Reese v. Young
| Decision Date | 30 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 5:20-cv-00676 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | VICTOR REESE, Petitioner, v. D. L. YOUNG, Warden, FCI Beckley, Respondent. |
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pending before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Petitioner Victor Reese (“Reese”). (ECF No. 1). Respondent has filed a response to the petition requesting that it be dismissed. (ECF No. 11). This case is assigned to the Honorable Frank W. Volk, United States District Judge, and was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by Standing Order for submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241 be DENIED, that Respondent's request for dismissal be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED, with prejudice and removed from the docket of the Court.
Reese is a federal prisoner currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution, Beckley (“FCI Beckley”) in Beaver, West Virginia, and according to the BOP Inmate Locator tool, is projected to be released on August 27, 2022.
Reese was charged and later indicted in the Northern District of Georgia (“Sentencing Court”) for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), being a felon in possession of a firearm. USA v. Reese, No. 1:17-cr-00310-AT-RGV-1 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 14, 2018) (“Reese I”), ECF Nos. 1, 3. On December 15, 2017, Reese pled guilty to the charge and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a term of 65 months imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Reese I, ECF Nos. 27, 35. Reese did not appeal his judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”).
On January 14, 2020, Reese, by counsel, filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Reese I, ECF No. 39. He argued that a recent case, Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), rendered his indictment, guilty plea, and conviction invalid because the government did not prove that Reese was aware of his status as a felon when he possessed the firearms. Id. at 5-8. The Sentencing Court denied Reese's motion, holding that the error Reese complained of was “not plain error or grounds for setting aside [Reese's] plea and conviction.” Reese I, ECF No. 51. Reese did not appeal this ruling.
On October 13, 2020, Reese filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and an accompanying memorandum of law. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). In his petition, Reese challenges the validity of his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. (ECF No. 1 at 3). He asserts that “the indictment charging him was defective because it lacked the status-knowledge element” described in Rehaif. (ECF No. 2 at 3). He asks that his claim be vacated and remanded. (ECF No. 1 at 7).
On February 19, 2020, Respondent answered the Court's order to show cause why relief should not be granted. (ECF No. 11). Respondent asks the Court to dismiss Reese's claims or construe them as a § 2255 motion and transfer them to the Sentencing Court. (Id. at 1). He argues that Reese's claims must be asserted in a motion pursuant to § 2255 and are not eligible to be heard in a § 2241 petition under the “savings clause” of § 2255(e). (Id. at 4-6).
On February 23, 2021, the undersigned issued an order allowing Reese 60 days to file a reply to Respondent's arguments. (ECF No. 12). Reese filed no reply and the Court has received no further argument or documentation from him. Therefore, the petition is ready for resolution.
Respondent requests that Reese's § 2241 petition be dismissed or transferred to Reese's court of conviction. (ECF No. 11 at 1). Respondent does not articulate under which rule's authority he seeks dismissal but presumably this request is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), as Respondent filed a Response concurrently with his motion to dismiss. See Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009). When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations of the petition as true and “draw all reasonable factual inferences” in favor of the petitioner. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014); Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 169 (4th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, the court is “not obliged to accept allegations that ‘represent unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,' or that ‘contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.'” Massey, 759 F.3d at 353 (quoting Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 2006)). A court presented with a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a federal habeas case must consider “the face of the petition and any attached exhibits.” Walker, 589 F.3d at 139 (quoting Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 169) (internal markings omitted); also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) ( that the court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint … as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.”). In addition, the court may consider “matters of public record, ” including documents from prior or pending court proceeding when resolving the motion, without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. Walker, 589 F.3d at 139.
Reese argues that his conviction for possession of a firearm should be vacated in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). In Rehaif, the Supreme Court considered whether under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits certain individuals from possessing firearms and ammunition, the government must prove that an individual knew both (1) that he engaged in the prohibited conduct of possessing a firearm, and (2) that he had obtained the relevant status which made his possession of the firearm illegal. See 139 S.Ct. 2191, at 2194. In contravention to this Circuit's prior precedent, United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995), the Supreme Court held that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Id. at 2200.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive remedy for challenging the validity of a federal conviction. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997). Although § 2241 provides a general grant of habeas corpus authority, the remedy under § 2241 is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under § 2255. To the contrary, “[i]t is only when ‘§ 2255 proves inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention,' that a federal prisoner may pursue habeas relief under § 2241.” Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333 (). The “savings clause, ” found at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), occasionally allows a § 2241 petition to take the place of a § 2255 motion, but not “merely ... because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a Section 2255 motion, ” In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194, nor simply because relief is unavailable due to the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255. Young v. Conley, 128 F.Supp.2d 354, 357 (S.D. W.Va. 2001). Rather, in the context of a challenge to the validity of a conviction, the savings clause creates a narrow opening for a petitioner to file a § 2241 petition when his claim contains all three of the following characteristics: (1) at the time of his conviction, the settled law of the circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of his conviction; (2) subsequent to his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which he was convicted is now deemed not to be criminal; and (3) he cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective by satisfying the In re Jones criteria. See Hood v. United States, 13 Fed.Appx. 72, 2001 WL 648636, at *1 (4th Cir. 2001); Hayes v. Ziegler, No. 5:11-cv-00261, 2014 WL 670850 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 20, 2014), aff'd, 573 Fed.Appx. 268 (4th Cir. 2014).
In the instant action, Reese claims that his conviction should be set aside because the United States failed to prove an essential element of the charge against him-namely, that he knew of his status as a felon. (ECF No. 2 at 2-3). Consequently, his claim must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless he can show that the savings clause applies to his petition. Satisfaction of the savings clause requirements is jurisdictional, and if the provision does not apply, this Court has no authority to hear the petitioner's claim. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2018).
Looking at the three prongs of In re Jones, the undersigned FINDS that Reese satisfies the first and third prongs of the test, but simply cannot meet the second prong, which requires him to show that “the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which he was...
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