Regan v. Iron County Court

• Decision Date: 01 March 1910
• Citation: 125 S.W. 1140,226 Mo. 79
• Parties: B. B. REAGAN et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY COURT OF IRON COUNTY; BUFORD et al., Judges; LEWIS, Treasurer; and IRON COUNTY BANK
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

125 S.W. 1140

226 Mo. 79

B. B. REAGAN et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY COURT OF IRON COUNTY; BUFORD et al., Judges; LEWIS, Treasurer; and IRON COUNTY BANK

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

March 1, 1910

Appeal from Iron Circuit Court. -- Hon. Joseph J. Williams, Judge.

Affirmed.

Geo. D Reynolds and Geo. V. Reynolds for appellants.

(1) It was the duty of the county court to designate as the county depositary the banking corporation or individual banker offering to pay to said county "the largest rate of interest per annum." Ever since 1889, when it was first made the duty of the county courts to let out the county funds, the law has ordered that they be let to the highest bidder, to the bidder offering the largest premium or "the largest rate of interest per annum." Laws 1889, p. 81; R. S. 1889, secs. 3212 to 3222; Laws 1891, p 103; Laws 1895, p. 126; R. S. 1899, secs. 6817 to 6829; Laws 1901, p. 101. (2) This law, in sec. 6819, R. S. 1899, is mandatory, and does not vest discretion. Where a law requires the letting to "the lowest responsible bidder," or gives the right "to select the bid most advantageous to the State," or city, or to let the contract "at such price as the board may deem best calculated to secure the object required," or gives the board a right "to reject any and all proposals as may be deemed best to the interests of the State," or where the law requires the letting "to the lowest reliable and responsible bidder," the body authorized to act has discretion; but when the command of the law is that the letting shall be to the "lowest" or to the "highest bidder," without any qualifying words there is no discretion left to be exercised. This is the effect of our law, provided only, that the highest bidder is, in the judgment of the court, high enough. High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec. 92; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. St. 343; People v. Dorsheimer, 55 How. Pr. 118; State ex rel. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386; State ex rel. v. Jones, 155 Mo. 570; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N.Y. 312; Appleby v. Mayor, 15 How Pr. (N. Y.) 423; Dickenson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N.Y. 65; People v. Contracting Board, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 250; Kelley v. Chicago, 62 Ill. 279; Boran v. Commissioners, 21 Oh. St. 311; Ross v. Board of Education, 42 Oh. St. 374; Bank v. Stranathan, 43 Kan. 618; Dillon, Mun. Corp., sec. 98; Henry County v. Salmon, 201 Mo. 169. (3) The requirement of section 6819 of this law that the award shall be to the one "offering to pay the highest rate of interest per annum," is positive. It is a canon of construction of universal recognition that every positive requirement, which, if disregarded, would necessarily defeat the object of the statute, is to be held mandatory, and when the prescribed requisites are for the protection and advantage of the citizen and disregard of them affects the citizen unfavorably or unjustly, they are to be held to be mandatory. Rose v. Trestrail, 62 Mo.App. 358; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 158 Mo. 510; Hall v. Schoenecke, 128 Mo. 668; Hope v. Flentge, 140 Mo. 401. (4) If the proviso in section 6819, giving the court the right "to reject any and all bids," is to be construed as authorizing the county court to reject the bid of the one offering the highest rate of interest and to accept the bid of the one offering to pay a lower or the lowest rate of interest, then it is inconsistent with the body of the law, is in conflict with its spirit, and is repugnant to the whole scheme, as laid down by article 6. If to be so construed, it is void. Endlich on Interp. Stat., sec. 185. But it is, if possible, to be so construed as to be in harmony with the whole law, the intent of which obviously is to secure the largest premium or highest rate of interest for the privilege of holding on deposit the county funds. It is a familiar rule of construction that words in a statute, which, if interpreted literally, destroy or pervert the manifest purpose and object of the statute, are to be disregarded; common sense and good faith are the leading characteristics of all interpretations. St. Louis v. Herthel, 14 Mo.App. 467; Bank v. Haywood, 62 Mo.App. 556; State ex rel. v. Slover, 126 Mo. 652; Ross v. Railroad, 111 Mo. 18; Bank v. Skeen, 101 Mo. 687; State v. Heman, 70 Mo. 441; State v. Heman, 70 Mo. 451; Cole v. Skrainka, 105 Mo. 310; Kane v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 39; Connor v. Railroad, 59 Mo. 293. Of necessity the strict letter of the law must yield to the manifest intent. Riddick v. Governor, 1 Mo. 147; State ex rel. v. Emerson, 39 Mo. 89; Heman v. McNamara, 77 Mo.App. 10. (5) The county court is to exercise a wise discretion in seeing that the county funds are safe, when let on deposit; that they are on deposit with a safe depositary. The law itself, by section 6820, provides for this in requiring and specifying the kind of bond to be exacted, and authorizes the county court to withhold the award until a proper bond is given or to withdraw the fund, if, for any reason, the security given falls below what the county court deems safe. This is the expression of the legislative intent as to how the county funds are to be secured and safeguarded, and it disposes of the contention that the county court, in passing on the bid, at which time it does not have the question of the bond before it, has any right to take into consideration the solvency of the bidder. Boran v. Com., 21 Oh. St. 311. (6) If any discretion was vested in the court, the facts show that it was abused, and the award made, not as a matter of judgment, but arbitrarily and without lawful basis. This amounts to abuse of discretion and is within the corrective control of the courts. State ex rel. v. Board of Public Schools, 134 Mo. 307; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; St. Louis v. Mfg. Co., 139 Mo. 570; People ex rel. v. Gleason, 121 N.Y. 631; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N.Y. 312; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N.Y. 23; Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N.Y. 65.

