Reeks v. Seattle Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 September 1909
• Parties: REEKS v. SEATTLE ELECTRIC CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

104 P. 126

54 Wash. 609

REEKS v. SEATTLE ELECTRIC CO.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

September 25, 1909

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Arthur E. Griffin, Judge.

Action by Albert Reeks against the Seattle Electric Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

James B. Howe and A. J. Falknor, for appellant.

Wright & Kelleher, for respondent.

RUDKIN, C.J.

On the 3d day of March, 1907, the plaintiff Reeks was severely injured in a collision between two street cars operated by the defendant company over its line between Ft. Lawton and the city of Seattle. This action was instituted to recover damages for the injuries thus received, and from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000 the present appeal is prosecuted.

Negligence on the part of the appellant company was conceded, and there was no claim of contributory negligence on the part of the respondent, so that the only question submitted for the consideration of the jury was the amount of damages to which the respondent was entitled. Error is assigned in the giving and refusing of instructions, and in the refusal of the court to grant a new trial or reduce the amount of the verdict.

The appellant requested the court to charge the jury as follows 'There is evidence in this case tending to show that plaintiff, who was a carriage maker by trade, has been so injured as to disable him from following that vocation. From this fact alone you are not entitled to conclude that the earning capacity of plaintiff is entirely gone, but it is your duty to determine whether or not other vocations in life are open to him, and, if you believe the plaintiff will be notwithstanding the disablement, able to enter some other vocation and have an earning capacity therein, you are to consider what he would be able to earn therein, and deduct such amount from any injury or loss he will suffer by reason of being disabled from following his present vocation.' The court instructed the jury substantially as requested, except that, instead of directing them to deduct the amount respondent might be able to earn in other employments from the amount he might have earned in his present vocation, it said: 'You may consider such facts in arriving at your verdict.' It is now contended that this modification left it optional with the jury to award a recovery as for a total loss of earning capacity, even though a total loss was not proved. When the instructions of the court are read in their entirety this criticism is unfounded. It is not the province of the court to direct the process or method by which juries shall make up or reach their verdicts. So long as the court laid down the proper measure or rule of damages for the guidance of the jury, the law is satisfied and, considering the charge in this case as a whole, the jury could not have been misled. They were plainly given to understand that the respondent was entitled to recover such damages as resulted from the impairment of his earning capacity and nothing more.

The court further instructed the jury that they might include in their verdict such reasonable...