Reeves v. S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fin. Fund

Citation434 S.C. 18,862 S.E.2d 248
Decision Date16 June 2021
Docket NumberOpinion No. 28034,Appellate Case No. 2019-001756
Parties Ashley REEVES, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Albert Carl "Bert" Reeves, Petitioner, v. SOUTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL INSURANCE AND RISK FINANCING FUND, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

William Mullins McLeod Jr. and Colin Ram, McLeod Law Group, LLC, of Charleston for Petitioner.

C. Mitchell Brown and Brian Patrick Crotty, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW :

A Town of Cottageville police officer shot and killed the former town Mayor Bert Reeves. A federal jury awarded Reeves’ estate $97,500,000 in damages. The South Carolina Municipal Insurance and Risk Financing Fund, which insured the town, paid $10,000,000 to settle the federal lawsuit and two other lawsuits. The Settlement Agreement provided for two questions to be submitted to the state courts. The first question is whether the amount of indemnity coverage available under the policy is more than $1,000,000. The second question is whether the South Carolina Tort Claims Act applies to a bad faith action against the Fund. We answer the first question "yes"; we decline to answer the second question.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Randall Price—a police officer for the Town of Cottageville in Colleton County—shot and killed former Cottageville Mayor Albert Carl "Bert" Reeves on May 16, 2011. Ashley Reeves—the personal representative of Bert Reeves’ estate—filed a wrongful death and survival lawsuit in state court against Price, the Cottageville police department, and the Town of Cottageville for negligence, assault, battery, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2012). Ashley alleged that while Price was on duty, he drove onto a dirt road to confront Reeves, blocked him in, started a fight with him, and shot and killed him. She claimed the police department and the town were liable for Price's actions because he was their employee. Ashley also alleged the police department and the town were negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising Price, and those actions violated Reeves’ civil rights under section 1983. The defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court. The parties refer to this as the Cottageville lawsuit.

Ashley filed a separate federal lawsuit against Cottageville Police Chief John Craddock. She alleged Craddock—a licensed paramedic—was present when Price shot Reeves. She claimed Craddock was liable for civil rights violations under section 1983 for failing to supervise Price, failing to intervene to stop Price, and failing to give medical care after Price shot Reeves.

The South Carolina Municipal Insurance and Risk Financing Fund provided liability insurance to Cottageville, and administered claims against it, pursuant to an insurance policy labeled the Coverage Contract. This "Fund," as we will call it, is a self-insurance liability fund established pursuant to subsection 15-78-140(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2020).1 Ashley filed a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court against the Fund requesting the court declare the extent of indemnity coverage provided in the Coverage Contract. The Fund argued then and argues now that coverage provided by the Coverage Contract is limited to $1,000,000.

The Cottageville lawsuit was the only case to go to trial. The federal jury found Price was negligent, his negligence proximately caused Reeves’ death, and Price violated Reeves’ constitutional rights by using excessive force and unlawfully seizing Reeves. The jury found Cottageville negligently hired, retained, and supervised Price, and violated Reeves’ constitutional rights. The jury awarded Reeves’ estate $7,500,000 in actual damages and $90,000,000 in punitive damages—$30,000,000 against Price and $60,000,000 against Cottageville.

Ashley and the Fund agreed to settle all three lawsuits for $10,000,000. The Settlement Agreement provided Ashley may seek declaratory judgment asking the courts to resolve the two questions.2 The Fund agreed to pay Reeves’ estate an additional $1,000,000 for each question resolved in Ashley's favor. The federal court approved the Settlement Agreement.

The Fund filed a petition with this Court asking us to decide the questions in our original jurisdiction. We declined. Ashley then filed this declaratory judgment claim by amending her pending complaint in circuit court. On the first question, the circuit court ruled in favor of Ashley, finding there was more than $1,000,000 in coverage available under the policy. On the second question, the circuit court ruled in favor of the Fund, finding the Fund is a political subdivision, and therefore, a bad faith claim against it would be subject to the Tort Claims Act.

