Reid v. Middle Flint Area Cmty. Serv. Bd.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-CV-259 (LAG) |
| Parties | CARL M. REID, III, Plaintiff, v. MIDDLE FLINT AREA COMMUNITY SERVICE BOARD, d/b/a MIDDLE FLINT BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 21). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
Plaintiff Carl M. Reid, III, initiated this employment discrimination action against Defendant Middle Flint Area Community Service Board, doing business as Middle Flint Behavioral Healthcare on December 21, 2020. (Doc. 1). With the Court's leave Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 31 2021.[1] (Doc. 9). In the Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him because of his disability when it transferred him to a new location, failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation, and discharged him. (Doc. 9 ¶¶ 91, 101-04, 112-13). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant discharged him in retaliation for complaining about the alleged disability discrimination. (Id. ¶¶ 114-15). He brings claims under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Id. ¶¶ 86-116). After discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 20, 2021. (Doc. 21). Plaintiff responded on January 24, 2022, and Defendant replied on February 7, 2022. (Docs. 26, 27). Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is ripe for review. M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.3.1(A).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate where “the evidence shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). “An issue of fact is ‘material' if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 893 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) ). At summary judgment, the Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and resolves factual disputes for the nonmoving party when doing so is supported by sufficient evidence. Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1134 (quoting Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)); Whitehead v. BBVA Compass Bank, 979 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020).
The parting moving for summary judgment “bears the initial burden” of showing, by reference to the record, “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Whitehead, 979 F.3d at 1328 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); see Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018). The movant can meet this burden by “identifying] the portions of the record” that show there is no “genuine issue of material fact” or “by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case” for which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23). If the movant meets their initial burden, the nonmovant must then “go beyond the pleadings” and demonstrate “that there is a ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Whitehead, 979 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324); Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1134 (citation omitted). The nonmovant must “present competent evidence in the form of affidavits, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions and the like, designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Lamar v. Wells Fargo Bank, 597 Fed.Appx. 555, 557 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ().
Under Middle District of Georgia Local Rule 56, “[t]he movant for summary judgment” must submit “a separate and concise statement of material facts to which the movant contends there is no genuine dispute to be tried.” M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. Local Rule requires the non-movant to respond “to each of the movant's numbered material facts” and warns that “[a]ll material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.” Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Additionally, Local Rule 56 provides that “documents and other record materials relied upon by a party moving for or opposing a motion for summary judgment . . . be clearly identified for the court” by citations to “dates, specific page numbers, and line numbers” when possible. Id.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts does not fully comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56. For example, Plaintiff disputes many of Defendant's numbered facts without specifically controverting the statement or citing any materials in the record supporting his position. (See, e.g., Doc. 26-1 ¶¶ 12, 24-25, 37, 54-55). Several of Plaintiff's responses include broad, non-specific citations to entire documents in the record. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 29 (); id. ¶¶ 36, 46 (citing Plaintiff's entire seven-page affidavit, containing forty-four paragraphs)). In many cases, these broad citations do not address Defendant's specific factual allegation or do not support Plaintiff's denial. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 46). Accordingly, the Court deems as admitted all facts in Defendant's Statement of Material Facts that are supported by specific record citation and which were not controverted by Plaintiff in accordance with Local Rule 56. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 56; see also Mason v. George, 24 F.Supp.3d 1254, 1260 (M.D. Ga. 2014).
Plaintiff who suffers from a seizure disorder, was a social services technician employed by Defendant. (Doc. 21-2 ¶¶ 1, 9; Doc. 26-1 ¶¶ 1, 9). Defendant is a community service board that provides a variety of mental health, substance abuse, and disability treatment services in Southwest Georgia.[2] (Doc. 21-2 ¶ 2; Doc. 26-1 ¶ 2); O.C.G.A. § 37-2-6 et seq. Defendant operates outpatient clinics, residential treatment programs, crisis units, group counseling, and other programs at facilities throughout the counties it serves. (Doc. 21-2 ¶ 2; Doc. 26-1 ¶ 2; Doc. 26-4 at 21:17-23:20). Plaintiff began working for Defendant in May 2018 as a social services technician with Defendant's New Beginnings program in Americus, Georgia. (Doc. 21-2 ¶¶ 4, 9; Doc. 26-1 ¶¶ 4, 9). Before he was hired by Defendant, Plaintiff was a participant in Defendant's addiction recovery programs for many years. (Doc. 21-2 ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 26-1 ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 26-3 ¶¶ 3, 6; Doc. 26-5 at 41:7-42:7). One of Plaintiff's recovery goals was to become a counselor so he could “share [his] strength, hope, and experience with other individuals” facing similar mental health or addiction struggles. (Doc. 26-5 at 48:7-9, 54:6-10; Doc. 21-2 ¶ 6; Doc. 26-1 ¶ 6). Plaintiff expressed his desire to help others this way during his individual counseling sessions with Defendant's Clinical Director, Willie Greene. (Doc. 21-2 ¶¶ 5-6; Doc. 26-1 ¶¶ 5-6; Doc. 26-5 at 49:4-7; Doc. 26-4 at 39:21-40:2). When a social services technician position with the New Beginnings program became available, Greene recommended Plaintiff apply. (Doc. 21-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 26-1 ¶ 5; Doc. 26-4 at 39:13-40:9; Doc. 26-3 ¶ 8; Doc. 26-5 at 49:1-10). At the time Greene recommended Plaintiff apply, Greene knew that Plaintiff did not have a valid driver's license-a requirement for the job- because he suffered from a seizure disorder. (Doc. 21-2 ¶ 7; Doc. 26-1 ¶ 7; Doc. 264 at 52:6-53:1, 53:17-54:9). Greene advised Plaintiff that he was willing to work with Defendant's CEO and Human Resources director to waive the license requirement, as long as Plaintiff agreed to be responsible for arranging his transportation to and from work. (Doc. 21-2 ¶ 8; Doc. 26-1 ¶ 8; Doc. 26-4 at 41:4-21, 45:10-13).
During his first year of employment with Defendant, Plaintiff pursued various training and certification opportunities including certified peer specialist credentials offered by the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities. (Doc. 21-2 ¶ 10; Doc. 26-1 ¶ 10; see Doc. 9 ¶ 30). A certified peer specialist (CPS) is someone who has “lived experience” with a mental health condition or substance use disorder and is trained by the state to provide recovery support services to peers struggling with similar conditions. (See Doc. 26-5 at 53:16-54:10; Doc. 26-4 at 29:25-34:3). The Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities offers specialty CPS certifications for mental health and addictive disease service providers. (Doc. 26-4 at 29:25-34:3). Shortly after he started working for Defendant, Plaintiff applied for the training programs required for each certification. (Doc. 21-2 ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 26-1 ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 26-5 at 50:3-11,...
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