Reeves v. Houston Oil Co. of Tex.

• Decision Date: 13 April 1950
• Docket Number: No. 4614,4614
• Citation: 230 S.W.2d 255
• Parties: REEVES v. HOUSTON OIL CO. OF TEXAS.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 255

230 S.W.2d 255

REEVES v. HOUSTON OIL CO. OF TEXAS.

No. 4614.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.

April 13, 1950.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1950.

Easterling & Easterling, Beaumont, J. R. Beck, Beaumont, for appellant.

Blades, Kennerly, Fisher & Whitworth, Houston, A. L. Bevil, Kountze, for appellee.

WALKER, Justice.

Appellant J. C. Reeves was plaintiff, and appellee Houston Oil Company of Texas was defendant, in the trial court.

This action is in trespass to try title. Plaintiff prayed judgment for title to and possession of a 30 acre tract in the G. W. Brooks League in Hardin County. Plaintiff made formal allegation of title in fee simple to this tract, and also pleaded title thereto under the 5, 10 and 25 year statutes of adverse possession.

Defendant disclaimed title to the surface estate in the land sued for; but with respect to the mineral estate in said land, pleaded not guilty and title under the 3, 5 and 10 year statutes of adverse possession.

The cause was tried before the court sitting with a jury; but at the close of the proof, defendant moved for an instructed verdict and the trial court sustained this motion. Judgment was accordingly rendered in plaintiff's behalf for the surface estate in the land in suit (on defendant's disclaimer), but that plaintiff take nothing against defendant as regards the mineral estate in said land.

From this judgment plaintiff has appealed, assigning 11 Points of Error for reversal.

Points 1, 2, 3 and 5 assign error to the trial court's order sustaining defendant's motion for instructed verdict; and Point 7 assigns as error that the trial court should have instructed a verdict in behalf of plaintiff. In connection with Point 7 it is to be noted that plaintiff filed no motion for instructed verdict; and therefore it cannot be said that the trial court erred in failing to instruct a verdict in behalf of plaintiff. However, Point 7 may also be disposed of on the same grounds as we dispose of the other Points just listed. The following is relevant to all of these various points and to others discussed hereinafter:

The subject matter in controversy on this appeal is the mineral estate in the 30 acre tract of land in suit.

Plaintiff's proof of title to this mineral estate is limited to evidence of adverse possession of the surface; and in order for plaintiff to recover, this proof had to show title in him to the 30 acres in suit under either or both of Articles 5509 and 5510, R.S.1925 or the former statutes now expressed in those articles. No possession of the minerals has occurred.

Defendant exhibited a paper chain of title to the land, originating with a grant to George W. Brooks by the State of Coahuila in Texas dated August 22, 1835. This chain of title runs through the Texas Pine Land Association; by deed dated July 31, 1901, the Association conveyed its interest in the Brooks League to the defendant. Plaintiff has objected to the sufficiency of the description in a prior conveyance to this Association from John P. Irvin, dated December 11, 1891; and this matter is referred to below.

The land in suit is the South 30 acres of an 80 acre tract upon the Brooks League which is described by metes and bounds in a deed from defendant to W. S. Frazier, dated June 9, 1902. This 30 acre tract is a rectangle, the south line of which is the south line of the Brooks League. The north and south boundaries run east and west, and the eastern and western boundaries run north and south. The tract is described as being 475 varas wide from east to west and as being 300 yards long from north to south. In the deed to W. S. Frazier of June 9, 1902, defendant reserved the mineral estate in the 80 acre tract conveyed, and thus, in the 30 acre tract in suit. Of this reservation defendant now owns an undivided one-half of the oil and gas; the remainder of the reservation is owned by American Republics Corporation (under Republic Production Co.) and by Southwestern Settlement & Development Company.

The 80 acre tract described in defendant's deed to W. S. Frazier of June 9, 1902 was a part of a 160 acre tract which W. S. Frazier caused to be surveyed upon the Brooks League in 1884. There was proof that W. S. Frazier established his residence upon the Brooks League in 1873 or 1875, and that he maintained his residence at the place so fixed until his death in 1914. He claimed 160 acres by limitation, and it was the boundaries of this claim which he fixed and had surveyed in 1884. We infer that his residence was upon this 160 acre tract, and the evidence raises the issue that this residence was upon the 80 acre tract described in defendant's deed of June 9, 1902, to W. S. Frazier, just south of Black Creek.

