been used by the public since the early 1950s or before, and Bowie County had maintained and repaired it.
Later in 1983, Charles R. Goff, an owner of land to Wright's south, sued Wright concerning a gate she had erected and locked, blocking public access to the road known as Goff Road, which ran south from the west end of Cherry Lane, across the western edge of Wright's property. Following a 1985 jury trial, that trial court declared Goff Road public. While the judgment in that suit did not address whether Cherry Lane was a public road, the only way the public could access Goff Road was by using Cherry Lane.4
In 1999, the Reeds purchased Lots One and Two in Block One of Meadow Brook Heights Addition—lots which are located on the north side of Cherry Lane at its west end—and built a house there. Although the Reeds could have used exclusively other roads to access their property, they also used Cherry Lane for that purpose. When Wright decided to block access to Cherry Lane, this lawsuit resulted. After a bench trial, the trial court declared Cherry Lane private.
We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that Cherry Lane is a public road. We reach that result because we hold (1) implied dedication was properly at issue at trial, and (2) implied dedication of Cherry Lane was conclusively proven, due to lack of any evidence to rebut the presumption of dedication, which presumption arose since conclusively (A) the origin of Cherry Lane is shrouded in obscurity, and (B) before 1983, the public had made long and continuous use of Cherry Lane.
Before we discuss the substance of implied dedication, we address a procedural matter. On appeal, Wright contends the Reeds' pleadings fail to allege implied dedication. The pleadings alleged that Cherry Lane had been dedicated to public use, but did not specifically plead implied dedication. The record does not indicate that any special exceptions were made concerning this issue.
Pleadings are sufficient if they provide the opponent with fair and adequate notice. Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982); Burke v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 138 S.W.3d 46, 66 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. filed). Pleadings provide fair and adequate notice if they contain information sufficient to allow an opposing party to adequately prepare for trial. Roark, 633 S.W.2d at 810. Further, pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. The Reeds' pleadings contending the road had been dedicated were sufficient to raise the issue of implied dedication.
Even if the pleadings had been insufficient to raise implied dedication, the issue was tried by consent. "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Tex. R. Civ. P. 67. Trial by consent applies in the exceptional case where it clearly appears from the record as a whole that the parties tried an unpled issue. Mastin v. Mastin, 70 S.W.3d 148, 154 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). To determine whether an issue was tried by consent, appellate courts "must examine the record not for evidence of the issue, but rather for evidence of trial of the issue." Mastin, 70 S.W.3d at 154; Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 797 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ). Each side submitted a trial brief addressing implied dedication. The trial court addressed implied dedication in its findings of fact. At a minimum, the parties tried the issue of implied dedication by consent. Implied dedication was properly at issue. We now turn to the substance of the implied dedication issue.
The Reeds assert the evidence conclusively proved implied dedication. We agree, because we hold there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of dedication which arose from the conclusive proof that (A) the origin of Cherry Lane was shrouded in obscurity, and (B) before 1983 the public made long and continuous use of Cherry Lane.
The Reeds appeal from a bench trial. Findings of fact entered in a case tried to the court are of the same force and dignity as a jury's answers to jury questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewable for evidentiary sufficiency by the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidentiary sufficiency to support a jury verdict. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).
When deciding a legal sufficiency point concerning a fact issue, we must consider all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered, and we must apply every reasonable inference that could be made from the evidence in that party's favor. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997); Pilgrim's Pride Corp. v. Smoak, 134 S.W.3d 880, 888-89 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied). We disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995); Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. 1990). A no-evidence point will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable minds about the existence of a vital fact. Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex. 2002).
The trial court addressed only dedicatory intent5 in finding Cherry Lane had not been dedicated. But since the trial court addressed that element, any omitted findings will be deemed to support the judgment if evidence exists to support such findings. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 299; Lindner v. Hill, 691 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. 1985); Norris v. Norris, 56 S.W.3d 333, 345 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
Dedication6 is presumed7 when the public engages in long and continuous use of a road whose origin is "shrouded in obscurity." Graff, 947 S.W.2d at 637; Fazzino, 836 S.W.2d at 274; see O'Connor, 339 S.W.2d at 882; Supak, 56 S.W.3d at 790.
Because the evidence conclusively establishes (A) the origin of Cherry Lane is shrouded in obscurity, and (B) before 1983 the public made long and continuous use of Cherry Lane, a presumption arose that all elements of proof, essential to establish implied dedication, in fact existed. We find no evidence that tended to rebut that presumption.
The origin of Cherry Lane is "shrouded in obscurity," since the record provides no evidence of the identity and no direct evidence of the intent of the owner who originally established the road. Wright contends the presumption of dedication does not apply because William Crain testified he built the road 1965 when he was leasing the field currently owned by Wright. Although Crain did state that he "built" the road, he also testified the "old road" had been there when he "built" it in 1965 and that his business had used the road since 1963, two years before he "built" the road. Crain's father-in-law bought the adjoining Twitty Nursery tract in 1948, and Crain became involved in the business in 1955. In 1998, Crain sold the Twitty Nursery tract to his son-in-law. Crain testified he leased the field currently owned by Wright from 1963 until 1977 or 1978. Crain testified as follows:
[Wright's Counsel]: Who built that road?
[Crain]: I did.
[Wright's Counsel]: When did you build it?
[Crain]: When we — back when we started that farm. The old road was there, but it wasn't much. And in order to get — in bad weather . . .
[Wright's Counsel]: So at the time you built the road, who owned that dirt on which you were building the road.
[Crain]: I don't know.
[Wright's Counsel]: And that's what year when you're building that road?
[Crain]: It was back in probably '65.
Wright also claimed to have "built" the road. The testimony clearly indicates that Crain did not originate the road, he only improved it. Further,...
To continue reading
Request your trial