Reeve v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | GEORGIA-PACIFIC,No. 93A02-8701-EX-31,93A02-8701-EX-31 |
| Citation | 510 N.E.2d 1378 |
| Parties | Dorothy Sue (Carey) REEVE, Allen Carey and Owen Carey, Appellants, v.CORPORATION, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Edward L. Murphy, Jr., Richard P. Samek, Livingston, Dildine, Haynie & Yoder, Fort Wayne, for appellants.
John A. Young, Young, Cochran & Reese, Indianapolis, for appellee.
Claimant-appellant, Dorothy Sue Carey Reeve (Dorothy), appeals an adverse ruling by the Industrial Board of Indiana (the Board) on her claim for benefits against respondent-appellee, Georgia-Pacific Corporation (Georgia-Pacific).
We reverse.
The facts are undisputed. On May 22, 1979, Arley Carey, a truck driver for Georgia-Pacific Prior to April 26, 1983, Dorothy inquired of Georgia-Pacific as to what effect, if any, a remarriage by her would have on both Allen's and her continued eligibility for compensation benefits. Georgia-Pacific responded by a letter dated April 23, 1983, as follows:
was killed in the course of his employment. He was survived by Dorothy, his widow, and six children, of which two remained dependents. The youngest, Dale Allen Carey (Allen), born on February 23, 1966, lived with his parents. Georgia-Pacific entered into an agreement approved by the Board to pay compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week for 500 weeks.
"Dear Mrs. Carey:
Thank you for your letter advising our office of your recent address change. We have reviewed your question, concerning the benefits should you remarry.
We contacted the Industrial Board to make sure we had the correct information before passing it on to you. Should you re-marry at this time, any dependents that haven't reach [sic] the age of eighteen, would continue to receive this benefit.
When the child attains the age of 18, benefits will terminate if he becomes gainfully employed or if he marries. However, if he continues to go to school and you can provide proof that he is not gainfully employed, he will continue to receive the benefit.
Should you be the only remaining dependent at the time you decide to re-marry, you would receive a lump sum settlement of 104 weeks of compensation.
To keep our file complete please advise if any of the childern [sic] have continued to go on to college or are employed or married. Also if you are planning to remarry, we will need the date.
Please feel free to call, if you do not understand any of the above information. We look forward to receiving the above information.
Cordially yours,
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION
/s/ Susan Guevremont
Susan Guevremont, Claims Rep.
Worker's Compensation Claims
Mid-West District"
In July 1983, Dorothy, as personal representative of the Estate of Arley Carey, settled a previously filed third-party suit on account of Arley's death. In reliance upon the April 23 letter she remarried on August 1, 1983. Allen reached his 18th birthday on February 23, 1984, and thereafter, on March 24, 1984, Georgia-Pacific terminated compensation. On April 19, 1984, a letter from John A. Young of the law firm of Rocap, Rocap, Reese & Young, representing Georgia-Pacific, was sent to Dorothy explaining that the compensation was terminated because she had remarried and Allen had reached the age of 18. No other cause was given.
After graduation from high school in May 1984, and a brief period of employment, Allen, in September 1984, enrolled in Vincennes University as a full-time student, and he continued in school for the times relevant here. Dorothy filed her Form # 10 application with the Board claiming the continuance of the compensation for Allen. The Hearing Member entered an order, as relevant here, which granted retroactive compensation on account of Allen from March 24, 1984, until the effective date of the order, March 6, 1986, in a lump-sum, plus payments at the rate of $120.00 per week to continue until one of the following events occurred: (1) payment for the full 500 weeks; (2) the total emancipation of Allen; (3) his graduation with a degree, (4) his discontinuance as a full-time student; or (5) his obtaining full-time employment prior to graduation. Upon appeal, the Full Board, two members dissenting, reversed this award of the Hearing Member and terminated compensation.
Dorothy presents the following two issues for review:
I. Whether Allen is a dependent-in-fact, pursuant to IND.CODE 22-3-3-20 II. Whether Georgia-Pacific is estopped from terminating workmen's compensation benefits to Allen as a result of its letter to Dorothy dated April 26, 1983.
and therefore, entitled to receive compensation as a result of Arley Carey's death.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
IND.CODE 22-3-3-18 creates three classes of dependents: presumptive dependents, total dependents-in-fact, and partial dependents-in-fact. Presumptive dependents are defined in IND.CODE 22-3-3-19 as follows: in subsection (a) as a wife; in subsection (b) as a husband; in subsection (c) and (d) as an unmarried child under the age of 18 who is dependent; in subsection (e) as a child over 18 who has never been married and who is either mentally or physically incapacitated; and in subsection (f) as a dependent child over 18 who has never been married and who is not gainfully employed. Clearly, Allen was a presumptive dependent and under subsection (c) was entitled to compensation, completely excluding a consideration of whether he was a total or partial dependent-in-fact. IND.CODE 22-3-3-19 also addresses the termination of compensation of a presumptive dependent:
The definition and rights of dependents-in-fact are stated in IND.CODE 22-3-3-20:
Dorothy argues that pursuant to the above statutes, Allen was a dependent-in-fact, as well as a presumptive dependent, and he is entitled to receive compensation after the age of 18. We disagree. Dependency is determined at the date of death of the employee. Once the right to dependent's benefits is established, payments are thereafter terminated if the conditions enumerated in the statute occur. Those conditions are absolute and there is no provision in the statute for a redetermination of actual dependency. Sam Winer & Co. v. Spelts (1976), 169 Ind.App. 392, 348 N.E.2d 670; Studebaker Corp. v. Anderson (1932), 96 Ind.App. 215, 183 N.E. 408. See also B. Small, Workmen's Compensation Law, sec. 10.9 at 287 (1950) (); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Papuschak (1943), 114 Ind.App. 233, 51 N.E.2d 875 ().
Dorothy presents no authority to support her position. We are of the opinion that the statute is clear and there is no need for statutory construction. Her argument on this issue is not well taken.
Dorothy claims that Georgia-Pacific is estopped from denying benefits because of its letter of April 23, 1983. In its findings the Full Board found that the letter had been written and that Dorothy mistakenly believed that compensation would continue if Allen was a college student after the age of 18, whether or not she remarried. It also found, "It is too speculative to determine whether or not, as she claims, that she would not have remarried, and would have declined settlement, to assure a continued compensation, as a widow during the student days of the child." Record at 56. It found that Georgia-Pacific was not estopped to assert its defense because the mistake was a mistake of law by Dorothy. Georgia-Pacific concedes that the letter was a misrepresentation, but argues that it was not a proper basis for estoppel because: (1) it was a mistake of law; (2) both parties had equal knowledge of the facts; (3) the misrepresentation was not of past or existing fact, but was a future promise; and (4) Georgia-Pacific believed its information was correct.
In AAA Wrecking Co. v. Barton, Curle and McLaren, Inc. (1979), 182 Ind.App. 418, 395 N.E.2d 343, the court set forth the general rules of equitable estoppel as follows:
"Since AAA had the burden of proof on the issue of estoppel at trial, its appeal is one from a negative finding. As such, the finding may only be disturbed as being contrary to law where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite conclusion. Link v. Sun Oil Co. (1974), 160 Ind.App....
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