Reid v. Angelone

• Decision Date: 19 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-6146.,03-6146.
• Parties: Juanita Pope REID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

369 F.3d 363

Juanita Pope REID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald J. ANGELONE, Director, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 03-6146.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 22, 2004.

Decided: May 19, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Keith R. Palfin, Student Counsel, Appellate Litigation Program, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Jennifer Ransom Franklin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Steven H. Goldblatt, Director, Appellate Litigation Program, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINS wrote the opinion, in which Judge WIDENER and Judge MICHAEL joined.

OPINION

WILKINS, Chief Judge.

Juanita Pope Reid seeks review of a district court order denying her motion for reconsideration of an order denying her application for habeas corpus relief. We hold that Reid must obtain a certificate of appealability as a prerequisite to our consideration of her claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c) (West Supp.2003). In addition, we grant a certificate of appealability as to the only claim that Reid seeks to appeal, vacate the decision of the district court, and remand with instructions.

I.

In November 2000, Reid appeared in a Virginia state court and pled guilty to larceny. The court accepted her plea, revoked the probation she was serving for a prior offense, and sentenced her to a total of six years imprisonment — four years for the probation violation and two years for the new offense (with an additional three years suspended). Reid's ensuing appeals were unsuccessful, and she did not seek collateral review in state court.

In July 2001, Reid filed an application for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.2003). The district court dismissed this application without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Reid subsequently filed a second habeas application. After the Commonwealth filed its answer, however, Reid moved to withdraw her application without prejudice so that she could pursue a state habeas action. The district court denied this motion and dismissed Reid's application with prejudice.

The district court construed Reid's application to present three claims:

1. Petitioner did not understand the nature of the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty; her attorney led her to believe she would only receive a ten month sentence.

2. Petitioner's conviction was obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence to petitioner, specifically that no presentence report was prepared despite the judge's request for one.

3. Petitioner's conviction was obtained by a violation of her privilege against self-incrimination when the judge heard evidence from the probation officer concerning her participation in treatment for substance abuse and kleptomania.

J.A. 77. The court determined that Claims 2 and 3 were procedurally defaulted and that Claim 1, the ineffective assistance claim, was meritless in light of Reid's representations at the plea hearing "that she was entering the plea voluntarily, that nobody forced her into entering the plea, that she understood the maximum penalty for the crime and that she was satisfied with her attorney's performance." Id. at 81.

Reid then moved for reconsideration, asking the district court "to vacate dismissal with prejudice prayerfully asking to be without prejudice, [and] to also vacate judgement of denial of withdraw[a]l of petition based on Petitioner mental health issues." Id. at 84. Reid further asked the court "to grant also the remand for resentencing." Id. The court construed this as a motion for relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and denied the motion. Reid now appeals this order.

II.

The initial question before us is whether Reid needs a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(1)(A), a COA is required in order for a habeas applicant to obtain appellate review of "the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court."¹ Thus, we must decide whether the order denying Reid's Rule 60(b) motion was "the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding."

To interpret this statute, we begin by examining its plain language. See Ramey v. Director, 326 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir.2003). We must give the relevant terms their "common and ordinary meaning." Mapoy v. Carroll, 185 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, to the extent that there is any ambiguity in these terms, we must consider other indicia of congressional intent, such as the legislative history, see Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 627, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993). It is also appropriate in cases of ambiguity to consider which interpretation of the statute would best give effect to the underlying legislative purpose. See United States v. Goines, 357 F.3d 469, 475 (4th Cir.2004).

A. "The Final Order"

We begin with the phrase "the final order." It is undisputed that an order denying relief under Rule 60(b) is a "final order" for purposes of appellate review. See United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 525 n. 4 (4th Cir.2000). Reid maintains, however, that the order denying her Rule 60(b) motion was not "the final order" in this case. She asserts that because Congress used the definite article "the," rather than a broader term like "a" or "any," § 2253(c) applies only to the order denying relief on her habeas application.

Reid is correct about the meaning of the word "the." See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2368 (1981) (stating that the word "the" is "used ... to indicate that a following noun... refers to someone or something that is unique"). Thus, because Congress used the definite article "the," we conclude that, in every habeas proceeding, there is only one order subject to the requirements of § 2253(c).

B. "Proceeding"

The conclusion we have just stated does not end our inquiry. Instead, we must determine whether the order denying Reid's Rule 60(b) motion was issued within the same "habeas corpus proceeding" as the order denying her § 2254 application. We conclude that it was not; on the contrary, a single habeas action may embrace multiple habeas "proceedings," and more than one of these proceedings may give rise to a "final order" subject to the COA requirement.

The term "proceeding" is indeterminate:

The word ["proceeding"] may be used synonymously with `action' or `suit' to describe the entire course of an action at law or suit in equity from the issuance of the writ or filing of the complaint until the entry of a final judgment, or may be used to describe any act done by authority of a court of law and every step required to be taken in any cause by either party.

Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed.1990); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (7th ed.1999) (defining "proceeding" alternatively as "[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment" and as "[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action"). But even under the more expansive definitions quoted above, a proceeding terminates with a judgment. Since Rule 60(b) motions are used to challenge final judgments, a proceeding involving a Rule 60(b) motion is necessarily separate from the proceeding giving rise to the underlying judgment. Cf. Holland, 214 F.3d at 525 n. 4 (noting that "the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable as a separate final order").

The language of Rule 60(b) confirms this understanding of the word "proceeding." The rule allows a party to seek relief from "a final judgment, order, or proceeding." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (emphasis added). This indicates that filing a Rule 60(b) motion initiates a new proceeding that is separate from the proceeding from which the movant seeks relief (or, as in this case, the proceeding giving rise to the judgment from which the movant seeks relief).

To the extent that any ambiguity remains, it may be resolved through examination of pre-AEDPA procedures. Congress enacted § 2253(c) in its current form as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Before the AEDPA, § 2253 provided in pertinent part:

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2253 ¶ 3 (West 1994). Although the AEDPA substantially revised this provision, it retained the phrase relevant to our analysis — "the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding." Because Congress did not change this phrase, we presume that Congress intended to ratify any settled judicial interpretation regarding the scope of the certification requirement. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994). It is therefore of great significance that pre-AEDPA courts consistently required a certificate of probable cause (CPC) when reviewing orders denying Rule 60(b) motions in habeas actions. See Lynch v. Blodgett, 999 F.2d 401, 402-03 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam order); see also Waye v. Townley, 884 F.2d 762, 762 (4th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (noting that habeas applicant was granted CPC for appeal from Rule 60(b) order).

C. "Habeas Corpus Proceeding"

There is one question remaining under § 2253(c): If an order denying ...