Reeves v. State, 91-02069
| Decision Date | 23 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-02069,91-02069 |
| Citation | 605 So.2d 562 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Week. D2237 Gregory REEVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John S. Lynch, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Defendant appeals from the departure sentence imposed upon the revocation of his probation. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Defendant was originally placed on community control as a youthful offender pursuant to a plea agreement after he had pleaded guilty to the offense of delivery of cocaine. At the time he committed that offense in March 1988, he was 17 years of age. He thereafter committed multiple violations of the terms of his required supervision (first the terms of his original community control and later the terms of other dispositions including probation) on six separate occasions. The last occasion was a March 1991 violation of probation which included the substantive offense of resisting arrest without violence, of which defendant was found guilty, as reflected in the revocation order. The departure sentence now being appealed is 15 years incarceration, which is an eight-cell bump-up from the recommended nonstate prison sanction disposition in the first cell. (His original community control pursuant to the plea had been a one-cell departure.)
Both defendant and the state agree that the 15-year departure sentence went too far. See Williams v. State, 594 So.2d 273 (Fla.1992). The bone of contention is whether, as the state argues, a bump-up is permissible for each of defendant's six violations, which would put him in the seven to nine years range, or whether, as defendant argues, the general six-year cap on youthful offender sentences applies under section 958.04(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). The parties appear to agree that resolution of this dispute boils down to the question of whether the amended version of section 958.14, effective October 1, 1990 (see chapter 90-208, sections 19 and 22, Laws of Florida), applies to defendant.
The amended version of section 958.14 operates to subject a youthful offender to the general provisions of section 948.06(1) beyond the normal six-year cap for such an offender when the offender commits a substantive violation of probation or community control. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant's...
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State v. Meeks
...5th DCA 1997); Johnson v. State, 678 So.2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Dunbar v. State, 664 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). While no Florida decision until Meeks had undertaken the task of specifically defining "substantive" or "technical/nonsub......
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Schebel v. State, 97-2879.
...statute cannot be applied to appellant, because of the ex post facto prohibition. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The state notes, however, that the trial court was not limited by the youthful offender act as to the new offenses, but ......
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Dunbar v. State, 94-02975
...excess of six years after revocation of probation if the violation was substantive. See Sec. 958.14, Fla.Stat. (1993); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The consecutive sentences are reversed with directions to impose concurrent sentences with the appropriate credit for tim......
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Johnson v. State, 95-1785
...Stat. (1995); Dunbar v. State, 664 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Darden v. State, 641 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). We recalled the mandate and accepted the motion for rehearing as timely filed and received no response from the defendant. ......