Reid v. State, 48046

• Decision Date: 03 May 1973
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 48046,48046,3
• Citation: 198 S.E.2d 358,129 Ga.App. 41
• Parties: Charles REID v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 358

198 S.E.2d 358

129 Ga.App. 41

Charles REID v. The STATE.

No. 48046.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

May 3, 1973.

S. Richard Rubin, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Morris H. Rosenberg, William M. Weller, Carter Goode, Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

STOLZ, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence for unlawful possession of cocaine in violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Held:

1. 'A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed by the appellate courts unless it clearly appears that the judge abused his discretion in this regard. (Cits.)' Dutton v. State, 228 Ga. 850(2), 188 S.E.2d 794, 796. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a continuance based upon the defendant's contention that he had originally contemplated employing another attorney, who was not available at the first call of the case, and that his subsequently retained counsel had inadequate time for preparation. 'Neither sudden withdrawal of retained counsel nor lack of preparation of new counsel is ipso facto a ground for continuance.' Huckaby v. State, 127 Ga.App. 439(1), 194 S.E.2d 119, 120. Here, the record shows that at the arraignment the trial judge granted the defendant's retained counsel a continuance from August 14 to September 5, the case being specially set for the latter date with the concurrence of counsel. There is no indication from the record that the defendant was not adequately represented by his retained counsel, or that a contended possible conflict of interest in fact existed, or that any of the defendant's rights were violated. The defendant was properly tried before his co-defendants were, at the State's request. Code § 27-2101 (as amended, Ga.L.1972, pp. 618, 619).

2. Where the police, acting on information supplied by a proven reliable informant, followed the automobile, in which the defendant (identified by the informant on the basis of police files and his on-the-scene observation) was a passenger, to a house, and set up a roadblock, and the defendant brought out of the house a bag of the contraband, which he discarded as he attempted to escape in the automobile by circumventing the roadblock, the defendant's flight, in connection with the circumstances of the information supplied by the informant, the police observation of the defendant's activities, and the abandonment of the contraband almost as a part of the act of fleeing, was sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest without a warrant, and authorized the appropriation of the abandoned contraband. See Green v. State, 127 Ga.App. 713, 194 S.E.2d 678 and cits. The motion to suppress the contraband as evidence was properly denied.

3. It is contended that the judge erred in failing, sua sponte, to instruct the jury to disregard the answer of a witness which revealed that the informant had identified the defendant partially on the basis of a police department picture taken upon a previous arrest. The record shows that this same information had been elicited upon the motion to suppress; that the judge sustained counsel's motion to strike this portion of the answer; that, after the ruling, counsel continued his examination without requesting further instructions or making further motions; and that no further complaint was made until after the verdict. 'In no case will the trial judge's ruling be reversed for not going further than requested.' Brooks v. State, 183 Ga. 466, 469, 188 S.E. 711, 713; Blocker v. State, 58 Ga.App. 560(3), 199 S.E. 444. "A party cannot during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an...