Reetz v. Mansfield
| Decision Date | 05 March 1935 |
| Citation | 119 Conn. 563,178 A. 53 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | REETZ v. MANSFIELD. GIBSON v. SAME. |
Appeal from City Court of Meriden; William M. Luby, Judge.
Separate actions by Anna Reetz and by James Gibson against Merriam Mansfield for damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence, brought to the city court of Meriden in New Haven county and tried to the court. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
No error.
Frank S. Bergin, of New Haven, for appellant.
Daniel J. Danaher, of Meriden, for appellees.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and JENNINGS JJ.
The plaintiffs filed in this court a plea to the jurisdiction based upon the fact that the recognizance given by the defendant under the provisions of the Practice Book 1934, p 98, § 335, for the prosecution of his appeal, as noted by the clerk of the city court of Meriden, provides that the " plaintiff" shall prosecute the appeal to effect. There has also been filed in this court, as a part of the appeal record, a document certified by the clerk and under the seal of the city court of Meriden, showing that in that court the records had been amended to accord with the fact that the recognizance as originally taken by the clerk required the " defendant" and not the " plaintiff" to prosecute the appeal. The city court had the power to amend its record to make it " speak the truth." Rowe v. Smith, 51 Conn. 266, 276, 50 Am. Rep. 16; Taylor v. Gillette, 52 Conn. 216, 218; Tyler v. Aspin wall, 73 Conn. 493, 497, 47 A. 755, 54 L.R.A. 758; Dunn's Appeal, 81 Conn. 127, 133, 70 A. 703. While that court has not formally corrected the appeal record in this court as provided by section 365, p. 110, Practice Book 1934, no purpose would be served by delaying in order to obtain such formal compliance, and we shall treat the record in this court as amended in accordance with the certificate of the city court. State v. Hunter, 73 Conn. 435, 445, 47 A. 665.
With the exception of a single paragraph, the finding is unattacked, and it discloses the following facts: The car in which the plaintiffs were riding was proceeding northerly on Madison Road, so called, in the town of Durham, on its right-hand side of the road, about half past 5 in the afternoon of May 8, 1932. A dirt road intersects and crosses the Madison road in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction. As the plaintiffs' car approached the intersection, the driver blew his horn and reduced the speed of the car and was crossing the intersection at a reasonable speed, when the car occupied by the defendant and two other persons approached on the intersecting road. The defendant's car was not under proper control, was approaching the intersection at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable under the circumstances, and gave no signal or warning of its approach. It struck the left side of the plaintiffs' car while at a point north of the center of the intersection and on the plaintiffs' right-hand side of the road, and both these plaintiffs were injured. At the time of the collision, there was a woman sitting behind the steering wheel of the defendant's car and the defendant was sitting at her right. The trial court reached the conclusions that the plaintiffs were in the exercise of the care and than the accident was caused by the negligent operation of the defendant's car. These conclusions are not contested upon this appeal.
That paragraph of the finding in which a contest has developed reads as follows: " The defendant was holding the steering wheel of his car at the time of the collision and was controlling its course." The last four words are the only ones in question. The defendant's claim was that the plaintiffs did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was controlling the course of the car. The related claims were that it was not established that the injuries to the plaintiffs resulted from any negligence of his, or that there was any legal relationship between the woman sitting behind the wheel of his car and himself. These claims were overruled, and the trial court reached the conclusion that " the defendant was operating his car at the time of the collision" and gave judgments for the plaintiffs. It results that the only question presented for our decision is whether the evidence as certified fails to support the disputed finding of subordinate facts and thus deprives the final conclusion of its validity.
The record before us contains oral testimony from two witnesses on this point. The car in which the plaintiffs were riding was owned by Gibson, who was in the front seat with Reetz, the latter driving, while Mrs. Gibson and Mrs. Reetz were on the back seat. Gibson testified that a young lady was sitting behind the wheel of the defendant's car with the so seated as to control the operation of the the defendant sitting at her right. He said he saw the defendant " grab the wheel," " it seems to me only just a few feet before he crashed into us" ; that the defendant's car was coming up this dirt road at a very fast rate of speed, and, coming out of the dirt road, was headed to the left. He estimated the speed as forty miles per hour. Mrs. Reetz testified she did not see whether the defendant was driving his car, and then added: " I looked to the left and this car was almost on us then, but I did see the man, he had the steering wheel and the woman was behind the steering wheel, then I didn't know anything more." This appears to be all the direct testimony of eyewitnesses as to whether the defendant was driving his car. The only conclusion to be reasonably reached, if there were no other relevant evidence, would be that the defendant was holding the steering wheel just before and at the time of the impact. In that brief period, therefore, it could hardly be believed that the young lady was controlling the car. A car is naturally presumed to be under the " control" of the person who is holding the steering wheel, and there appears to be no direct, evidence that the young lady was holding the wheel in any way at this interval of time.
But in addition to the direct evidence there are circumstances which the court was justified in noting and from which reasonable inferences could legitimately be drawn. It appears from the finding that brush and trees and the elevation of the land at the intersection obscured the vision of the occupants of both...
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