Reif v. Beese (In re Dvorak's Estate)

• Decision Date: 10 April 1931
• Docket Number: No. 40246.,40246.
• Citation: 236 N.W. 66,213 Iowa 250
• Parties: IN RE DVORAK'S ESTATE. REIF v. BEESE ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

213 Iowa 250

236 N.W. 66

IN RE DVORAK'S ESTATE.

REIF

v.BEESE ET AL.

No. 40246.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 10, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Linn County; John T. Moffitt, Judge.

Action to establish a claim for services for board and room and nursing, against an estate, based on an oral agreement. The jury returned a verdict for the claimant. The defendants appeal. The facts appear in the opinion.

Affirmed.G. M. Wilson, of Mt. Vernon, and W. J. Barngrover, of Cedar Rapids, for appellants.

George C. Claassen, of Cedar Rapids, and Carl F. Becker, of Mt. Vernon, for claimant-appellee.

GRIMM, J.

Frank Dvorak was a farmer living near the towns of Lisbon and Mt. Vernon, in Linn county, Iowa. His wife died in 1914, and he remained a widower. He continued to live on his farm a few miles south of Mt. Vernon and Lisbon up to a short time prior to his death. Some time prior to his death, he sold the farm and bought a small house in Lisbon. This was in 1926. His two daughters, some time prior to 1924, married and left home, leaving the father without a housekeeper.

It appears that some time about 1924 the deceased developed some heart trouble which progressed as the years passed on.

The evidence tends to show that at different times, beginning perhaps in 1924, the claimant, Mary A. Reif, performed various services for the deceased, such as cleaning his house, doing some cooking for him, washing his clothes, and other similar services about the farm. She would go out to the farm at various intervals to do this work. There is also evidence to show that at different times the deceased would go to claimant's home in Mt. Vernon, occasionally remaining overnight in a room which the claimant had for him. These visits to the claimant's home in Mt. Vernon were more frequent in 1925.

In January, 1926, the deceased purchased a house in Lisbon which was about a mile from claimant's home in Mt. Vernon. The evidence tends to show that claimant cleaned up the house which the deceased purchased and in various ways prepared the house for his moving into it. These circumstances are illustrative of the kind of services which it is claimed were performed for the deceased, over a period of years, by the claimant.

The deceased died in April, 1927, at the claimant's home where he had been for a short time prior to his death and where the claimant nursed and cared for him.

Several witnesses testified in reference to conversations between the claimant and the deceased, or conversations on the part of the deceased tending to show an oral agreement on the part of the deceased to compensate the claimant for services rendered. There is also some evidence in the record tending to show that the deceased promised to make a will in which he would provide for the claimant in compensation for services rendered. No such will was made.

On April 18, 1927, the claimant filed in the estate a claim for $3,753.30. The jury returned a verdict for $1,000.

The appellant sets up numerous errors relied upon for a reversal.

[1] I. It is claimed by the appellant that the court erred in overruling paragraph 1 of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, wherein the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to establish the various alleged claims of the plaintiff as submitted to the jury by the court.

A careful examination of the record discloses there is sufficient competent evidence to warrant the jury in returning a verdict for the claimant.

It would serve no good purpose to set out the testimony. It was not contradicted. It is not as clear and convincing as one would like, but it is sufficient for submission to the jury in this kind of proceeding.

II. The appellant complains of instruction No. 7, and particularly that portion thereof which pertains to the question of a demand for pay for services by the claimant. The appellant contends that the words of which complaint is made might be construed by the jury as an indication from the court that an agreement had been made between the parties.

We have very carefully examined this language. It appears to be more favorable to the defendants than to the plaintiff.

The language in question might very readily be construed by the jury as a warning against the allowance of the claim for the reason that no demand had been made by the claimant for services during all of the years the services were being rendered. At all events, there is no prejudicial error in the instruction.

[2] III...