Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. Raygor

• Decision Date: 04 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. C1-99-1140.,C1-99-1140.
• Citation: 620 N.W.2d 680
• Parties: REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Appellant, v. Lance RAYGOR and James Goodchild, Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

620 N.W.2d 680

REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Appellant, v. Lance RAYGOR and James Goodchild, Respondents.

No. C1-99-1140.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

January 4, 2001.

Mark R. Rotenberg, General Counsel, Lorie S. Gildea, Associate General Counsel, Minneapolis, MN, Andrew Parker, Matthew E. Johnson, Smith Parker, PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Howard L. Bolter, Borkon, Ramstead, Mariani & Letourneau, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for respondents.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

This case raises the issue of whether the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1993), applies to toll the statute of limitations for Minnesota Human Rights Act claims against the Regents of the University of Minnesota during the time the state law claims were pending in federal court. Respondents Lance Raygor and James Goodchild brought this action against appellant Regents of the University of Minnesota (University) alleging age discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The University brought a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations for the MHRA claims had expired. In granting the motion, the state district court found that the statute of limitations for respondents' MHRA claims was not tolled under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute and that equitable tolling did not apply to the facts in this case; therefore, the claims were not timely. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 1367(d) did toll the state statute of limitations and that, in the alternative, the MHRA claims were equitably tolled during the pendency of the federal district court action. We reverse, holding that the application of section 1367(d) in this case is an unconstitutional infringement on state sovereign immunity in violation of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that equitable tolling does not apply.

In August 1995, respondents filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights alleging age discrimination by the University of Minnesota in certain employment decisions. The department dismissed the claims on July 17, 1996, and advised each respondent by letter that he could bring a civil action against the University in state district court within 45 days of receipt of the letter. Rather than filing in state court, respondents filed separate actions in the federal district court for the District of Minnesota on or about August 29, 1996, alleging violations of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1999), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 363 (2000). In its answers, the University raised Eleventh Amendment immunity and lack of jurisdiction as affirmative defenses. The federal actions were consolidated. In June 1997, the University served and filed a motion to dismiss the complaints pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state by citizens of that or another state. The federal district court granted the motion by order filed July 14, 1997, dismissing the claims without prejudice. Respondents appealed the federal district court's decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was stayed. On January 11, 2000, the United States Supreme Court held in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), that the Eleventh Amendment is a valid defense to an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim against a state. After Kimel was decided, respondents moved to withdraw the appeal, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.

Meanwhile, on August 1, 1997, respondents commenced this action in state district court alleging age discrimination under the MHRA. The action was stayed while the federal appeal was still pending; however, the stay was lifted on December 31, 1998, for the limited purpose of deciding the University's summary judgment motion. In moving for summary judgment, the University claimed that the action was barred by the state statute of limitations because respondents failed to file their claims in state district court within 45 days of receiving notice that the Minnesota Human Rights Department had dismissed the claims. See Minn.Stat. §§ 363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000). The state district court granted the motion,¹ concluding that the limitations period for the state action was not tolled while the federal action was pending and that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the limitations period.

Respondents sought review of the state district court's judgment in the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations for respondents' MHRA claims during the pendency of the federal district court action. See Raygor v. University of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn.App.2000)

. Alternatively, the court of appeals concluded that respondents' claims were equitably tolled while their federal district court action was pending. See id. at 134.

I.

This case presents us with the question of whether the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute should apply to toll the statute of limitations for a state law claim against a state defendant, in light of the immunity afforded the state by the Eleventh Amendment. In consideration of this issue, we first review the supplemental jurisdiction statute and the Eleventh Amendment.

In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the United States Supreme Court recognized the common law doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which permits a federal court to hear state law claims over which the federal court would not otherwise have jurisdiction when the state law claims are joined with a related federal claim. 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). To be related for purposes of pendent jurisdiction, the claims "must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." Id. Congress codified the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. § 1367, known as the supplemental jurisdiction statute. Subdivision (a) provides:

Except as provided in subsections (b) [dealing with diversity jurisdiction] and (c) [discretionary dismissal of supplemental claims] or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1993).

At issue in this case is subdivision (d) of section 1367, which tolls the state statute of limitations for claims asserted under supplemental jurisdiction while the claims are pending in federal court. Subdivision (d) also assures a 30-day period in which to bring a state action after a supplemental claim is dismissed by the federal court:

The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). By its plain language, section 1367(d) applies to "any claim" asserted under section 1367(a); however, the University argues that this federal statute cannot trump the protections afforded the University by the Eleventh Amendment.

Critical to our analysis of section 1367(d)'s effect in this case is an understanding of the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Notwithstanding this express language, the Eleventh Amendment has long been interpreted to also prohibit citizens from pursuing claims against their own state in federal court. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)

. The protections of the Eleventh Amendment exist unless the state has unequivocally consented to suit in federal court, or Congress has unequivocally abrogated state immunity in order to effectuate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Because there is no dispute that the University is an "arm" of the State of Minnesota, the University is entitled to the protections of the Eleventh Amendment in a suit brought by citizens of Minnesota in a federal court. See Treleven v. University of Minn., 73 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.1996).

Prior to the enactment of section 1367, the United States Supreme Court applied Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims brought in federal court under common law pendent jurisdiction. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984)

. In Pennhurst, the Court concluded that "neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment." 465 U.S. at 121,

104 S.Ct. 900. Therefore, under the reasoning in Pennhurst, the federal district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the MHRA claims once the Eleventh Amendment was asserted by the University. See Cooper...