O'regan v. Cunard S.S. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 January 1894 |
| Parties | O'REGAN v. CUNARD STEAMSHIP CO., Limited |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Gaston & Snow, ( A.F. Hayden, of counsel,) for plaintiff.
George Putnam and Thomas Russell, for defendant.
The plaintiff was sent for, and the price for her passage was paid, by one of her daughters, a resident of Boston. It does not distinctly appear by the report whether the daughter, in paying for the passage, acted for herself or as an agent for the plaintiff, but the case has been argued by the plaintiff's counsel as if the plaintiff was the original contracting party, acting through her daughter as her agent. It is a natural inference from the language of the report that the daughter paid the money and made the contract in Boston as a principal, but for the benefit of her mother. Perhaps this is not very important, for, if the defendant contracted with the daughter to carry the plaintiff, it would owe the plaintiff the duty to use proper care for her safety as a passenger, as it would if the contract were made with the plaintiff herself.
The first question in the case is whether the contract made in Boston, or the more definite agreement subsequently made in Cork, is the contract by which the rights of the parties are to be determined. The contract made in Boston was not an agreement that the plaintiff should take passage, and that the defendant should carry her to Boston at all events. It gave an option to the plaintiff to be carried or not, as she might choose; and, if her decision should finally be adverse to coming, it bound the defendant to pay back the money, less the agent's commission. It did not state when or by what steamer the plaintiff would come, or whether she would come at all, and it could not be known whether it would ever be the duty of the defendant to carry her, until she should first determine whether she wished to come. As soon as she gave the notice of her intention to embark in accordance with the terms of the original contract, she became entitled to a steerage passage on the next steamer sailing for Boston. If nothing else had occurred, her rights would have been finally fixed by the contract made in Boston; but, if the parties chose, it was proper for them to make a new and more definite contract, containing provisions in regard to what before had been left indefinite and uncertain. The giving of the notice of intention to embark, the assignment of the plaintiff to a particular steamer, and the giving up of the old contract by both parties, was a sufficient consideration for the making of the new one. If the plaintiff, through her daughter as agent, was the original contracting party at Boston, it is very clear that she could...
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