Reid v. Miller

• Decision Date: 24 February 1910
• Parties: REID v. MILLER et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

205 Mass. 80

91 N.E. 223

REID v. MILLER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 24, 1910

COUNSEL

Daniel L. Smith, for plaintiff.

Delaven C. Delano, for defendant Virginia Miller.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

In this action a husband and wife were sued jointly to recover the price of stone used in the construction of a house on land of the female defendant. At the close of the evidence the judge was asked to rule that there could be no recovery against this defendant. This ruling was refused, and the verdict was against her alone. The evidence showed that the husband made a contract or contracts under which the stone were furnished and it was not disputed that the stone were used in the construction of the cellar wall of the house. This defendant knew that the house was being erected, and knew in a general way what was being done there. The question is whether, from this evidence, the jury might infer that the work was being done by her authority. If it was done by her authority, and nothing more appeared, the law would imply a promise to pay for it.

In Beston v. Amadon, 172 Mass. 84-86, 51 N.E. 452, this court quoted with approval the language of Mr. Justice Hoar in Westgate v. Munroe, 100 Mass. 227, that the court entertained 'no doubt that if a person, with the knowledge of the owner, performs valuable services upon the separate property of a married woman, it is evidence of employment by her, and may authorize a jury to find a contract by her to pay for it.' It is a fair inference that ordinarily a person will not perform valuable services upon the real estate of another person without authority from the owner. The fact of performance of such services well warrants an inference of authority.

The ultimate fact to be ascertained in such cases is whether there was an employment from which arises, either expressly or by implication, an obligation to pay. The facts in the present case include everything that was shown in the case first referred to, except that in that case a payment was made by the defendant's husband, from her money, for some painting on a part of the place where they lived, upon which the greenhouse was erected by her son-in-law, for material used in the construction of which the plaintiff was allowed to recover. As the payment for the painting was not made by the person who contracted the debt for which the suit was brought, and as it was not for the painting of any part of the greenhouse, this portion of the evidence seems to have been of but little consequence. In every such case all the facts are to be considered, to ascertain whether there was or was not a contract, express or implied.

In the present case the jury might have disbelieved the testimony of the husband that this defendant objected to the building of the house. It is plain from the evidence that he was managing that part of her property--a fact which was deemed important in Arnold v. Spurr, 130 Mass. 347. The relation of husband and wife that existed between this manager and the owner of the land is a fact of significance, in connection with the nature of the work that was going on. There is a broad field for legitimate inference by a jury from facts like these. Besides the cases cited above, see Dyer v. Swift, 154 Mass. 159, 28 N.E. 8; Wheaton v. Trimble, 145 Mass. 346, 14 N.E. 104, 1 Am. St. Rep. 463, and Gannon v. Shepard, 156 Mass. 355, 31 N.E. 296. We are of opinion that the jury were rightly permitted to find that the husband was the wife's agent in procuring the material for this important addition to her real estate.

The...