Reid v. Reid

• Decision Date: 17 February 2006
• Docket Number: KEN CV-04-148
• Parties: KENNEBEC, ss.í PRISCILLA REID, Plaintiff v. CLAYTON REID, et al., Defendant SUPERIRO COURT CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss.í PRISCILLA REID, Plaintiff v. CLAYTON REID, et al., Defendant KENNEBEC, ss.í PRISCILLA REID, Plaintiff v. CLAYTON REID, et al., Defendant SUPERIRO COURT CIVIL ACTION
• Court: Maine Superior Court

PRISCILLA REID, Plaintiff v. CLAYTON REID, et al., Defendant

No. KEN CV-04-148

Superior Court of Maine, Kennebec.

February 17, 2006

SUPERIRO COURT CIVIL ACTION

DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT WASTE MANAGEMENT OF MAINE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the court on defendant Waste Management of Maine's motion for summary judgment. By her complaint plaintiff Priscilla Reid, individually, and as personal representative of the estate of James C. Reid, alleges the death of her husband was the result of negligence on the part of defendants Clayton Reid, Waste Management of Maine, Inc. and the Town of Mount Vernon.

James Reid ("James"), now deceased, was the brother of Defendant Clayton Reid ("Clayton" or "Defendant Reid"). Plaintiff Priscilla Reid ("Priscilla" or "the Plaintiff") is the sister-in-law of Clayton and the widow of James. On July 12 2003, James traveled to the Mt. Vernon transfer station located in the Town of Mt. Vernon ("the Town"), as a passenger in a pickup truck operated by Clayton. Upon arrival at the transfer station, James exited the vehicle to ask the attendant how to dispose of a television set that they had brought with them. After learning the location of the proper repository, James proceeded to remove orange pylons from the front of the identified dumpster, and then motioned to his brother to back his vehicle into position for unloading. As Clayton maneuvered backward, he received guidance from his brother, who was standing outside on the passenger side of the truck, and whom he viewed through the side-view mirror. At that time, however, Defendant Reid's view through the rear window and rearview mirror was obscured by the television, which sat in the bed of the truck. When James motioned for his brother to stop the truck, he did so turned off the engine, and began to get out. As he was stepping out of the truck, Clayton heard two thumps coming from the rear, which he believed to be the tailgate dropping down and James falling into the dumpster. When Defendant Reid approached the rear of his truck, he saw that the tailgate which had been up when he began backing up, was now down, and his brother was lying at the bottom of the dumpster. James' fall into the dumpster caused him to strike his head, killing him.

The dumpster into which James fell was owned by Defendant Waste Management of Maine ("Waste Management") and rented to the Town pursuant to the terms of a Solid Waste Disposal and Hauling Agreement ("the Agreement"). The dumpster itself was situated such that its top lip protruded only about a foot to a foot and a half above the ground upon which persons depositing trash would stand. Prior to the accident, a set of chains had been erected in front of the dumpster to prevent people from falling into it. On the date of the accident, however, these chains were no longer in place, and the Town did not employ any other device that would prevent people from falling into the dumpster.

The Plaintiff filed her complaint on July 1, 2004 in her individual capacity and as the personal representative on behalf of the estate of James Reid. In her complaint, Priscilla alleges that Clayton, Waste Management, and the Town were negligent and proximately caused the death of her husband, for which she seeks damages in accordance with the Maine Wrongful Death Statute, 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-804.

The Law Court has explained that:

Summary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy. It is simply a procedural device for obtaining judicial resolution of those matters that may be decided without fact-finding. Summary judgment is properly granted if the facts are not in dispute or, if the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the evidence favoring the plaintiff is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff as a matter of law.

Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18, 21--22. Summary judgment is proper if the citations to the record found in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Dickinson v. Clark, 2001 ME 49, ¶ 4, 767 A.2d 303, 305. The party opposing summary judgment will be given the benefit of any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the presented facts. See Perkins v. Blake, 2004 ME 86, ¶ 7, 853 A.2d 752, 755. "A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case under governing law." Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 4, n.3, 770 A.2d 653, 655, n.3 (citing Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575). "The invocation of the summary judgment procedure does not permit the court to decide an issue of fact, but only to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists. The Court cannot decide an issue of fact no matter how improbable seem the opposing party's chances of prevailing at trial". Searles v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College, 1997 ME 128, ¶ 6, 695 A.2d 1206, 1209 (quoting Tallwood Land & Dev. Co. v. Botka, 352 A.2d 753, 755 (Me. 1976)). To avoid a judgment as a matter of law for a defendant, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of her cause of action. See Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1995).

In its motion, Waste Management first argues that it owed no duty to the Plaintiff with regard to the placement of the dumpster, or the selection, inspection, installation and maintenance of safety devices around the dumpster. To the contrary, the Defendant asserts that these considerations were the sole responsibility of the Town.

Waste Management also contends that its only responsibilities with respect to the dumpsters used at the transfer station were to rent them to the Town, to transport them to and from the station, and to dispose of the deposited waste. In support of these assertions, the Defendant suggests that the Agreement it entered into with the Town fixes the parties' duties as just described.

Even assuming that it did owe James a duty, Waste Management further asserts that the Plaintiff cannot possibly prove a breach. As grounds for this argument, the Defendant contends that for the Plaintiff to succeed at trial, she will have to prove that the placement of and failure to install safety devices around the dumpster amounts to a breach of the industry standard of care. In the Defendant's view, proof of industry standards will require expert testimony. In particular, Waste Management points out that expert testimony is required where the subject presented is beyond the scope of knowledge of the average layperson. See Lemay v. Burnett, 660 A.2d 1116, 1117 (N.H. 1995). Since the Plaintiff failed to disclose an expert to testify on this subject prior to the deadline for doing so, Waste Management asserts that Priscilla is precluded from offering expert testimony on this issue at trial.

In opposition, the Plaintiff asserts that Waste Management did in fact owe James a duty to reasonably and safely locate the dumpster and to make sure that appropriate safety measures were in place. Priscilla notes that the Defendant regularly picked up, transported, and dropped off dumpsters at the Mt. Vernon site. Moreover, the Plaintiff asserts that Waste Management knew exactly where the dumpster was located, and was aware, or should have been aware, that no safety devices were in place to prevent someone from falling as James did. Also, contrary to the Defendant's suggestion, Priscilla asserts that Waste Management was in fact responsible under the Agreement for the details of the work to be performed. In addition, the Plaintiff suggests that because Waste Management is in the business of trash hauling and disposal, it has expertise in the field. Under these circumstances, the Plaintiff contends that James' death was reasonably foreseeable, and was directly caused by the negligence of Waste Management and the other Defendants. Priscilla also maintains that in allowing the Town to continually use the bins in their dangerous condition, Waste Management should also be found liable on a negligent entrustment theory.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff criticizes the Defendant's suggestion that expert testimony will be necessary to prove her case. Priscilla points out that in Lemay, cited to by the Defendant, the plaintiff sued the owner of a pool after he dove from the diving board and hit his head on the bottom. The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated in its opinion that laypersons generally do not know when water becomes too shallow for diving, given a set of particular diving conditions. See Lemay, 660 A.2d at 1118. However, Priscilla draws our attention to the further statement in Lemay, indicating that "had [the water] been three feet deep, a jury could have readily determined the question of reasonable care unaided by expert testimony. The same would have been true of a pool fifty feet deep." Id. The Plaintiff explains that she is not arguing that the dumpster should have been 36 inches above the ground as opposed to 30, but rather, that the mere existence of an unprotected hole in the ground is negligent. Therefore, a jury will not be required to engage in the technical weighing and evaluation of particular measures that might have been utilized. Put another way, she implies that this situation is similar to the pool containing only three feet of water, and is thus distinct from Lemay.

In reply, the Defendant again claims that, pursuant to the Agreement, it was under no obligation to ensure the safety of the transfer station. Indeed the Agreement does not explicitly say what services are to be provided by Waste Management, but such services can be inferred from paragraph 3, Compensation. Under that paragraph, Waste Management is to be paid for hauling waste and delivering ...