Reeves v. Smith
| Decision Date | 21 January 1935 |
| Docket Number | 4-3788 |
| Citation | 78 S.W.2d 72,190 Ark. 213 |
| Parties | REEVES v. SMITH |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Searcy Chancery Court; Sam Williams, Chancellor affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
W. F Reeves, for appellant.
A. Y Barr, W. T. Mills, W. T. Mills, Jr., and Culbert L. Pearce for appellees.
On September 5, 1934, there was filed with the clerk of Searcy County, Arkansas, two parts of a petition to initiate act No. 1 of Searcy County, the same being, "An Act to Fix the Salaries and Expenses of County Officials, and to Fix the Manner in which Compensations and Salaries shall be paid, to reduce the costs of County Government and for other purposes." A day or two later three other parts of the petition were filed. The petition took the usual or ordinary course as provided by law. Ballot title was certified in proper form and manner to the election commissioners and other requirements, as provided by Amendment No. 7 of the Constitution of the State and laws of the State, were complied with, in order that said petition might be voted upon at the general election held on November 6, 1934.
On October 5, 1934, W. F. Reeves, a citizen and taxpayer, filed this suit in the chancery court of Searcy County, to review the action of the county clerk in accepting and certifying the sufficiency of the said petition, and prayed for an injunction restraining the county board of election commissioners from placing the proposed act on the official ballot, and also to restrain Sam Blair, the county clerk, from certifying it to the election commissioners, and Buck Mays, as county judge, from carrying out its provisions.
Two contentions were made by the plaintiff and decided adversely to him, which become the basis of this appeal.
The first is that three of the separate parts of the petition, filed after parts one and two were filed, did not contain the enacting clause "Be it Enacted by the People of Searcy County, Arkansas." The three said parts were necessary to complete the petition, as the first two parts contained the names of only about eight per cent. of the voters of Searcy County. The number of electors signing all the parts were required in order that fifteen per cent. of the voters in that county might be counted upon the petition to initiate the proposed act.
The second objection was to the effect that the publication of the notice did not meet the requirements of Amendment No. 7 or of the law, and that, on account thereof, the proposed act was not properly submitted and would therefore be invalid if adopted.
The proposed act was advertised in the Marshall Republican, in its issues of September 21 and September 28, and no other or further publication was had, and at the time of trial, in October, it was urged that insufficient time remained within which the legal notice could be given.
These two objections will be disposed of in the order stated.
Amendment No. 7 to the Constitution of the State is the Initiative and Referendum Amendment, and provides, among other things, that the petition for an act to be initiated by the people may be circulated and presented in parts, but each part of any petition shall have attached thereto the affidavit of the persons circulating the same, etc. This means, necessarily, that all the "parts" constitute but one petition for any proposed act filed with the county clerk, who shall pass upon the sufficiency of the petition.
The first two parts of the petition filed, according to the briefs, contained the enacting clause and are not subject to the objection urged as to the other three parts, which, it is stated, were filed a day or two later.
It is argued by the appellees that, when these parts of the petition shall have been filed, they constitute but one petition, praying for the same relief, and that their identity as parts, upon the proper filing was lost. They became one instrument or petition. If that theory is correct, then the one petition did have the enacting clause and complied with the constitutional requirements.
We agree with this contention. There are several reasons that impel us to reach this conclusion. The first is that Amendment No. 7 necessarily must be construed with some degree of liberality, in order that its purposes may be well effectuated. Strict construction might defeat the very purposes, in some instances, of the amendment.
Another reason, not less cogent, is that Amendment No. 7 permits the exercise of the power reserved to the people to control, to some extent at least, the policies of the State, but more particularly of counties and municipalities as distinguished from the exercise of similar power by the Legislature, and, since that residuum of power remains in the electors, their acts should not be thwarted by strict or technical construction. We are supported in this idea of more liberal construction by the following case: Ferrell v. Keel, 105...
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