Reierson v. City of Minneapolis

• Citation: 264 Minn. 153,118 N.W.2d 223
• Decision Date: 09 November 1962
• Docket Number: No. 38531,38531
• Parties: Gilbert REIERSON, Respondent, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 223

118 N.W.2d 223

264 Minn. 153

Gilbert REIERSON, Respondent, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Appellant.

No. 38531.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 9, 1962.

Syllabus by the Court

Where a municipality in the operation of its workhouse undertakes to use the labor of a prisoner in a competitive business enterprise, it is held to the same standards of responsibility and required to exercise the same degree of care for the safety of such person as is required of others who engage in a like private enterprise. By engaging in the operation of a sawmill, the municipality functions in its proprietary capacity.

Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., and G. V. Johnson, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for appellant.

Gilbert E. Carlson and Richard J. Haertzen, Howard, Peterson, LeFevere, Lefler & Haertzen, Minneapolis, for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an action by a former inmate of the Minneapolis Workhouse against the city of Minneapolis to recover damages sustained as a result of an accident which occurred while he was working in a sawmill operation conducted by the municipality at its workhouse. The city moved for summary judgment, asserting that it is immune from liability because the workhouse is operated by it in its governmental capacity. The trial court denied the motion and certified the question as important and doubtful.

From the record it appears that the plaintiff, Gilbert Reierson, was sentenced to 30 days in the city workhouse on August 20, 1958. While serving his term, he was required to work in the workhouse sawmill. His work involved the operation of a machine called an edger, which is used in the process of manufacturing skids which the defendant sells to the public. The complaint states that the plaintiff was given no instructions as to the machine's use and that it lacked safety devices or guards of any nature. On September 5, 1958, while working on the machine, the plaintiff suffered a severe injury to his right hand.

The complaint alleges that the injuries sustained were due to the negligence of the defendant city and--

'That the City of Minneapolis is engaged in the business of manufacturing skids which are sold for profit to private parties; that the work of plaintiff while incarcerated at said workhouse was in furtherance and a part of the City of Minneapolis' business activity; that said business activity is not a governmental function.'

The sole issue which we consider on appeal is whether the plaintiff's alleged injuries arose out of a municipal function which was proprietary or governmental in nature.

It has long been held that a municipal corporation is not liable for injuries to prisoners resulting from the negligence of police guards for the reason that in the maintenance of a jail the municipality exercises governmental powers and discharges governmental duties and, accordingly, cannot be held responsible for the negligence or misconduct of officers which it must necessarily employ. ¹ This principle is supported by Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N.W. 812. In that case the plaintiff had been arrested January 6, 1895, and had been confined to the village jailhouse all night. The building was open, cold, and wholly unfit to be used in the winter season. The complaint alleged that for 2 hours during the night there was no fire and that during the balance of the night 'said lockup was insufficiently heated,' by reason of which the plaintiff sustained an illness from which he became permanently disabled. In reversing an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint it was held that a municipal corporation was not liable for maintaining its lockup or prison in a defective and unfit condition. We there said (62 Minn. 279, 64 N.W. 812):

'* * * It is a well-settled rule of law that municipal corporations are not liable for either negligent omissions or commissions in the performance of duties for which they receive no pecuniary profit, but which are imposed upon them as mere governmental agencies.'

In Lamont v. Stavanaugh, 129 Minn. 321, 152 N.W. 720, L.R.A.1915E, 460, we held that a city was not liable for injuries received by a person on its streets in an assault by a police officer, although such officer was known to the officials appointing him to be a man of vicious propensities and violent temper.

The plaintiff urges that we follow the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach (Fla.) 96 So.2d 130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193. That case involved an action for death by wrongful act in which the decedent's widow sought damages from a town whose police officer locked her husband in a jail and left it unattended. The jail became filled with smoke during the night, causing decedent's suffocation. The court there came to the conclusion that the doctrine that a municipality is immune from liability for wrongful acts committed in the exercise of so-called governmental functions offends the basic concept of justice and decided that the municipal corporation was not immune from liability for wrongful acts of its police officers. See, also, Ballard v. City of Tampa, 124 Fla. 457, 168 So. 654.

It is not necessary for the determination of this case to review the numerous appellate court decisions and the considerable body of legal literature which has recently accumulated on the subject of municipal immunity from tort liability. This court will express its views on that subject in a decision which will shortly be released. ² It is sufficient to say that while this state has to date adhered to the principle of governmental immunity from tort liability it is apparent that the trend of the law is to restrict rather than to extend the principle. ³ Moreover, and of controlling importance here, the rule is subject to the well-established qualification that it does not apply under circumstances where the tort arises out of the conduct of a proprietary function.

In discussing the qualification of the rule, we said in Heitman v. City of Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 119, 30 N.W.2d 18, 21:

'From the antiquated maxim 'the King can do no wrong' comes whatever immunity in tort is enjoyed by a municipality. In the judicial process, the principle of nonliability has been increasingly qualified by the distinction that, while the King can do no wrong as King, he can certainly commit wrongs as an individual so far as municipal corporations are concerned. Nonliability in tort for negligence is confined to acts performed in a sovereign or governmental capacity, as distinguished from the liability attaching to acts which are performed by a municipality in its individual corporate or proprietary role. The principle of nonliability for governmental acts and liability for proprietary acts is easy to state but difficult to apply. When is the act governmental, and when is it proprietary? We have evolved no catchall test equally applicable to all situations. We have, however, come to recognize certain characteristics as indicative of the proprietary role. In Storti v. Town of Fayal, 194 Minn. 628, 632, 261 N.W. 463, 465, we adopted the rule of Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 390, 114 N.E. 722, 724, L.R.A.1917B, 1285, wherein the Massachusetts court said:

"* * * The underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all without the element of special corporate benefit Or pecuniary profit. If it is, there is no liability, if it is not, there May be liability.' (Italics supplied.)'

From an examination of our authorities it may be said that whether a municipal activity is governmental or proprietary must depend upon the particular facts in each case. ⁴ In Heitman v. City of Lake City, supra, we held that the ownership and operation of a small boat harbor by the municipality was proprietary and not governmental. In Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254, we said that in the operation of a municipal liquor store the city was engaged in both a governmental and a proprietary function. We held in Keever v. City of Mankato, 113 Minn. 55, 129 N.W. 158, 775,...