Reid v. United States
| Decision Date | 14 May 1908 |
| Citation | 161 F. 469 |
| Parties | REID v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
On July 18, 1904, the petitioner enlisted as a soldier in the army of the United States, and took oath to serve as such soldier 'for the period of three years unless sooner discharged by proper authority. ' This enlistment oath, together with Reid's application to enlist and the record of his physical examination, constitute his enlistment papers, and embody whatever contract was made between him and the United States in respect of his engagement as a soldier. He was assigned to the Twenty-Fifth Infantry, and on August 13 1906, was stationed, with a battalion of his regiment, at Fort Brown, which is in or contiguous to Brownsville, Tex.
During the night of August 13-14th, certain persons repeatedly discharged firearms in the streets of Brownsville. The firing was apparently at random, but resulted in the killing of one man and the wounding of several others. It was the general if not the universal, belief of the citizens of Brownsville that this murderous riot was perpetrated by certain soldiers of the Twenty-Fifth. The disturbance was first investigated by an Inspector General under orders from the Military Secretary, and later, upon the President's own order, by the Inspector General of the army. This officer reported that in his opinion it had been established by careful investigation that the random firing aforesaid had been done by unidentified enlisted men of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry belonging to the garrison of Fort Brown. He further reported that the enlisted men of that command had failed to tell all it was reasonable to believe they knew concerning the riot and concluded that 'they (said enlisted men) appeared to stand together in a determination to resist the detection of the guilty. ' Upon the submission and approval of this report, an order was issued by the President's direction on November 9, 1906, requiring the discharge without honor of practically all the enlisted men comprising the garrison of Fort Brown. The men so discharged were by said order debarred from re-enlisting in the army or navy, but they were granted travel pay, and by a subsequent order of December 12, 1906 re-enlistment applications were permitted if made in writing accompanied by evidence that the applicant had not been implicated in the riot aforesaid, nor withheld any evidence that might lead to the discovery of the perpetrators thereof. Such applications, however, were to be submitted to the War Department for consideration and investigation before action could be taken by recruiting officers.
Reid, having received his discharge under these circumstances, brings this petition to recover the pay and emoluments which would have accrued to him from the date of such discharge to the expiration of his three-year term of enlistment, and, inasmuch as he brings suit under the Tucker act, it is necessarily implied that claim is asserted upon a 'contract express or implied with the government of the United States, or for damages * * * in a case not sounding in tort in respect of which * * * he would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity or admiralty if the United States were suable.'
A separate defense contained in the answer sets forth at length the documents supporting the statement hereinabove made, and avers that the 'order of the President and the said discharge (of Reid) were not made as punishment of the petitioner or of others but for the good of the service and for the maintenance of the morale of the army. ' To this defense there is a general demurrer.
Mellen & Woodbridge, for petitioner.
Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Atty.
HOUGH District Judge (after stating the facts as above).
Several matters discussed at bar must be laid aside as immaterial to the disposition of this cause. Whether Reid or his comrades, or any of them, were guilty of the riotous disturbance in question; or whether Reid personally committed any infraction of good order or military discipline; or whether he is in fact a desirable soldier; or whether he knew or withheld anything tending toward the discovery of the perpetrators of The brownsville riot; or whether, so far as Reid or others are concerned, the President's action was unnecessarily severe, cruel, or unjust-- are questions beyond this judicial investigation.
The material inquiries seem to me very few. The nature of a soldier's contract of enlistment has been sufficiently treated in Re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 11 Sup.Ct. 54 34 L.Ed. 636. By his contract Reid assumed the burden of military service, not for a definite time, but for...
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