Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of NC

• Decision Date: 30 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-556-CIV-5-F.,93-556-CIV-5-F.
• Citation: 859 F. Supp. 963
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Haidee REIGEL, M.D., Plaintiff, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF NORTH CAROLINA, the Southeast Permanente Medical Group of North Carolina, P.A., and Carolina Permanente Medical Group, P.A., Defendants.

859 F. Supp. 963

Haidee REIGEL, M.D., Plaintiff, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF NORTH CAROLINA, the Southeast Permanente Medical Group of North Carolina, P.A., and Carolina Permanente Medical Group, P.A., Defendants.

No. 93-556-CIV-5-F.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Raleigh Division.

June 30, 1994.

Lawrence Brenner, Egerton & Brenner, Greensboro, NC, for plaintiff.

Charles R. Holton, Andrew B. Cohen, Agnes M. Schipper, Moore & Van Allen, Durham, NC, for defendants.

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JAMES C. FOX, Chief Judge.

POSTURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff brought this action against her former employer, The Southeast Permanente Medical Group of North Carolina, P.A., and its successor, The Carolina Permanente Medical Group, P.A., (hereinafter, collectively referred to as the "Medical Group"),¹ and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of North Carolina (hereinafter the "Health Plan"), alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., as well as a pendent state law breach of contract claim. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on various grounds, to which motions plaintiff has responded. Defendants have replied thereto, and the matter is ripe for disposition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 2, 1986, the Medical Group, then doing business as Carolina Permanente Medical Group, P.A., hired plaintiff as a physician under the terms embodied in the Physician Employment Agreement, entered into on that date by both plaintiff and the Medical Group. Plaintiff, although employed at that time as a full-time internist, maintained only an employment at-will status with the Medical Group. Upon becoming a full shareholder of the Medical Group in 1989, following recommendation by the Medical Group's board of directors and approval by the physicians in the Raleigh service area, plaintiff's employment could only be terminated for cause.

In early 1991, plaintiff suffered an injury to her right shoulder, later diagnosed as reflex sympathetic dystrophy, causing her to be unable to perform the functions of her job as an internal medicine physician with the Medical Group. Plaintiff, upon the advice of her consulting physician, took sick leave from work on August 15, 1991, which leave was converted to disability leave in November, 1991. By December, 1992, plaintiff — whether due solely to her disability, as defendants argue, or due to defendants' failure to accommodate her, as plaintiff argues — had not returned to work for a period of 12 months and was terminated by decision of the Board of the Medical Group. Pursuant to the Medical Group's policy, plaintiff was asked to remit her shares of stock in the Medical Group upon her discharge.

During her leave from work, plaintiff saw several doctors on numerous occasions for diagnosis, treatment and consultation with respect to her injury. The record and submissions of both parties are replete with correspondence to, from and among plaintiff, her various doctors, various insurance agencies, multiple attorneys and the Medical Group, concerning the status of both her injury and her employment. In fact, it is these communications which essentially comprise the basis for this lawsuit and the conflicting arguments and positions of all parties hereto.

On October 27, 1992, prior to her discharge, plaintiff filed a "Charge of Discrimination" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On July 23, 1993, the EEOC issued plaintiff a "Notice of Right to Sue" letter, dismissing plaintiff's charge of discrimination on the ground that "Charging party is not able to perform the essential functions of the position." (Pl.'s Resp.Ex. 13.)² On September 7, 1993, plaintiff commenced the instant action against the Medical Group and the Health Plan.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of presenting a prima facie showing of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact through affidavits, documents or the pleadings on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The mere existence, however, of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In order to overcome such a motion, the non-moving party must therefore establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact by presenting evidence on which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Id. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The court is obliged to credit the factual asservations contained in the material before it which favor the party resisting summary judgment and to draw inferences favorable to that party if the inferences are reasonable (however improbable they may seem)." Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cir.1980). When the evidence from the entire record could not lead a rational fact-finder to find for the nonmoving party, no genuine issue for trial exists and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

I. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (hereinafter the "ADA"), provides that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As defined by the ADA, a "qualified individual with a disability" is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that that individual holds or desires. Id. § 12111(8). In the event a qualified individual cannot perform the duties of her job without reasonable accommodation, the ADA imposes upon the covered entity the affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of the individual unless the entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Reasonable accommodations, by the ADA's terms, may include making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, and acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. Id. § 12111(9).

II. THE HEALTH PLAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Health Plan has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) plaintiff's ADA claim against the Health Plan was never submitted to the EEOC; (2) the Health Plan is a separate and distinct entity from the Medical Group and never acted as plaintiff's employer; and (3) plaintiff has at no time enjoyed a contractual relationship with the Health Plan. Having reviewed the evidence in its entirety, the court concurs in each of these arguments advanced by the Health Plan. Accordingly, for the reasons offered by the Health Plan in its memorandum, the Health Plan's motion for summary judgment is hereby ALLOWED.

In short, the Medical Group and the Health Plan were, at all times relevant hereto, separate and distinct entities, related only by virtue of a common goal of providing quality health care services and a contractual agreement to work together toward this common goal. The two entities at all times had distinct corporate offices, were managed and directed by different corporate boards and officers, and did not commingle or share responsibilities or decision making authority with respect to the management decisions of each other. The mere fact that, by virtue of the contractual arrangement between the Medical Group and the Health Plan, the two entities share a common trade name, "Kaiser Permanente," as well as legal resources and counsel does nothing to blur the distinction that exists with respect to the legal independence of identity of the two corporations.

Plaintiff's employment contract by its own terms and as affirmed in the affidavits proffered by defendants, was entered into solely with the Medical Group. Plaintiff herself has recognized the Medical Group as her employer in all prior documents that she has submitted to insurance companies, to the EEOC, and in the complaints she has filed in her legal actions. Nor has plaintiff ever submitted any correspondence to the Health Plan concerning her requests or ability to return to her employment. In fact, plaintiff has never identified the Health Plan as a defendant prior to the instant action. To the contrary, plaintiff's October 27, 1992, "Charge of Discrimination" filed with the EEOC identified her employer as Southeast Permanente Medical Group in Raleigh, North Carolina. (Pl.'s Resp.Ex. 10.) Upon receiving the EEOC's July 23, 1993, "Notice of Right to Sue" letter dismissing plaintiff's claim, in which the EEOC identified Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., d/b/a Southeast Permanente Medical Group as the respondent to plaintiff's claim, (Pl.'s Resp.Ex. 13), plaintiff promptly drafted a letter to Richard Waltz, Director of the Raleigh EEOC Office, stating "As the charging party, provide me with an amended Notice of Right to Sue letter, as my charge was against The Southeast Permanente Medical Group, P.A., making the letter that I received from you today invalid." (Def. Health Plan's Mot.Ex. 11.) Plaintiff, therefore, has unequivocally indicated her awareness of the distinction between the Medical Group and the...