Reid v. Bd. of Educ. of Marion Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2
| Decision Date | 16 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5-18-0519,5-18-0519 |
| Citation | 2019 IL App (5th) 180519 -U |
| Parties | GREG REID, on Behalf of Himself and All Certified Teaching Personnel Employed by Marion Community Unit School District No. 2 During the 2014-15 School Year (Class A); DURENDA FUCHS, on Behalf of Herself and All Professional Employees of Williamson County Education Services Assigned to Marion Community Unit School District No. 2 During the 2014-15 School Year (Class B, Sub-Class 1); and VICKI CHISMAR (f/k/a Kalaher), on Behalf of Herself and All Nonprofessional Employees of Williamson County Education Services Assigned to Marion Community Unit School District No. 2 During the 2014-15 School Year (Class B, Sub-Class 2), Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MARION COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2 and GOVERNING BOARD OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY EDUCATION SERVICES, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE
Decision filed 07/16/19. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Williamson County.
¶ 1 Held: Circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, because section 10-19 of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/10-19 (West 2014)) required defendants to compensate plaintiffs for days worked beyond originally established closing date of 2014-15 school calendar.
¶ 2 The defendants, Board of Education of Marion Community Unit School District No. 2 and Governing Board of Williamson County Education Services (collectively, School Board), appeal the summary judgment entered by the circuit court of Williamson County on September 26, 2018, in favor of the plaintiffs, Greg Reid, on behalf of himself and all certified teaching personnel employed by Marion Community Unit School District No. 2 during the 2014-15 school year (Class A); Durenda Fuchs, on behalf of herself and all professional employees of Williamson County Education Services assigned to Marion Community Unit School District No. 2 during the 2014-15 school year (Class B, Sub-Class 1); and Vicki Chismar (f/k/a Kalaher), on behalf of herself and all nonprofessional employees of Williamson County Education Services assigned to Marion Community Unit School District No. 2 during the 2014-15 school year (Class B, Sub-Class 2) (collectively, employees). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 4 Pursuant to a joint statement of uncontested facts filed by the parties, the 2014-15 calendar adopted by the School Board established May 28, 2015, as the closing date for the academic year. The calendar budgeted five emergency days to be used in the event severe weather prevented attendance, and all five of these emergency days were used due to severe weather. Subsequently, attendance was cancelled by the School Board on twoadditional days, March 5 and 6, 2015, due to severe weather. The employees concede that their pay was not reduced for the pay period encompassing these two additional days. On April 21, 2015, the School Board established a revised calendar for the 2014-15 school year, rescheduling the two additional cancelled days for the end of the year with the result of the closing date of the school year being extended to June 1, 2015. Some of the employees worked on both May 29 and June 1, 2015, some worked on only one of those days, and others utilized paid sick or personal leave days in lieu of working.
¶ 5 On May 25, 2016, the employees filed a class action complaint for a declaratory judgment against the School Board. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the employees worked for the School Board beyond the days set forth on the calendar for the 2014-15 academic year but were not paid for those days. The employees requested the circuit court to grant class certification for three different categories of employees based upon whether the employees worked one, both, or none of the days beyond which the School Board extended the calendar. In addition, the employees requested the circuit court enter a declaratory judgment that the School Board breached section 10-19 of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/10-19 (West 2014)) by refusing to pay or credit the employees for leave days as appropriate. Finally, the employees requested that the circuit court order the School Board to pay or credit the employees for those days. The circuit court granted certification of the three classes on December 28, 2017.
¶ 6 On June 25, 2018, the employees filed a motion for a summary judgment and the School Board filed a cross-motion for a summary judgment. A hearing on the motions was conducted on September 24, 2018. On September 26, 2018, the circuit court enteredan order granting the employees' motion for a summary judgment, denying the School's cross-motion for a summary judgment, and awarding the employees back pay and leave days to which they were entitled, the amounts of which were to be determined on the basis of their regular contracts.1 The School Board filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 8 The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred by granting the employees' motion for a summary judgment. "A summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hagy v. McHenry County Conservation District, 190 Ill. App. 3d 833, 842 (1989). "Summary judgment is appropriate *** where there is no dispute as to any material fact but only as to the legal effect of the facts." Id.
¶ 9 "In appeals from summary judgment rulings, a reviewing court conducts a de novo review." Makowski v. City of Naperville, 249 Ill. App. 3d 110, 115 (1993). "The reviewing court's function in reviewing a summary judgment is to determine whether the trial court correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the trial court correctly entered judgment for the moving party as a matter of law." Id. "In the light of the record made at the time the trial court ruled [citation], a reviewing court maysustain the decision of the trial court on any grounds called for by the record, regardless of whether the trial court made its decision on the proper ground." Id.
¶ 10 The parties agree that the operative facts of this case are undisputed, that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that one party or the other is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The parties' disagreement hinges on the construction of a provision within section 10-19 of the School Code. 105 ILCS 5/10-19 (West 2014). That section provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 11 The meaning of the emphasized provision above is disputed by the parties. "[T]he fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature." In re County Treasurer, 308 Ill. App. 3d 897, 899 (1999). In interpreting a statute, "[c]ourts should look first to the statutory language itself, as the language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature's intent." Id. "Where the meaning of a statute is clearly expressed in the language of the statute, a court cannot imply any other meaning." Id.¶ 12 Here, the plain language of the section at issue reveals the legislature's intent. According to this section's plain language, school boards have the authority to establish school calendars each year to accommodate the minimum number of days of attendance that the section requires. 105 ILCS 5/10-19 (West 2014). However, the statute limits the School Board's authority to lengthen the calendars past the originally-scheduled closing dates of the calendar by providing they may do so only to the extent necessary to satisfy the required number of attendance dates. Id. In the case that it becomes necessary to extend the closing date of the calendar in order to satisfy the required number of attendance dates, the plain language of this provision requires school employees to be paid "for such additional time on the basis of their regular contracts." Id.
¶ 13 The School Board argues that "for such additional time on the basis of their regular contracts" means time in excess of the number of days the employees were contracted to work. The School Board contends that because work days were rescheduled, not added, and because...
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