The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's ruling regarding the amount of coverage available but affirmed the ruling the Fund is a political subdivision. Reeves v. S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fin. Fund , 427 S.C. 613, 635, 640, 832 S.E.2d 312, 324, 326 (Ct. App. 2019). We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision.

II. Indemnity Coverage Available

The Coverage Contract provided indemnity coverage for the town in areas such as general liability, business auto liability, and law enforcement liability. The coverage at issue in this case is law enforcement liability under Section IV of the Coverage Contract. The general provisions in Section I apply.

A. Insuring Language

We begin with the law enforcement liability insuring language in Section IV. We highlighted the operative language in bold for clarity,

[The Fund] agrees , subject to the limitations, terms, and conditions hereunder mentioned to pay on behalf of the Member or Covered Person(s) for sums which the Member or Covered Person(s) shall be obligated to pay exclusively as Money Damages because of a Wrongful Act by a Member , a Law Enforcement Employee , or other Covered Person(s) while acting in conjunction with Law Enforcement Employees, which is committed while acting in both the course and the scope of his or her official duties , as provided under the "South Carolina Tort Claims Act" where a South Carolina state law is involved, or while acting in both the course and scope of a mutual aid agreement between governmental entities for the temporary sharing of Law Enforcement Employees or other Covered Person(s) under the terms and circumstances specified therein, and which results in :
a. Property Damage or Bodily Injury which is first caused and first becomes manifest during the Coverage Period, provided the Wrongful Act amounts to an Occurrence ; or
b. Personal Injury or Advertising Injury which is first caused and first becomes manifest during the Coverage Period.

Under this insuring language, the Fund agreed to pay when a Member (Cottageville) or a Law Enforcement Employee (Price or Craddock) committed a Wrongful Act in the course and scope of his official duties, and the Wrongful Act resulted in Bodily Injury or Personal Injury. The parties agree Price and Craddock were acting within the scope of their official duties when Price killed Reeves. The federal jury determined Cottageville and Price committed numerous Wrongful Acts.

The next question is whether the Wrongful Acts resulted in Bodily Injury. Bodily Injury is defined in the Coverage Contract. We highlighted the operative language in bold for clarity,

"Bodily Injury" means physical injury to any person (including death) and any mental anguish or mental suffering associated with or arising from such physical injury. However, for purposes of this Section IV, Bodily Injury does not include such injuries if they result directly and immediately from the infliction of Personal Injury, including without limitation assault and battery; any such resulting injuries shall be deemed to be part of the Personal Injury.

Reeves is dead; that is a Bodily Injury. Therefore, as the parties agree, the insuring language provides coverage in this case.

We turn then to the policy limits for law enforcement liability indemnity coverage. The Contract Declaration page for Section IV of the Coverage Contract provides the "Liability Limit" is "$1,000,000" "Per Occurrence."

The term "Occurrence" is one we commonly use. In that common usage, the death of Bert Reeves was one tragic occurrence. However, we are not permitted to use our intuitive definition of a term defined in an insurance policy. The Fund wrote the definition of "Occurrence" applicable here, which is found in Section I, the General Provisions section of the Coverage Contract. Again, we put the operative language in bold for clarity,

"Occurrence" means an accident which results in Bodily Injury or Property Damage, the original cause of which and the initial damage from which happened during the Contract Period set forth in the Declarations. Without limitation, all references to any type of injury arising out of or from an Occurrence or being caused by an Occurrence employ the foregoing meaning. Subject to the foregoing, "Occurrence" includes continuing exposure to the same harmful conditions. All such continuing exposure, damage, or injury shall be treated as one Occurrence.
Only when used to describe coverage limits on a per "Occurrence" basis or when otherwise describing whether an event or series of events constitutes one loss for coverage purposes or more than one loss, the word "Occurrence" means a covered event of the sort expressly described in the Insuring Agreement of the relevant Coverage Section pertaining to the loss or claim, whether an Occurrence (as defined in the opening paragraph of this General Definition or as defined in the separate definition, if any, appearing in the Definitions part of the relevant Coverage Section), a Wrongful Act , a Loss, or an Offense causing Personal Injury or Advertising Injury, as those terms are defined in the relevant Coverage Section.

This is not a simple and...

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