C. P. Damron for the county court; Wm. R. Edgar, M. L. Clardy and C. D. Corum for the bank.

(1) The statute authorized the county court to exercise its reasonable discretionary powers. The county court did exercise reasonable and wise discretion, and under such circumstances the courts will not interfere by mandamus, injunction, prohibition, or in any other manner. State ex rel. v. Hawkins, 130 Mo.App. 41; State ex rel. v. Gregory, 83 Mo. 137; State ex rel. v. Fort, 180 Mo. 108; High on Extra. Leg. Rem., secs. 24, 92, 94; Mechem on Pub. Officers, sec. 991. (2) Where discretion is vested in a public officer the courts will not direct how it shall be executed nor what conclusion or judgment shall be reached, in the absence of an arbitrary abuse of power. State ex rel. v. Jones, 155 Mo. 576; State ex rel. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386; State ex rel. v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44. (3) The fact that the successful bidder must file a bond for the faithful performance of its duty does not deprive the county court of discretionary power, nor preclude it from rejecting any bid. State ex rel. v. Hawkins, supra; Commonwealth v. Smith, 92 Pa. St. 349; People v. Dorsheimer, 55 How. Pr. 118.

OPINION

GRAVES, J.

Whilst the pleadings in this case are lengthy, the facts thereof, and the issues therein can be stated in short form. Under the law, Revised Statutes 1899, section 6817, the county court of Iron county advertised for bids from such banks or bankers as might desire to become the county depositary. In response to such notice two banks of the county filed their bids. Each complied with the law in filing such bid. When the bids were opened it was found that the Bank of Ironton had offered to pay four and three-eighths per cent interest on the daily balance of county deposits, and the Iron County Bank had offered to pay two per cent on such daily balances. The latter bank also offered to receive at par items on other banks, and to issue drafts upon other banks free of charge whenever requested by county officials. The bids were opened at the hour designated by law, and owing to the insistence of counsel for the Bank of Ironton, the matter was passed upon by the county court before adjournment for dinner. The statute prescribes that the bids shall be opened at high noon, and they were so opened. It would appear that members of the court desired time to look into the matter but counsel for the Bank of Ironton insisted that they should then and there make the award. Following this insistence the award was made, but to the Iron County Bank rather than to the Bank of Ironton. Relators, as taxpaying citizens, many of whom were interested in the defeated bank, brought this action, which action and the proceedings, nisi, are well set forth in a written opinion filed in the cause by the chancellor, thus:

"The plaintiffs, by their petition in this case, and in their capacity as taxpaying citizens of Iron county, Missouri, ask this court for a mandatory injunction to restrain and enjoin the county treasurer of said county from hereafter depositing the county funds, or district school funds, or capital school funds, or any part thereof, of said county, in the Iron County Bank, under, and by virtue of an order of the county court of said county, designating and selecting that bank, as the depositary of such funds, made on the first day of May 1905, for the then ensuing two years; to restrain and enjoin the Iron County Bank from receiving or retaining such funds or any of them; requiring the treasurer to withdraw all of such funds, as may, by virtue of said order of court, have been, by him, deposited in said bank; restraining and enjoining the county court of said county from further recognizing its said order of May 1, 1905, and requiring it to proceed, under the statute, in such cases made and provided, to designate and select some depositary...