Reid v. State

• Decision Date: 06 February 1913
• Citation: 181 Ala. 14,61 So. 324
• Parties: REID v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

61 So. 324

181 Ala. 14

REID v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 6, 1913

Anderson J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Lee County; Lum Duke, Judge.

Bartow Reid was convicted of first degree murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The following charges were refused to defendant:

"(2) The defendant had proven without conflict in this case a good character. I charge you that you must consider this proof, and I charge you that you may consider it together with all the other evidence in the case, even to the generation of a reasonable doubt, that would authorize you to find the defendant not guilty."

"(4) I charge you, gentlemen, that, if you believe from all the evidence in this case that defendant's wife fired the pistol shot, it would make no difference how those pistol wounds were inflicted, if you believe from the evidence that the situation, at the time the defendant came on the scene, was such as to impress the mind of a reasonable man that defendant's wife was in danger of losing her life or suffering great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, if you further believe from the evidence that defendant's wife was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty between her and deceased."

Barnes & Denson and Thomas D. Samford, all of Opelika, for appellant.

R.C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAYRE J.

Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer death. At the trial he did not deny the killing, but sought to excuse himself on the ground that it had been done in defense of his wife. Apart from the parties, there were no eyewitnesses to the difficulty. Deceased had three wounds in the back, one large wound inflicted by a shotgun and two small ones made by shots from a pistol. One Wilson, a witness for the state, saw the body of deceased shortly after death, saw the wounds upon it, and testified that, in order to stop the flow of blood from the large wound, he had "stuffed about a pound and a half or two pounds of cotton in it." The state asked this witness, "What was the range of the wounds on deceased's body?" He answered, "That the large wound, on the right of deceased's spinal column, went straight in; that the small wound, at the lower edge of deceased's shoulder blade, ranged upward and stopped at the point of deceased's shoulder; that the small wound, on the left of deceased's spinal column, ranged to the left, and stopped at the point of deceased's hip." Timely objections were taken and exceptions reserved to the allowance of this testimony. The objections were that the witness had not been shown to be an expert on the subject of gunshot wounds; that it had not appeared that witness had any means of knowing the range of the wounds; and that his statement was a mere conclusion, without facts to support it. In the circumstances of the case shown by the evidence, it is impossible to say that this testimony did not touch upon a most material point. But it is equally impossible to affirm that the witness did not know whereof he spoke. No expert knowledge was necessary. If he observed the course or range of the wounds--and the necessary implication was that he did--he could state the fact. If the competency of his statement was doubted as not being the result of actual observation or as resting in debatable inference, the invalidating facts should have been developed by a cross-examination. On its face, the testimony was competent, and there was no error in the court's ruling.

The charge requested by defendant in reference to the proof of good character (charge 2) was clearly erroneous. It assumes that defendant had a good character, whereas that was a matter to be found by the...