Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp.

Decision Date16 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. C 11-03505 CRB,C 11-03505 CRB
PartiesMARTIN GARDNER REIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. MICROSOFT CORP. ET AL., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California
ORDER GRANTING GATES'S AND BALLMER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pro se Plaintiff Martin Reiffin has been pursuing infringement claims against Microsoft Corporation since 1998. See Case No. 98-0266. This case has been before Judge Walker, the Federal Circuit, and Judge Alsup; it landed here when Plaintiff filed a new case alleging that Defendants Microsoft, William H. Gates III, and Steven A. Ballmer committed fraud on the court before Judge Walker.1 See Compl. dkt. 1.2 The motion practice before this Court alone has been extensive. On Friday April 13, 2012, the Court held a hearing on Gates's and Ballmer's Motion to Dismiss the SAC, for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.3 See dkt. 83. As described below, the Court concludes that it has nopersonal jurisdiction over the two defendants, and so GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice, on that basis.

I. BACKGROUND4

After this Court granted Microsoft's Motion to Dismiss and entered Judgment for Microsoft, see dkts. 39, 40, it held a case management conference to determine the status of Defendants Gates and Ballmer, see dkt. 48. Concerned about the propriety of service, the Court then ordered Plaintiff to take the depositions of the individuals Plaintiff claimed to have served on Gates's and Ballmer's behalf. See dkt. 49. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Entry of Default against Gates and Ballmer. See dkt. 52. Subsequently, Gates and Ballmer appeared in the case, filing a Motion to Dismiss, see dkt. 55, and so the Court stayed the Order Regarding Service, denied the Motions for Default, and directed Plaintiff to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, see dkt. 60.

On February 2, 2012, the Court granted Gates's and Ballmer's Motion to Dismiss, holding that "The First Amended Complaint ["FAC"] does not even endeavor to make a prima facie showing of the Court's personal jurisdiction over Gates or Ballmer." See dkt. 78 at 3. The Court granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint, and directed Plaintiff to serve that amended complaint on Gates and Ballmer. Id. at 4. Plaintiff timely filed his SAC. See dkt. 80. Gates and Ballmer again moved to dismiss. See dkt. 83.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) governs dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. It is the plaintiff's burden to establish the court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir.1984). The court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to assist it in its determination and may order discovery on the jurisdictional issues. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). "When a district court acts on a defendant's motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing ofjurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss." Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir.1995) (citations omitted); see also AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.1996). In this context, a prima facie showing is established if plaintiff has produced admissible evidence which, if believed, would be sufficient to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction. See Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clemens Ltd., 328 F.3d. 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

Gates and Ballmer move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.5 Importantly, as was the case with the FAC, the SAC "does not even endeavor to make a prima facie showing of the Court's personal jurisdiction over Gates or Ballmer." See dkt. 78 at 3. The SAC does not address either defendants' contacts with California, alleging only that Gates is "a resident and citizen of the State of Washington" and that Ballmer is also "a resident and citizen of the State of Washington." SAC ¶¶ 23-24. The SAC's allegations as to these defendants mostly consist of Ballmer exhorting Microsoft employees to "Take every one of their good ideas and make them one of our good ideas," id. ¶¶ 143, and Gates rewarding Ballmer for that strategy by making him Microsoft's CEO, id. ¶ 144. Assuming the truth of these allegations, the SAC nonetheless utterly fails to establish the Court's personal jurisdiction over Gates and Ballmer.

Plaintiff does include some conclusory allegations of jurisdiction in his Opposition brief. See Opp'n (dkt. 86) at 1 ("defendants Gates and Ballmer personally induced infringement of the subject '603 patent throughout the State of California for fourteen years, and have had far more contacts with the State of California than the 'minimum contacts' required to subject these defendants to the personal jurisdiction of this Court."); id. at 8 ("DEFENDANTS' CONTACTS WITH CALIFORNIA FAR EXCEED THE MINIMUMREQUIRED TO BESTOW PERSONAL JURISDICTION").6 And Plaintiff submitted "evidence" of the Court's jurisdiction in three declarations; one alleges that Gates was a willful infringer and attaches two letters Plaintiff sent (one of them to Gates) in 1997, a return letter Plaintiff received from Microsoft counsel, and documents showing Microsoft's presence in Silicon Valley, see Reiffin Decl. re Gates (dkt. 84); the other two attach documents that resulted from Plaintiff's Google search of the defendants' names combined with the words "California" (for Ballmer), see Reiffin Decl. re Ballmer (dkt. 81), and "Indian Wells" (for Gates), see Second Reiffin Decl. re Gates (dkt. 87).

"For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have at least 'minimum contacts' with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "Minimum contacts" can be satisfied with either "general jurisdiction" or "specific jurisdiction." Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001). As described below, the Court has neither general nor specific jurisdiction over Gates or Ballmer.

A. General Jurisdiction

"General jurisdiction applies where a defendant's activities in the state are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic,' even if the cause of action is unrelated to those activities." Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977)). "Unless a defendant's contracts with a forum are so substantial, continuous, and systematic that the defendant can be deemed to be 'present' in that forum for all purposes, a forum may exercise only 'specific' jurisdiction." Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006). "For general (unlimited) jurisdiction, a higher level of 'contacts'with the forum state is required to support local jurisdiction." Roberts v. Synergistic Intern., LLC, 676 F. Supp. 2d 934, 942 (E.D. Cal. 2009). "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011). A person is a citizen of the state were he or she is domiciled. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

1. General Jurisdiction over Gates

The SAC does not support the exercise of general jurisdiction over Gates. It alleges only that Gates is "a resident and citizen of the State of Washington." SAC ¶ 23. Based on that allegation, the state of Washington would have general jurisdiction over Gates; not California. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.

The papers Plaintiff submitted in opposing the defendants' Motion also do not establish general jurisdiction. The 1997 letters Plaintiff sent (one of them to Gates) and the 1998 letter Plaintiff received in response from a Microsoft attorney do not demonstrate "'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic'" contacts with California. See Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361. The materials Plaintiff attaches to his Second Declaration, which resulted from his entering "Bill Gates" and "Indian Wells" into Google, suggest that Gates owns (although they do not suggest that he frequents) a vacation house in Indian Wells, California. See Second Reiffin Decl. re Gates. This alleged property ownership does not constitute "'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic'" contacts with California. See Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361. Indeed, in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Greenberg, No. 07-CV-1566, 2008 WL 2262423, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008), the court found that a party's purchase of a vacation home and visit to that home on several occasions fell short of "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" contact. See also Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1544 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding where it appeared that a party "often visits Colorado but does a relatively small amount of business in the state" that there was no basis for general jurisdiction). Plaintiff provides no authority holding that ownership of a vacation house is sufficient to establish general jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of the Court's general jurisdiction over Gates.

2. General Jurisdiction over Ballmer

As with Gates, the SAC alleges that Ballmer is "a resident and citizen of the State of Washington." SAC ¶ 24. Based on that allegation, the state of Washington would have general jurisdiction over Ballmer; not California. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.

The papers Plaintiff submitted in opposing the defendants' Motion also do not establish general jurisdiction in California. In his Declaration...

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