Reid v. Partners
| Decision Date | 16 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 05CVH12-14637,No. 09AP-442,09AP-442,05CVH12-14637 |
| Parties | Madelynn Reid, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Plainsboro Partners, III et al., Defendants-Appellees. Lawrence W. Friel, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Margaret E. Swartz, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Carrie M. Varner, for appellant Madelynn Reid.
Onda, LaBuhn, Rankin & Boggs Co., LPA, Patrick H. Boggs and Benjamin W. Ogg, for appellant Margaret E. Swartz.
Giorgianni Law LLC, and Paul Giorgianni, for appellees Plainsboro Partners III, Columbus Junction Co., Bellows & Associates, Lawrence W. Friel, Jr., Jeffrey C. Bellows, Kathleen M. Underwood, and Tammi L. Tootle.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, Madelynn Reid ("Reid" or "appellants"), and Margaret E. Swartz ("Swartz" or "appellants"), appeal judgments rendered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.
{¶2} The factual background of this impassioned familial dispute regards a father, Lawrence W. Friel, Jr. ("Friel" or "appellees"), and his estranged twin daughters, Reid and Swartz. Although the record does not conclusively establish the relationships amongst the appellees in this matter, Friel and Jeffrey C. Bellows ("Bellows" or "appellees") are business partners who own, operate, or have some business interest in Columbus Junction Company, Bellows & Associates, Inc., and Plainsboro Partners III, L.P. dba Olde Mill Lakes Apartments ("appellees"). At all relevant times, Kathleen M. Underwood was employed by Bellows & Associates, Inc., while Tammi L. Tootle was allegedly employed by one or some number of the foregoing entities.
{¶3} In 2004, Reid resided in an apartment unit at the Olde Mill Lakes Apartments in Dublin, Ohio. She did not pay rent and was not residing there pursuant to a written lease. She had been living there under these terms for around seven years. According to the record, Friel frequently allowed Reid and her three siblings to live rentfree at his properties.
{¶4} In August 2004, Reid informed the property manager of Olde Mill Lakes Apartments that she was scheduled to undergo bilateral foot surgeries and would need a disability access ramp to make her apartment wheelchair accessible. On September 3, 2004, Swartz notified Reid that a ramp had been built. However, Swartz and Reid felt that the ramp appellees had constructed was unsafe and outside city code. As a result, over the next few weeks, appellants and appellees disputed various issues, including the ramp's specifications and the party who would ultimately be responsible for bringing the ramp up to code.
{¶5} Appellants contacted building inspectors and government agencies to raise issue with the ramp. On September 28, 2004, appellees sent Reid a letter informing her of their intent to remove the ramp. The letter also served as an eviction notice and gave Reid until October 31, 2004 to leave the premises. Days later, appellees recanted and indicated that Reid could remain on the property if she entered into a lease and began paying rent in the amount of $550 per month. Additionally, appellees granted permission for a new ramp to be installed.
{¶6} Based upon the circumstances, Reid filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC") on October 1, 2004 ("charge one"). The allegations of charge one referenced appellees' inability to construct an access ramp that met code requirements in addition to the threat of eviction that resulted from her complaints.
{¶7} In the middle of October 2004, appellants and appellees had a dispute over the installation of a viewer/peephole for the front door of Reid's apartment.
{¶8} Construction of the new ramp was completed in early December 2004. Reid acknowledged that the new ramp met code requirements but indicated that appellees needed to provide handicap parking and proper signage. Appellees agreed toprovide such by December 17, 2004, the date of a scheduled inspection. The day before the inspection, however, Reid had her own contractor paint a handicap parking space. Appellees then installed signage that Reid claimed was not in accordance with city code. As a result, Reid's contractor corrected the deficiencies. The ramp, parking space, and signage passed the inspection with minor modifications.
{¶9} As a result of these circumstances, Reid filed a charge of retaliation with the OCRC on December 21, 2004 ("charge two"). In charge two, Reid expressed her belief that appellees intended for the inspection to fail.
