Schaffer v. Leimberg
| Decision Date | 21 June 1945 |
| Citation | 318 Mass. 396,62 N.E.2d 193 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | MAURICE M. SCHAFFER & another v. GOLDIE LEIMBERG; ADMINISTRATOR OF THE OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION, intervener. |
January 2, 1945.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., LUMMUS, QUA WILKINS, & SPALDING, JJ.
Price Control. Constitutional Law, War powers, Delegation of powers Assertion of constitutional rights, Federal statute, State courts, Price control. War. Jurisdiction, Federal statute Price control. District Court, Jurisdiction. Damages Penalty. Practice, Civil, Appellate Division: appeal. Statement by LUMMUS, J., as to the war powers of Congress.
The provision of Section 205 (e) of the Federal emergency price control act of 1942, that one overcharged may recover either $50 or "treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater," provides for the recovery of remedial damages and not a penalty.
The power to make regulations fixing maximum rents, given by Congress to the administrator of the Office of Price Administration by the emergency price control act of 1942, was validly delegated within the Federal
Constitution. A Federal statute, or a regulation made under it, if valid under the
Federal Constitution, is binding on the courts of a State even though repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the State. The provision, constitutional under the Federal Constitution, of Section
204 (d) of the Federal emergency price control act of 1942, denying to all courts, except the Emergency Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari from that court, the power to consider the constitutional validity of regulations made by the administrator of the Office of Price Administration under the authority of the statute, was not a valid ground for a ruling by the Municipal
Court of the City of Boston, a court of record of superior and general jurisdiction of actions at law, that it had no jurisdiction of an action brought under Section 205 (e) of the statute by a tenant who alleged that he had been charged rent in excess of the maximum rent established by such a regulation; the court had jurisdiction even if the provision in question was repugnant to the Constitution and laws of Massachusetts.
An appeal by a plaintiff from an order by the Appellate Division in an action in a District Court was not to be dismissed merely for the reason that the estimated expense of the preparation of the papers was wholly paid by an intervener, also an appellant from the order, who stipulated with the plaintiff in effect that the same record might serve for both appeals.
CONTRACT OR TORT. Writ in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated March 26, 1943.
The administrator of the Office of Price Administration was allowed to intervene.
The action was heard by Riley, J., who ordered it dismissed for want of jurisdiction. A report to the Appellate Division was ordered dismissed. Both the plaintiffs and the intervener appealed.
In this court the defendant filed a motion that the plaintiffs' appeal be dismissed on the ground that they had not paid the estimated expense of preparation of the papers.
The plaintiffs and the intervener filed in this court a stipulation that, "the intervener having paid the expense of the preparation and printing of the record on appeal and the said intervener and plaintiffs having severally claimed an appeal, . . . the appeal herein may be considered the joint and several appeal of the said plaintiffs and intervener upon the record herein filed."
W. B. Sleigh, Jr., for the intervener. C. D. Brown, for the plaintiffs.
S. Miller, (E.
Miller with him,) for the defendant.
In this action of "contract or tort" begun on March 26 1943, in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, the plaintiffs alleged in their declaration that on March 1, 1942, they occupied as a residence an apartment in Boston which they held as tenants at will of the defendant at a rent of $40 a month; that on October 22, 1942, the administrator of the Office of Price Administration, popularly called the OPA, under the authority of the emergency price control act of 1942 (Act of January 30, 1942, c. 26; 56 U.S. Sts. at Large, 23), issued "Maximum Rent Regulation
No. 53," effective as of November 1, 1942, which provided that within territory of which Boston is a part, the maximum rent for housing accommodations rented on March 1, 1942, was to be the rent charged on that date; that for the two months beginning November 15, 1942, the defendant charged the plaintiffs and received from them $5 a month in excess of such maximum rent; and asked relief under Section 205 (e) of the emergency price control act of 1942 which provided that a person overcharged might recover either $50 or "treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater," plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court.
The answer began with a general denial, and then set up (a) that the female plaintiff was not a tenant, (b) that the act could not affect the tenancy in question because it antedated the act, (c) that the act and any regulations made under its authority were unconstitutional, and (d) that Congress could not delegate to the administrator the making of the regulation relied on by the plaintiffs.
On May 17, 1943, Prentiss M. Brown, administrator of the Office of Price Administration, was allowed to intervene as provided in Section 205 (d) of the act. On May 3, 1944, Chester Bowles, his successor in that office, was substituted as intervener.
There was evidence to support the allegations of the declaration. The judge did not find the facts, but ruled that the court had no jurisdiction, and ordered the action dismissed. On October 28, 1943, the plaintiffs having claimed a report, the judge made a report to the Appellate Division. On September 12, 1944, the Appellate Division sustained the judge by dismissing the report. Both the plaintiffs and the intervener appealed to this court.
The power of Congress "to declare war," and by plain implication, to wage war, is a power to wage war successfully, with all the means needed for that purpose. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25, 26. See also Godard v. Babson-Dow Manuf. Co. 313 Mass. 280, 287. Many individual rights that exist in time of peace may be denied in time of war, not because war suspends the Constitution, for it does not (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 120, 121; United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. 255 U.S. 81, 88; Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425, 426; A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 110), but because the war power given to Congress by the Constitution itself overrides, during the emergency of war, every claim of right that might impede the successful prosecution of the war. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. 251 U.S. 146. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 315 U.S. 289, 305. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283. No one in the present case questions the general proposition, now firmly established by judicial decisions under the very act in question, that the power to wage war includes the power to control prices and rents in order to prevent inflation, profiteering and economic distress during a war. Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co. 279 U.S. 253. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503. Taylor v. Brown, 137 F.2d 654. Compare, as to price regulation in time of peace, Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236; Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. 315 U.S. 575; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379.
Even if the rule that the courts of one sovereignty will not enforce penalties imposed by the laws of another applies to penalties imposed by the laws of the United States, the short answer to any objection founded on that rule is that a cause of action given to a person aggrieved to recover damages for the wrong done him is remedial and not penal within that rule even though the damages consist of a multiple of the actual loss or even are assessed without regard to the actual loss. [1] This has been so held with respect to the remedy given by the act in question to a person overcharged. Miller v. Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. (2d) 818. Lapinski v. Copacino, 131 Conn. 119. Lambros v. Brown, ---- Md. ----. [1] Beasley v. Gottlieb, 131 N. J. L. 117. Compare Bowles v. Farmers National Bank, 147 F.2d 425.
The objection that Congress had no power to delegate to the administrator the fixing of maximum limits upon rents has already been decided to be unsound. It is true that neither Congress nor the General Court of this Commonwealth may delegate its legislative function completely. But where the legislative branch of government has determined the policy to be pursued, it has power to delegate to an administrative officer or board the working out of the details by which that policy is applied to the subject matter. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 315 Mass. 335 , 341-343. Opinion of the Justices, 315 Mass. 761 , 767, 768. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397, 398. Regulations made under the act in question have already been held constitutionally valid within that rule by the controlling authority of the Supreme Court of the United States. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-427. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 512-516.
Of course an unconstitutional regulation, equally with an...
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