Reeves v. State, CR-77-220
| Decision Date | 10 April 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. CR-77-220,CR-77-220,1 |
| Citation | 564 S.W.2d 503,263 Ark. 227 |
| Parties | Rodney Dale REEVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Matthew Horan, Fayetteville, for appellant.
Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen. by Jackson M. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
The appellant was charged with the theft of a 1973 Volkswagen car by receiving an offense that is essentially what was formerly known as receiving stolen property. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2206 (Repl.1977). Upon trial by jury he was found guilty and was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to 10 years' imprisonment and to a $10,000 fine. Several points for reversal are argued by court-appointed counsel.
The State's proof showed that on the night of August 27, 1976, the appellant Reeves and Mike Lovell, a police informant, drove together in Reeves's car from Fort Smith to Fayetteville for the purpose of stealing a Volkswagen. In Fayetteville the two men found a car of the kind that Reeves wanted. Lovell actually stole the car and followed Reeves back to Fort Smith. There they drove the Volkswagen into a garage next to Reeves's residence and used specialized tools to remove the several V.I.N.'s (vehicle identification numbers) from the stolen car. Lovell was paid $150 for his assistance when he left at about dawn. The police obtained a search warrant and searched the premises, finding the vehicle in question and several other Volkswagens from which the V.I.N.'s had been similarly removed.
It is first argued that the court should have granted a defense motion for a month's continuance and a defense motion for a second preliminary hearing. Our difficulty with respect to both motions arises from the absence of any facts tending to show why the court abused its discretion in denying the motions.
Neither motion was supported by the proffer of testimony. Counsel simply argued that 18 days was not sufficient time for him to prepare the case for trial and that a second preliminary hearing should be ordered because Reeves, as a result of having been found not to be an indigent, was not represented by counsel at the first preliminary hearing. It is argued here, as it was in the court below, that the issues in the case were so complex that it could not be properly prepared for trial in 18 days and that evidence favorable to Reeves might have been developed at a second preliminary hearing. We have, however, no facts to go on except the record of the actual trial as abstracted by counsel. That record indicates that Reeves received a fair trial and was well represented. In matters of this kind, turning essentially upon the many practical considerations that must be taken into account in setting a case for trial, we must depend upon the sound judgment of the trial court unless a clear abuse of discretion is made to appear. That showing has not been made in this case.
It is next argued that the court should not have allowed the State to prove Reeves's commission of other offenses; that is, that the officers found on Reeves's premises other Volkswagens from which the V.I.N.'s had been removed. The State did not actually try to show that the other vehicles had been stolen, though no doubt the jury so inferred. Even so, the proof was admissible as tending to show Reeves's knowledge that the 1973 Volkswagen in question had been stolen. Evidence of other crimes may be admissible to show knowledge. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-1001, Rule 404(b) (Supp.1977). It makes no difference that the prosecution had already shown by a witness that Reeves had participated in the theft of the Volkswagen. The State was entitled to prove its case as conclusively as it could. That Reeves possessed other vehicles from which the V.I.N.'s had been removed in a similar manner was competent evidence to suggest to the jury that he had so removed the V.I.N.'s from the Volkswagen in question for the purpose of preventing its possible identification as stolen property; in short, he must have known that it was stolen.
Third, the appellant questions the admissibility of the State's proof of previous convictions under the habitual criminal statute. Three of the four convictions that were proved showed that the sentences had been suspended. It is argued that such a judgment is not a "conviction" within the meaning of the habitual criminal law.
In Rogers v. State, 260 Ark. 232, 538 S.W.2d 300 (1976), we held that under the habitual criminal statute in effect in 1975, a judgment imposing a suspended sentence was admissible as a conviction. Act 228 of 1953, as amended. That statute was...
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Ruiz v. Norris, PB-C-89-395.
...for admission and that the records admitted in this proceeding were neither authentic nor properly authenticated. In Reeves v. State, 263 Ark. 227, 564 S.W.2d 503 (1978), the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the State's proof of two previous convictions based upon the circuit clerk's testimony......
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Watson v. State
...denies knowing the property is stolen, proof of previous acts of the same nature is admissible to show knowledge. Reeves v. State, 263 Ark. 227, 564 S.W.2d 503 (1978); Walker v. State, 13 Ark.App. 124, 680 S.W.2d 915 (1984). By the same token, questions relating to a conviction for growing ......
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Heard v. State
...they were the original records, not copies that needed to be certified, and were identified as such by the clerks. In Reeves v. State, 263 Ark. 227, 564 S.W.2d 503, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964, 99 S.Ct. 450, 58 L.Ed.2d 422 (1978), we held that proof of previous convictions was not inadmissib......
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Beaver v. State
...have been used against him for sentencing under that State's repeat offender statute. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1001 (1977); Reeves v. State, 263 Ark. 227, 564 S.W.2d 503, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964, 99 S.Ct. 450, 58 L.Ed.2d 422 The Arkansas convictions constituted felonies under the Alabama C......