Reeves v. Snider

• Decision Date: 31 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 25260.,25260.
• Citation: 115 S.W.3d 375
• Parties: Eugene and Tapian REEVES, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Donna SNIDER, Assessor of Pemiscot County, Missouri, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

115 S.W.3d 375

Eugene and Tapian REEVES, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Donna SNIDER, Assessor of Pemiscot County, Missouri, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 25260.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

July 31, 2003.

Opinion Denying Rehearing August 21, 2003.

Eugene and Tapian Reeves, Caruthersville, pro se.

Stephen P. Sokoloff, Kennett, for respondent.

KENNETH W. SHRUM, Judge.

This is an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming the assessments for 1999 on properties owned by Eugene and Tapian Reeves ("Taxpayers"). Respondent Donna Snider ("Snider") was the Pemiscot County assessor during the relevant period. Taxpayers state four reasons why they believe the State Tax Commission ("STC"), and the trial court upholding the STC's decision, erred. We believe, however, the real issue is whether the affirmance of the assessed valuations for the subject properties was proper and non-discriminatory. We affirm.

FACTS

During the 1999 tax year, Snider reassessed several tracts of Pemiscot County real estate owned by Taxpayers. In doing so, Snider used a "new index" and a "mass appraisal system" called the "Honeycutt Cost System." To effectively evaluate the properties, two certified appraisers helped Snider in the process. Of the twenty-five properties thus reassessed, only one was not increased in value from the 1998 tax year.

Initially, Taxpayers attempted to convince Snider that her reassessment values were wrong. They insisted Snider failed to adequately inspect the properties, and her valuation exceeded fair market value. In part, they claimed the valuations of their property should have been based solely on the average percentage of increases in the county and not fair market value.

Upon failing to convince Snider of their claims, Taxpayers appealed to the county board of equalization. After the board refused to lower the valuations and assessments on twenty-two tracts of Taxpayers' real estate, they appealed to the STC.

Taxpayers' appeal to the STC raised many grounds for overturning the valuations. In part, they claimed there was no "physical inspection" of the properties within the meaning of the applicable statute. They also raised a due process violation because of an alleged presumption by the board of equalization that Snider had correctly evaluated the subject properties. The STC affirmed the decision of a hearing officer that upheld the assessments.

Taxpayers then filed a petition in the circuit court for review of the STC's decision. The circuit judge affirmed the STC's decision and order. This appeal followed. Additional facts are given as we discuss Taxpayers' arguments.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of this case is directed to the findings and decisions of the STC. Lebanon Properties I v. North, 66 S.W.3d 765, 767[1] (Mo.App.2002). Review of factual challenges to the STC's order is limited to determining if the STC's order is supported by competent and substantial evidence as a whole, or whether it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of its jurisdiction. Evangelical Retirement Homes of Greater St. Louis, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 669 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Mo.banc 1984); Lebanon Properties I, 66 S.W.3d at 767[2]. "The evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to the administrative body, together with all reasonable inferences which support it...." Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 564 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Mo.banc 1978).

Contrarily, questions of law when decided by an administrative agency, as contrasted with questions of evidence, are matters for the independent judgment of the reviewing court. King v. Laclede Gas Co., 648 S.W.2d 113, 114[1] (Mo.banc 1983). Stated differently, "the decision of the administrative agency on a question of law does not preclude, restrict, or control review of the issue by the court." Ceramo Co., Inc. v. Goldberg, 650 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Mo.App.1983).

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

At the outset, we note Snider has requested that we dismiss Taxpayers' appeal due to deficiencies in their appellate brief. That motion, which was taken with the case, is denied.

We caution, however, that this ruling does not mean we find Taxpayers' brief complies with Rule 84.04.¹ It fails for a multitude of reasons. Even so, this excerpt from Norman v. Ballentine, 627 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.App.1981), explains our decision to address Taxpayers' claim of reversible error:

"Inadequate briefs of counsel are a disservice to parties so represented and a burden on the system of justice. See Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo.banc 1978). Because of the result here reached, however, suspension of strict application of Rule 84.04 will work no hardship on the respondent. Our jurisdiction is apparent from the record, and we have been able to determine the facts of the case and the issues to be decided from the briefs and transcript. A punitive order of dismissal would serve no purpose here, but we trust that members of the bar will take heed of the warning implicit in our discussion of this matter."

