Rees v. State

Decision Date06 March 1941
Docket NumberNo. 5775.,5775.
Citation149 S.W.2d 184
PartiesREES v. STATE.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from District Court, Morris County; R. T. Wilkinson, Jr., Judge.

Suit by the State of Texas, in behalf of itself and others, against Evan Rees for taxes and foreclosure of tax liens. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Hardy Moore, of Paris, and J. M. Lasater, of Naples, for appellant.

Starnes & Pharr and Edgar Hutchins, all of Greenville, and Boyet Stevens and George French, both of Daingerfield, for appellee.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This is a suit for taxes and for foreclosure of tax lien filed by the State of Texas in behalf of itself, Morris County, and certain political subdivisions of the county, to recover of Evan Rees, defendant below, the sum of $3,188.54 allegedly assessed and due as taxes, interest and costs against twelve tracts of land, aggregating 4,800 acres, owned by defendant. Taxes for the years 1919, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1938, are involved.

To the first amended original petition upon which trial was had, appellant interposed a general demurrer and a general denial. No assignment of error attacks the sufficiency of the amended original petition in stating a cause of action to support the judgment rendered, and its allegations will not be detailed. Appellant urged in his answer and asserts in this appeal that the assessments of taxes so made were invalid, being in contravention of Sections 1 and 20 of Article 8 of the Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., in that the properties were not assessed during the years involved at their fair cash market value, nor on an equal and uniform basis with other property of like kind in the county. The defense urged is more clearly reflected in the following quoted portion of the answer reading, "That in valuing defendant's property for tax purposes during the years involved, the taxing authorities were motivated by a desire to raise a certain amount of revenue for Morris County, without consideration of the value of the property sought to be taxed, and without considering the value of the defendant's property in relation to other property of like kind and that had defendant's property been taxed during the years involved on the same basis as other property of a similar kind in proportion to its value, the taxes would not have amounted to more than 50% of the amount involved in this suit." At the close of the evidence, the court peremptorily instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment was entered against appellant for the amount sued for, together with foreclosure of tax lien against the respective tracts in the amount found to be due against each.

During the years involved this land was assessed at $3 an acre, except at $3.25 for 1932. Appellant's land is situated between White Oak and Sulphur rivers and from 50 per cent to 80 per cent is subject to overflow. Seventy-five acres have been cleared and were cultivated up to 1935. Its chief value comes from its timber and use for grazing purposes. Through the years timber has been cut and is now being cut from the property. The overflows are gradually destroying its value for grazing purposes. Portions of the land from time to time have been under oil and gas leases from which yearly rentals have been received. Appellant's witnesses valued the land at $3 or $4 an acre in 1931; $2.50 in 1938; never worth as much as $3 an acre; $2 an acre since 1931, not over $2 an acre. The Heard tract of land in the general area was assessed for taxes at $4 an acre for 1933, 1934 and 1935, and at $3 for subsequent years. Beggs rendered his tract of 160 acres at $3 or $3.75 an acre. Renditions of two others tracts in the area were $3 or $4 an acre. The testimony did not disclose the valuation placed upon any other real estate situated in other parts of the county. A large part of the evidence dealt with the improvements, extent of overflow, and use of above tracts in comparison with that owned by appellant. It may be said that appellant's land was not as valuable when these various elements are considered.

Appellant did not testify. The evidence does not disclose if appellant did or did not render the property for taxes. If he did, there is no contention made in his pleadings or on this appeal that the Commissioners' Court sitting as a Board of Equalization raised the values of any rendition, nor that the tax assessor did so. It was admitted that the 1919 taxes were properly assessed, and during the trial appellant tendered the amount due on same. The county judge of Morris County for 1929 to 1935, a commissioner of the county for 1930 to 1936, and a deputy tax assessor testified to the schedule or plan used by the county during the period of time to assess property for taxation. The valuation placed on this land and other real estate in Morris County was supposed to represent 60 per cent of its actual value. "We didn't use any method, but as an Equalization Board we tried to get 50% to 60% of the actual value." "We valued the land at 60% of its value." "We valued each farm so much and tried to equalize every farm the same according to what his land was worth and tried to keep it down below the market value; personal property about the same, might have been less than 60% and maybe a little more; bank stock was figured at fifty some-odd." In response to inquiry how bank stock had been assessed, the deputy assessor testified that the capital and surplus of a bank was assessed at 50 per cent; and as high as 55 per cent, but could not say as to 60 per cent; that any land owned by it was figured in as part of the capital.

The county judge testified that in 1932 or 1933 when the county first began to operate under the Budget Law, Vernon's Ann.Civ. St. art. 689a—9 et seq., they...

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3 cases
  • Hengy v. Dallas County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 6
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 19 Diciembre 1946
    ...the appellant for the amount of taxes due. Crocker v. Santo Consolidated Ind. Sch. Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 116 S.W.2d 750; Rees v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W. 2d 184, 185. Wherefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for another On Appellee's Motion for Re......
  • Freeman v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 10 Enero 1947
    ...witness while testifying and that part of said rolls relating to the property in suit was read into the record. See also Rees v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 184, error dismissed. The case of Sparks v. State ex rel. Saltillo Independent School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 27 S.W.2d 918, 921, was......
  • Darby v. Borger Independent School Dist.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 11 Enero 1965
    ... ... No objections to the copies as such were ever made and no request made to compare them with the originals. Under this state of the record we believe the point is without merit. Article 7326, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St.; Stone v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W.2d 937 ... City of Port Neches, Tex.CivApp., 46 S.W.2d 1057 (N.W.H.); Rees v. State, Tex.Civ.App., ... 149 S.W.2d 184 (writ dismissed, judgment correct) ...         The taxing units having made out a prima facie ... ...

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