On September 1, 1896, W. S. Frazier brought suit in trespass to try title against the Texas Pine Land Association, in Cause No. 570, in the district court of Hardin County, to recover title to and possession of 160 acres of the Brooks League. The Association was served with citation on September 14, 1896, and thereafter answered. Judgment was rendered in this cause on September 26, 1899, that Frazier take nothing and that the Texas Pine Land Association recover the Brooks League, and specifically, the 160 acres for which Frazier had sued. Frazier's petition and the trial court's judgment, both as recorded in the trial court's minutes and as recorded in the deed records of Hardin County wherein the land lies, were in proof; but the parties have summarized these documents in the statement of facts in such a way as to omit the description of the 160 acres for which Frazier sued. We infer, however, that this description included the land in suit; and the description in Frazier's subsequent suit against defendant No. 2239, styled Frazier v. Houston Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W. 20, very clearly did include the land in suit. At any rate, on the face of the judgment rendered in No. 570, whatever legal interest or title W. S. Frazier had in said land was, as of September 26, 1899, the date of the judgment, vested in the Texas Pine Land Association. Plaintiff proved the citation issued to the Association in No. 570 and also proved an answer filed in No. 570 by the Association, to show that title to the Brooks League as distinguished from the 160 acres for which Frazier sued was not in litigation and that the part of the judgment in No. 570 awarding the Association title to the entire Brooks League was erroneous. Since the judgment in No. 570 was not attacked by appeal or otherwise, and since the present suit is not an attempt to set that judgment aside, we can only assume that this judgment was supported by proper pleading. Concerning this judgment in No. 570, see: Kirby v. Houston Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 246, being No. 4402 in this court, in which we held that said judgment, as against the objections raised in that suit, was valid and enforcible as regards a 19 acre tract off the north end of the 80 acre tract, of which, as we have stated, the land in suit is a part. W. S. Frazier's deed to Kirby, on which the title of appellants Kirby in No. 4402 was based, was proved in the cause now pending, and since our holdings in No. 4402 and the application there to the land in suit appear upon the face of our opinion filed in No. 4402, we can take judicial notice of said holdings and apply them on this appeal so far as relevant. See: Montgomery v. Huff, Tex.Civ.App., 11 S.W.2d 237, pages 240-241.

Plaintiff tendered evidence, which the trial court excluded, that this judgment in Cause No. 570 was rendered in violation of an agreement between W. S. Frazier and the Texas Pine Land Association that 80 acres presumably in fee simple, would be conveyed to Frazier, by the Association, and that Cause No. 570 would be dismissed. The trial court's action in excluding this proof is the subject matter of plaintiff's Point 10 which is discussed hereinafter. Other proof tendered by plaintiff, namely, the proceedings in Cause No. 2239, styled W. S. Frazier, et al. v. Houston Oil Co., which was also excluded by the trial court, shows a course of proceeding which is inconsistent with the excluded testimony concerning an agreement between Frazier and the Pine Land Association, and this matter is referred to in greater detail in our discussion of plaintiff's Point 8.

No deed to W. S. Frazier from the Texas Pine Land Association is shown. Instead, as had been stated, it was in proof that the Association conveyed its interest in the Brooks League to defendant by a deed dated July 31, 1901, and that defendant, by the deed of June 9, 1902, conveyed to W. S. Frazier the 80 acre tract mentioned above, reserving the mineral estate therein.

W. S. Frazier had continued to maintain his residence where it was (as we have stated, the proof raises the issue that this residence was on the 80 acre tract of land); and he accepted defendant's deed of June 9, 1902, and asserted title thereunder for a long period of time. For instance, it is in proof that he filed this deed for record; it was so filed on July 29, 1902, 20 days subsequent to its date. On August 2, 1904, two years after its date, he and his wife conveyed to H. S. Kirby 19 acres off the north end of the 80 acre tract; this deed to Kirby refers to defendant's deed of June 9, 1902 to W. S. Frazier. Still later, by deed dated April 7, 1905, W. S. Frazier conveyed to his son-in-law W. T. Moulder the 30 acre tract in suit. In this deed he did not mention the defendant's deed to him, but he did describe the southwest and southeast corners of the 30 acre tract conveyed to Moulder in such a way as to identify these corners with the southwest and southeast corners of the 80 acre tract described in defendant's deed. The deed to W. T. Moulder was filed for record on October 5, 1905. There was, however, some proof that W. S. Frazier could not read.

Plaintiff holds a chain of title under W. T. Moulder to the land in suit, as follows: (1) Deed from...