Reeves v. Howard

• Decision Date: 21 October 1902
• Citation: 91 N.W. 896,118 Iowa 121
• Parties: EMILY M. REEVES, Appellee, v. LYDIA J. HOWARD, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

91 N.W. 896

118 Iowa 121

EMILY M. REEVES, Appellee, v. LYDIA J. HOWARD, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 21, 1902

Appeal from Plymouth District Court.--HON. GEORGE W. WAKEFIELD Judge.

ACTION in equity to set aside and declare void certain deeds by which one Harmess J. Howard conveyed real estate to the defendant. Decree as prayed, and defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Martin & Martin for appellant.

I. S Struble for appellee.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

The plaintiff and defendant are sisters. On May 23, 1898, Harmess J. Howard, a brother of these parties, being upon his deathbed, made, executed, and delivered to defendant deeds for four several tracts of real estate of the value of $ 4,000 to $ 6,000, the express consideration of such conveyances being "one dollar and natural love and affection," and immediately after executing said deeds also executed a will bequeathing the remainder of his estate being personalty of the value of $ 500 to $ 700, to plaintiff and another sister, Mrs. McKean, in equal shares. Two or three days later Harmess J. Howard died, and his will has since been duly admitted to probate. The plaintiff refused to accept any benefits under the will, and brings this action, alleging that at the time Howard made the conveyances to defendant he was ill, and in such weakened condition of mind as to be easily subjected to undue influence exercised by his friends and attendants: that in years previous to this sickness defendant had shown great kindness and attention to her said brother, and thus obtained his confidence and affection, and exercised great influence over him; that taking advantage of his sick and weakened condition, she, by her own undue solicitation and influence, and by the undue solicitation and influence of Mrs. McKean, induced and persuaded the said Harmess, against his natural inclination, to make said conveyances without any consideration whatever. Upon these allegations it is demanded the deeds be held void. Defendant denies all allegations of undue influence in the procurement of the deeds from her brother.

I. It is first urged by appellant that the petition states no cause of action, in that it does not allege nor state facts showing that she is an heir at law of Harmess J. Howard, or has any such interest in his estate as will enable her to maintain this action. No such question was raised in the court below, and we think defendant cannot take advantage of the defect here. Weis v. Morris, 102 Iowa 327, 71 N.W. 208; Benjamin v. Vieth, 80 Iowa 149, 45 N.W. 731; Bank v. Zeims, 93 Iowa 140, 61 N.W. 483; Wood v. Dunham, 105 Iowa 701, 75 N.W. 507.

II. As will be observed, plaintiff's demand for relief is based solely upon the charge that the deeds were procured by the exercise of undue influence over the grantor, and it is necessary for us to look closely into the evidence upon which the decree of the trial court is sought to be sustained. During his last sickness of about two weeks Howard lived at the home of a neighbor. Both plaintiff and defendant were living at a distance, but, upon being notified of his condition, both came, and were in attendance upon him for several days preceding his decease. The exact nature of the fatal sickness is not disclosed by the record, but soon after the sisters arrived Howard developed a tendency to convulsions of an epileptic character. At the outset these attacks occurred at intervals of several hours, but increased in frequency, and from Monday, until death occurred on Wednesday or Thursday, he rapidly declined. During the paroxysms he was more or less unconscious, and, of course, unfit to transact business, but during the intervals he appears to have been entirely sane. The physician who attended him says that the tendency of the convulsions was to leave the patient dull for a while, but "he would grow clearer afterwards;" that on Sunday he found him "nervous, shaky, and not clear in mind," and was informed he had been having a convulsion; and the witness adds: "His mind cleared up while I was there Sunday evening, and he appreciated what was said to him, and answered my questions, but was nervous, and easily excited. How clear his conceptions were I could not say. The conversation he directed to me was intelligent and connected. He said some things out of the way. The tendency was to become brighter, and I would expect his mind to improve." This report has reference to a time about three hours before the papers were executed, and we find nothing in the record to indicate there was any change for the worse in the sick man's mental condition during the interval. Of the many witnesses testifying for plaintiff concerning Howard's mental condition most of them did not see him during his sickness until after the deeds had been executed and delivered. But one (Daniel McArthur), aside from parties in interest, undertakes to say that he saw signs of mental wandering before the deeds were made, and he in another place says he did not notice the change in the sick man "until after he begun to have convulsions." Another (J. Alderson) says, "Howard conversed connectedly between spasms on Monday," and further says that, "After the deeds were signed, he was able to talk intelligently, but not much after that." The testimony, therefore, aided as it is by the legal presumption of mental soundness, makes it too clear for successful dispute that Howard, while weak and suffering in body,--too weak, doubtless, to endure the the strain of any business requiring great mental effort,--was fully conscious of the nature and effect of his act, and had full and intelligent appreciation of the fact that he was thereby conveying the property in controversy to the defendant. True, he was in that weakened condition which might have made him the easy prey of a designing person, and, if there was anything in the record fairly tending to show that the defendant did take advantage of his weakness or exhaustion to procure from him the gift of this property, we should not hesitate to affirm the decree appealed from; but when we take up the question whether defendant did directly or indirectly thus secure the conveyances attacked in this case, we are constrained to say that there is a signal failure of proof.

As we have seen, the defendant resided at some distance from her brother, and there is no showing that she had recently seen him or communicated with him prior to the time she was summoned to his deathbed. There is not a word of testimony that up to the time of that meeting she had in any manner or by any means sought to influence his action in the disposition of his property. From the time of her arrival until her brother's death, though surrounded by numerous witnesses, few of whom can be accused of partiality for her none of them (with one exception, hereafter noted) testify to any word or act on her part directly or indirectly indicating a desire to control his actions in selecting a beneficiary of his bounty. If witnesses tell the truth, she did on this and other occasions manifest a grasping disposition and a strange want of feeling, but not one of them testifies to having heard her mention the subject of property to her sick brother, nor make any request or suggestion to him as to how ...