Id. at 85.

Point I: The Presumption Issue

When the STC affirmed the hearing officer's decision, it declared, inter alia, "[i]t is well established law that there is a presumption in favor of the board of equalization as found by the Hearing Officer."² (Emphasis supplied.)

In Point I, Taxpayers charge the STC erred by "relying on a presumption that the decision of the Pemiscot Board of Equalization was correct, instead of making findings based on competent and substantial evidence of values and that valid assessment increases had occurred." Taxpayers advance two reasons why the presumption does not attend here.³ However, we need not address or consider Taxpayers' Point I argument. This follows because any error by the STC in relying on this presumption—if it was error—would not affect the merits of Taxpayers' appeal. Rule 84.13(b).

To explain, Taxpayers were the moving parties seeking affirmative relief, and as such, they bore the burden of proving the vital elements of their case, i.e., the assessments were "unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious." Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo.1959); Westwood P'ship v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152, 161[8] (Mo.App.2003); 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 710, 726. This is true regardless of the existence or non-existence of the challenged presumption. As the Supreme Court of Missouri explained, "even were we to hold that it [the presumption] has been overcome, the burden of proof on the facts and inferences would still remain on petitioner, for it is the moving party seeking affirmative relief." Cupples, 329 S.W.2d at 702[16]. See also 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 710, which states: "Even where there is no presumption in favor of the assessor's ruling, if no evidence is offered in support of the complaint, the reviewing board is justified in fixing the valuation complained of in the amount assessed by the assessor."

To prevail, Taxpayers had to "present an opinion of market value and then ... present substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on tax day." Daly v. P.D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Mo.App.2002). They utterly failed in this regard. As the STC correctly found, Taxpayers "elected to offer no evidence of value, with the exception of one parcel."⁴ Taxpayers do not contend otherwise.

Because Taxpayers did not carry their burden of proving the assessments were excessive or discriminatory, we would be compelled to affirm the STC's order upholding the assessed valuations for 1999 even if we found the STC erred in relying on the challenged presumption. See Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d at 161 (holding the statutory abolition of the presumption in favor of an assessor's evaluation does not relieve a taxpayer of the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was improperly valued). Under the circumstances, any opinion expressed by this court regarding the status of the presumption, that boards of equalization act correctly, would be advisory only. Appellate courts do not render advisory opinions. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Goodman, 883 S.W.2d 71, 74[3] (Mo.App.1994). Point denied.

Point III: Assessor's Authority To Use Appraisers⁵

Section 137.115.10 required Snider to "conduct a physical inspection" of any real estate upon which she had increased the valuation "by more than seventeen percent since the last assessment."⁶ In attempts to comply with this statutory mandate, Snider hired two licensed appraisers (Mark Hensley and Billy Keefer) to make such inspections.

Taxpayers' third point maintains the subject properties were unlawfully reassessed because Snider failed to prove she had authority to hire these appraisers. In developing this argument, Taxpayers concede that section 137.230.2 "would authorize" assistance for Snider, i.e., authorize her to use the services of appraisers Hensley and Keefer, but insist that Snider would only have this authority if an order to that effect was entered of record by the county commission.⁷ They assert Snider bore the burden of proving the existence of such an order, she failed to do so, and it was an erroneous conclusion of law for the STC to hold that Taxpayers had to come forward with evidence showing a lack of authority.

The fallacy in Taxpayers' argument is their premise that Snider had to adduce evidence on the "authority" issue. As explained in Point I, Taxpayers had the burden of proving the vital elements of their case, i.e., the assessments were unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. If Taxpayers' position is that the assessments were unlawful or improper because Hensley and Keefer were not authorized to participate in the reassessment, they had to timely put the issue before the STC in some fashion, i.e., either by pleading, or objection to evidence, or oral argument. See Textron Financial Corp. v. Trailiner Corp., 965 S.W.2d 426, 429...