Reese v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 27 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-06655-DMR |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | KADEEM DESHAUN REESE, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Kadeem Reese moves for summary judgment to reverse the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (the "Commissioner's") final administrative decision, which found Reese not disabled and therefore denied his application for benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. [Docket Nos. 22, 28 ( ), ( ).] The Commissioner cross-moves to affirm. [Docket No. 25 ("Def. Mot.").] For the reasons stated below, the court grants in part Reese's motion, denies the Commissioner's cross-motion, and remands this case for further proceedings.
Reese filed an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits on December 4, 2012,1 alleging disability beginning December 15, 2011. Administrative Record (A.R.) 21. His application was initially denied on August 13, 2013 and again on reconsideration on February 12, 2014. A.R. 89-92, 96-101. On February 28, 2014, Reese filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). A.R. 102-104. ALJ Bradlee S. Welton held a hearing on June 3, 2015.2 A.R. 20-29. Reese did not appear for the hearing, although his counsel at that time, Michael Wolchansky, appeared on his behalf. A.R. 38.
After the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding Reese not disabled. A.R. 20-29. The ALJ determined that Reese has the following severe impairments: cannabis abuse/dependence, cocaine abuse, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), asthma, and depression. A.R. 22. The ALJ found that Reese retains the following residual functional capacity (RFC):
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, dust, and other lung irritants. He is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production work requirements involving only simple, work-related decision-making, with few, if any, workplace changes, and no interaction with the public.
A.R. 23-24. Relying on the opinion of a vocational expert ("VE") who testified that an individual with such an RFC could perform other jobs existing in the economy, including an assembler, an inspector, and a photocopying machine operator, the ALJ concluded that Reese is not disabled. A.R. 28.
The Appeals Council denied Reese's request for review on September 18, 2017. A.R. 1-6. The ALJ's decision therefore became the Commissioner's final decision. Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011). Reese then filed suit in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity3 and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work she previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are as follows:
1. At the first step, the ALJ considers the claimant's work activity, if any. If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled.
2. At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant's impairment(s). If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in [20 C.F.R.] § 416.909, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled.
3. At the third step, the ALJ also considers the medical severity of the claimant's impairment(s). If the claimant has an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the listings in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the "Listings"] and meets the duration requirement, the ALJ will find that the claimant is disabled.
4. At the fourth step, the ALJ considers an assessment of the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and the claimant's past relevant work. If the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled.
5. At the fifth and last step, the ALJ considers the assessment of the claimant's RFC and age, education, and work experience to see if the claimant can make an adjustment to other work. If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99.
Reese did not appear for the hearing before the ALJ that took place on June 3, 2015. A.R. 38. His attorney, Michael Wolchansky, stated that he had not been able to locate Reese, and that he believed Reese was currently homeless. A.R. 39-41, 45. Wolchansky represented that he had last spoken to Reese in February 2015. A.R. 39. The ALJ found that Reese had constructively waived his right to appear. A.R. 38. He further determined that he would issue a Notice to Show Cause to Reese and give Reese ten days to respond. A.R. 38. Wolchansky responded to the request to show cause on Reese's behalf. A.R. 156-57. He represented that he had been out of touch with Reese since February 2015, and at that time, Reese did not have any forwarding address. A.R. 156-57. It appears that another hearing was scheduled for March 22, 2016 (A.R. 161-78) that was then continued to May 4, 2016 (A.R. 181-86). However, there is no information in the record about whether that hearing went forward or what happened at it, and it appears that the ALJ's decision in this case was based only on the proceedings of the June 3, 2015 hearing.
At the hearing, the ALJ reviewed Reese's prior work history to the extent it was available in the record. A.R. 43. Reese previously worked as a machinery assembler. A.R. 43. He also worked at California Conservation Corps doing grounds maintenance and road work; was a prep cook at Six Flags Discovery Kingdom; worked as a cashier at Dollar Tree; served as a barista at a coffee shop; and did gardening work. A.R. 43, 259-264. He last worked around 2010. A.R. 494. The ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE based on the following assumed facts:
Assume a hypothetical person with the same age and education as the claimant, that being 22 years of age with a GED. Further assume this hypothetical person has no exertional limitations; however, must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, and poor ventilation. And work would be limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements involving only simple work-related decisions with few, if any, workplace changes, and no interaction with the public.
A.R. 44. Based on the hypothetical RFC, the VE testified that such an individual could not perform any of Reese's prior positions. A.R. 44. However, she testified that there are other jobs in the labor market that a person with the specified limitations could perform, including as an assembler of electrical accessories, an inspector and hand packager, and a copy-machine operator. A.R. 45.
Reese has seen a variety of treating providers throughout the relevant time span. Since Reese only contests the ALJ's findings as to his mental impairments, the summarized history focuses on treatment and evaluations he received for those impairments.
In July 2006, when Reese was 16 years old, the police were called to his residence. A.R. 380. His adoptive mother told the police that she had ordered Reese to leave the house after he "threatened vengeance on the family." A.R. 380. She said that he hated her and his three siblings and did not want to live with them anymore. A.R. 380. She also reported that the two of them had had a "troubled relationship" for a long time and that she feared that Reese would harm her or one of her children. A.R. 380.
Reese was referred by the police to a child psychiatric evaluation. A.R. 381-86. He told the social worker that he was separated from his biological mother at birth. A.R. 381. Reese stated that he entered foster care and his foster mother adopted him when he was five years old. A.R. 381. He said he had never felt accepted by his foster family, and that they did not care about him. A.R. 381, 384. He told the interviewer that he was always being blamed, called names, and belittled by the family. A.R. 384. He reported that his adoptive mother would slap him on the cheek over and over again. A.R. 384. Reese stated that he had done consistently poorly at school. A.R. 383. He also said he had thoughts of cutting his wrists in the ninth grade. A.R. 381.
During the examination, Reese reported depressive symptoms, including anhedonia, decreased energy, hopelessness, worthlessness, lack of concentration, suicidal ideation, and weight change. A.R. 382. His speech was slow, his mood was depressed, and he appeared to be tearful and angry. A.R. 382. He told the social worker that he does not feel like getting out of bed. A.R. 384. The social worker noted his mental status...
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