Reeves v. Reeves
| Decision Date | 05 June 1945 |
| Citation | 61 N.E.2d 654,318 Mass. 381 |
| Parties | REEVES v. REEVES et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by Charles V. Reeves against Ruth M. Reeves and another to enjoin defendants from prosecuting a petition for modification of an order for support of minor child contained in a decree of divorce, and for other relief. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Good, Judge.
Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, DOLAN, RONAN, and SPALDING, JJ.
R. J. Thibodeau, of Boston, for plaintiff.
T. N. Creed, of Boston, for respondents.
By this bill the plaintiff seeks to have the defendant Ruth M. Reeves enjoined from prosecuting a petition for modification of an order for support of their minor child contained in a decree of divorce, and from interfering with, annoying or molesting the plaintiff or any person to whom he may be married. The plaintiff also seeks to have the defendant Herbert F. Callahan, Esquire, removed from his office as trustee under a trust instrument hereinafter described.
The bill was heard by the judge upon agreed facts. The material facts may be summed upon as follows: The plaintiff and the defendant Ruth M. Reeves, hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Reeves, were married on April 5, 1926. On April 7, 1937, Mrs. Reeves filed a libel for divorce in the Probate Court for the county of Suffolk alleging desertion. On April 5, 1937, the plaintiff and Mrs. Reeves executed a trust instrument in which the defendant Mr. Callahan was named as trustee. The trust instrument, after reciting the pendency (sic) of the divorce libel and a desire to make suitable provision for the support of the minor child of the parties and for the payment of a sum of money to Mrs. Reeves in lieu of alimony and all claims that she might have against the plaintiff, provided that Mrs. Reeves should accept the sum of $2,250 in lieu of alimony and all other claims. Under the terms of the trust instrument the trustee was to pay out of that sum, the receipt of which he acknowledged, $250 to himself and upon entry of a ‘final decree of divorce,’ an additional sum of $250 for professional services ‘rendered and to be rendered’ to Mrs. Reeves. Upon the entry of a ‘final decree of divorce,’ the trustee was to pay the balance of the fund with any increment thereon to Mrs. Reeves. The trustee acknowledged the receipt of $50 from the plaintiff to be paid forthwith to Mrs. Reeves for the support of the minor child of the parties for the month of April, 1937, and the plaintiff agreed to pay a like sum to the trustee on the first day of each month thereafter until the decree of divorce became absolute, and thereafter to make such monthly payments directly to Mrs. Reeves. The provisions wherein Mrs. Reeves agreed with the trustee not to interfere with, annoy or molest the plaintiff or any person whom he might marry so long as he continued his payments for the support of the minor child need not be stated in detail. On May 28, 1937, a decree nisi of divorce was entered in favor of Mrs. Reeves. Custody of the minor child of the parties was awarded to her, and the plaintiff, the libellee, was ordered to pay $50 each and every month thereafter, or until the further order of the court, for the support of the minor child. Despite that order the case stated sets forth that the terms of the trust agreement were not incorporated in the decree of divorce, that the agreement ‘was made independent of any decree of the Probate Court and was intended to continue indefinitely in and of itself independently among the parties after the aforesaid decree of divorce.’ The plaintiff has substantially fulfilled every term, provision and stipulation of the trust agreement, ‘having paid up in full under the terms of said contract.’ On November 12, 1943, Mrs. Reeves filed a ptition in the Probate Court for modification of the decree of divorce with respect to the order for the support of the minor child, which is now pending. The defendant Mr. Callahan, the trustee named in the trust agreement, is acting as counsel for Mrs. Reeves in the matter of the petition just referred to. The judge made an order for the entry of a final decree dismissing the bill, ruling that the plaintiff could avail himself of the opportunity of setting up the trust agreement as a defence in the proceeding pending in the Probate Court and that ‘there is no basis for the granting of equitable relief herein.’ A final decree was entered dismissing the bill, and the plaintiff appealed.
The only duty of the judge was to order the correct decree on the agreed facts without reference to rulings. Stuart v. Sargent, 283 Mass. 536,...
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Cavanagh v. Cavanagh
...or are not "free from fraud and coercion." Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 514, 432 N.E.2d 691 (1982), quoting Reeves v. Reeves, 318 Mass. 381, 384, 61 N.E.2d 654 (1945).4 We note, however, that even where the provisions of a separation agreement "are merged and do not survive the divorc......
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Cabot v. Cabot
...was raised as to this conclusion. 8. Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 514, 432 N.E.2d 691 (1982), quoting from Reeves v. Reeves, 318 Mass. 381, 384, 61 N.E.2d 654 (1945), held that separation agreements that survive divorce judgments are valid "when free from fraud and coercion and when f......
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