Reid v. State

• Decision Date: 24 August 2012
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2011.,No. 113,113
• Citation: 428 Md. 289,51 A.3d 597
• Parties: David REID v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

428 Md. 289
51 A.3d 597

David REID
v.
STATE of Maryland.

No. 113, Sept. Term, 2011.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 24, 2012.

[51 A.3d 598]

Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, and Howard R. Ehrlich, Rule 16 Atty., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for appellant.

Brian S. Kleinbord, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Todd W. Hesel, Honors Attorney, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and McDONALD, JJ.

BATTAGLIA, J.

[428 Md. 291]This case presents us with questions regarding the use of certain technology about which we have not had occasion to opine before, in the context of the Fourth Amendment.¹ The primary issue before us is whether the use by Baltimore City police of a Taser ² that fired two metal darts into the back of David Reid, the Appellant, affected a Terry³ stop or his [428 Md. 292]arrest.⁴ The determination of the type of detention is pivotal, affecting whether a statement Reid made to the police that he had a gun in his pocket, and the gun itself,

[51 A.3d 599]

should have been suppressed by the Circuit Court Judge who denied Reid's Motion to Suppress.

After having been convicted on an agreed-upon statement of the facts of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun illegally and of being in possession of a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying offense, Reid appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but, before any action was taken in that court, we, on our own motion, granted certiorari, 424 Md. 628, 37 A.3d 317 (2012), to consider the following questions:

1) Should the trial court have suppressed the evidence seized, where the use of a “Taser” to effectuate a Terry stop, under the circumstances of this case, violated the Fourth Amendment?

2) Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress his statement made following arrest and prior to Miranda warnings? ⁵

The State, in its brief, presented the questions as:

1) Was the Fourth Amendment seizure of Appellant supported by probable cause, and therefore reasonable, regardless of whether it was a de facto arrest or investigatory detention?

2) Was Appellant's statement that he had a gun in his pocket properly admitted under the “public safety” exception[428 Md. 293]to Miranda, and even if the statement should have been suppressed, was the gun found in Appellant's pocket nonetheless properly admitted, thus making the admission of the statement harmless error?

We shall hold that the use of a Taser to fire two metal darts into Reid's back converted what otherwise may have been a Terry stop into a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that there did not exist sufficient probable cause to arrest Reid. We shall further hold that both Reid's statement and the gun recovered from him should have been suppressed.

When the issue was addressed in the suppression hearing, Detective Scott Reid, unrelated to David Reid, was the only individual who testified. The Circuit Court Judge determined that the Detective was credible and made the following findings:

With respect to the facts leading up to the encounter between Reid and police officers, the judge found that officers received a call from an informant who told them that a tall, black male was armed and selling drugs at a particular location in Baltimore City:

Detective Reid, he was credible, he provided evidence, he was a relatively experienced officer, showed that he received a call or information from another, a superior, a Lieutenant McVicker about a confidential informant and provided information, and as counsel noted, I don't think this is particularly significant. I mean, it was a confidential informant so it was someone that they actually were aware of and it provided certain information but it wasn't particularly that significant information in the sense that it wasn't predicting any sort of future activity on the targets but nonetheless did provide information and in fact there was an individual, a taller individual, who he associated with a black Honda in a particular location.

The judge went on to find that the officers arrived at the location and observed a group of men, including a taller man, near a black Honda:

[51 A.3d 600]

[428 Md. 294]The officers responded at that location, I believe it was about 12:30 during the day in a public street and saw an individual sort of, Mr. Reid was described to be the taller individual, I guess among the three or four individuals that were present near this black Honda, he was the taller of the individuals and the officers then went to respond, and the call was for drugs, someone associated with drugs and/or guns in this vehicle.

The judge then found that the officers were wearing their badges and guns, thereby giving Reid notice that they were police and that Reid moved to conceal the right side of his body from one officer before running, as the officers approached:

[the officers] were wearing indicia of being police, meaning badges and they had their badges hanging down and I believe a gun, the defendant was observed, at that particular point in time, to try to enter the black Honda which I guess, again, would corroborate the fact that he was somehow associated with the Honda. He also, as the officers came, the officers indicated or the officer, Detective Reid, indicated that he made some sort of actions to secrete himself or what he called blading which I, for the record, is sort of turning yourself away from the police officers so they couldn't see the side where in fact the gun would be, checking the area where the gun would be, and then, as the officers approached, at that time, the defendant ran.

The judge also found that the officers called out to Reid to stop, and, when he did not, the Detective fired two metal darts from his Taser at Reid. The judge, relying on a case from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, then determined that the Detective effected a proper Terry stop by shooting the darts into Reid:

The officers at that particular point in time attempted to stop the defendant by calling out to him and I would find at that particular point in time, based on of all those observations, the confidential informant information which is corroborated by what the officers saw, by the fact that he made sort of evasive maneuvers when the officers came, and then [428 Md. 295]obviously the flight when the officers came up, he ran. And then while he was running away, he had gym shorts on and in the gym shorts there was a heavy object which made sort of a swinging motion which would again be consistent with having a handgun or something similar to a handgun in his pocket.

So at that point in time, I find that the officers had articulable suspicion both to stop and to frisk the defendant. The defendant did not respond when the officers identified themselves and asked him to stop. At that time he was struck with a Taser. It seems to me the case law is very consistent, I mean, obviously when the officers have articulable suspicion to stop someone, they can in fact use reasonable force to effectuate the stop which could include tackling him, handcuffing him, and I was able to find at least one case, there was a federal case, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which is United States v. Colon, 654 F.Supp.2d 326 (E.D.Pa.2011 [2009] ), in which the Court found that in fact it was reasonable and appropriate to use a Taser to in fact stop the defendant when, one, he was believed to be armed, and, two, he was responding to what the officers asked—when the officers asked him to stop and he was in a public street at that time, a public location I should say.

[51 A.3d 601]

The judge went on to consider whether or not Miranda warnings should have been given to Reid because of his determination that a reasonable person in Reid's position would have believed he was in custody and “not free to go”:

It seems to me at some point in time, a stop can get to the point where someone is in custody and certainly it seems to me under the facts of this circumstance where in fact this gentleman was knocked down, he had two prongs in his back from where he had been struck by the Taser and as the Detective indicated, in fact it would take a medical technician or a medical personnel to actually remove the Taser, I would find that in fact under those circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that they were in custody and not free to go.

428 Md. 296]The judge concluded, however, that the public safety exception ⁶ to Miranda applied and denied suppression of Reid's statement and the gun itself, but declined to rule on the issue of inevitable discovery:

At this particular point in time what the evidence shows though is in fact the simple question was, I think the Detective asked him if he had anything illegal on him, and this was in the context of just having taken this person down, having articulable suspicion to believe that he was armed, I would find that in fact this would qualify under the safety, public safety exception that was set out in New York v. Quarles which is 467 U.S. 49 [649, 104 S.Ct. 2626] and then there were similar cases in Maryland, specifically—well, not exactly a similar case but talked—discussed about the public safety section which is Thomas v. State, which is 128 Md.App. 274 [737 A.2d 622] and there is also, I believe, was the case of Hamilton v. State which is another public safety exception which was 62 Md.App. 603 [490 A.2d 763].

I think under the circumstances that these particular officers were not asking that question for some sort of investigatory term, certainly I would find at that point in time, they would have had a right to frisk him, I think it was clearly just to ask for a public safety, safety of the officers, just quickly trying to get down to the reason why they stopped him and they asked that...