{¶10} In the meantime, the OCRC had been investigating charge one. In January 2005, the parties executed a conciliation agreement and consent order ("CACO") to resolve charge one. The OCRC approved the CACO, under which Plainsboro Partners III dba Olde Mill Lakes Apartments, Bellows & Associates, and their respective agents paid Reid $13,325 to resolve charge one without admitting to liability. Reid received the CACO check and deposited the funds on March 14, 2005. Three days later, she received a letter indicating she would be required to sign a lease and begin paying rent if she intended to remain at Olde Mill Lakes Apartments. The proposed rent was $650 per month. The letter gave Reid until April 17, 2005 to enter the lease.
{¶11} The OCRC informed Reid that its staff had recommended charge two receive a "no probable cause" finding. On March 24, 2005, Reid withdrew charge two before the OCRC issued its anticipated no probable cause order.
{¶12} Nevertheless, one day before charge two was formally withdrawn, Reid filed another charge with OCRC ("charge three"). Again, she alleged disability discriminationand retaliation. Charge three was based upon appellees' request for Reid to enter into a lease and begin paying rent. The record indicates that charge three was amended on April 5, 2005. After investigating charge three, the OCRC found that no probable cause existed to support Reid's allegation that appellees engaged in discrimination.
{¶13} As Reid lodged these complaints, Swartz consistently participated in the disputes and supported Reid. In May 2005, Friel filed a complaint for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Swartz in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The case resulted from a loan that Friel provided to Swartz in the amount of $7,448.19 in June 1985. Based upon the allegations of the complaint, the unpaid debt accumulated interest and had grown to $93,993.39 at the time Friel filed his complaint. The matter was assigned as case No. 05CVH05-5825 ("5825 case"). In response, Swartz filed an answer and counterclaims, in which she alleged Friel engaged in discrimination and retaliation against Swartz based upon her involvement in the disputes amongst Reid and appellees.
{¶14} In June 2005, appellees initiated an eviction action against Reid in the Franklin County Municipal Court, which was assigned case No. 2005 CVG 023432. In July 2005, Reid filed her answer and counterclaims, which resulted in a transfer to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The matter was assigned case No. 05CVH07-8122 ("8122 case") and was consolidated with the 5825 case. Eventually, however, the parties dismissed the claims and counterclaims in the 8122 case. However, Reid's claims were re-filed and assigned case No. 05CVH12-14637 ("14637 case"), which was again consolidated with the 5825 case. In the 14637 case, Reid presents causes of action against appellees for: (1) retaliation in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) discrimination and harassment in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 and the ADA; (3) violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) violations of 42 U.S.C. 1985, 1986; (6) hostile environment in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112; (7) punitive damages; (8) retaliation in violation of R.C. Chapter 5321; and (9) violation of public policy.
{¶15} The claims in the 14637 case were all resolved when the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on September 20, 2006. An appeal followed, which this court dismissed based upon the absence of a final appealable order. See Reid v. Plainsboro Partners III, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1099, 2007-Ohio-5655, ¶12. After the trial court resolved Swartz's retaliation claims in the 5825 case, Reid again appealed and raises the following assignments of error:
Both of Reid's assignments of error challenge the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to appellees. Therefore, the issue raised in Reid's portion of this consolidated appeal is whether summary judgment was properly granted against her.
{¶16} Appellate courts review decisions on summary judgment motions de novo. Helton v. Scioto Cty. Bd. Of Commrs. (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162. "Whenreviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, the court of appeals conducts an independent review of the record and stands in the shoes of the trial court." Mergenthal v. Star Banc Corp. (1997), 122 Ohio App.3d 100, 103. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds raised by the movant at the trial court are found to support it, even if the trial court failed to consider those grounds. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42.
{¶17} Summary judgment is proper only when the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates that (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is...
To continue reading
Request your trial