Jackson v. County of Los Angeles

• Citation: 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96,60 Cal.App.4th 171
• Decision Date: 19 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. B107622,B107622
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 63 Cal. Comp. Cases 1670, 7 A.D. Cases 1256, 11 NDLR P 195, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9565, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,261 Eddie JACKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 96

70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96

60 Cal.App.4th 171, 63 Cal. Comp. Cases 1670, 7 A.D. Cases 1256,

11 NDLR P 195, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9565,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,261

Eddie JACKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B107622.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 19, 1997.

Review Denied March 11, 1998.

Law Offices of Robert M. Moss and Robert M. Moss, Santa Monica, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Melanie E. Lomax & Associates and Melanie E. Lomax, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

MASTERSON, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Eddie Jackson, a safety police officer with the County of Los Angeles ("County"), sustained a work-related injury to his back. He filed a workers' compensation claim, but continued to perform his job without the need for any accommodation. Jackson received a workers' compensation award of $48,359. The award also contained a work restriction mandating that Jackson's Jackson filed this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213), alleging that the County had discriminated against him because of his disability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on the ground that Jackson's work restriction rendered him unqualified for employment. We affirm.

employment be free from emotional stress and strain. In compliance with the work restriction, the County placed Jackson on extended medical leave.

BACKGROUND

In October 1974, Jackson began his employment with the County as a safety police officer I. At some point, he was assigned to County-U.S.C. Medical Center ("Medical Center") and was promoted to safety police officer III. According to Jackson's performance evaluations, his job responsibilities included protecting patients, visitors, employees, and members of the public from acts of violence; safeguarding county property by responding to fires, bomb threats, and hazardous material spills; and arresting individuals engaged in criminal activity. These duties required that Jackson carry a firearm.

The formal class specification for the position of safety police officer III states that "[p]ositions allocable to this class ... [are assigned to] isolated fixed posts, or conduct individual foot and vehicle patrol of premises where the patrons and clientele include a high proportion of aggressive and quarrelsome individuals and groups hostile to authority, and who often react to the frustration of having rules imposed that regulate their behavior by resorting to physical assault upon persons or property. The areas included within these assignments are often invaded by groups and/or individuals who come upon the premise[s] to commit crimes such as theft, vandalism and rape.... [p] Positions allocable to this class are distinguished from full-time peace officer positions by the limited nature of their law enforcement authority. Such authority is limited to the enforcement of law only as necessary to prevent injury to persons or damage to or theft of property within the area or areas of the County facility of facilities of the shift to which they are posted or assigned." The class specification indicates that the position of safety police officer III has a physical class rating of "4," which means that the physical demands of the job are "arduous."

In March 1991, Jackson sustained an injury while restraining a hyperactive patient who was on phencyclidine, commonly known as PCP. Shortly thereafter, Jackson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, alleging injuries to his back, shoulder, and psyche. While the claim was pending, Jackson continued to perform his job satisfactorily. He did not miss any work because of the injury. Nor did he request or require any accommodation to perform his job.

In connection with the workers' compensation claim, Jackson's attorney selected two physicians, Drs. Richard Low and Jack Kroeger, to evaluate his injuries. ¹ In a report dated April 16, 1992, Dr. Low found that Jackson suffered from several work-related health problems, including hypertension. Dr. Low stated: "Mr. Jackson is labor disabled based solely upon the condition of worsening hypertension. Furthermore, this condition is now permanent and stationary for purposes of rating." Under the heading, "Work Restrictions," Dr. Low advised: "By virtue of the worsening hypertension, and based solely on this condition, the patient is restricted to working in an environment free of emotional stress and strain, and no heavy work as fatigue tends to aggravate these findings and set him up for life threatening complications."

On September 10, 1992, Dr. Kroeger reported: "The subjective factors of disability are occasional slight to moderate low back pain when getting out of bed in the morning. [p] ... The objective factors of disability include restriction of low back motion with pain on terminal range, tenderness in the area and 50% restricted squatting." Under the heading, "Work Restrictions," Dr. Kroeger stated: "Mr. Jackson is to avoid quick back movements and strains, including heavy lifting, repeated bending and stooping." Under At the County's request, Jackson was also evaluated by Randolph Noble, M.D. In a February 1, 1993 report, Dr. Noble concluded: "Mr. Jackson is presently working full time and there does not appear to be an internal medicine disability precluding him from his usual and customary job activities. [p] ... [I]t is my opinion that Mr. Jackson could perform his usual and customary occupational duties without restriction. Work preclusions are not indicated."

the heading, "Rehabilitation," Dr. Kroeger wrote: "Mr. Jackson is a Qualified Injured Worker. He is unable to return to his usual occupation as a safety police [officer]. He is eligible for vocational retraining and rehabilitation."

In early April 1993, Jackson's workers' compensation claim was resolved by way of the parties' "Stipulations with Request for Award," which they filed with the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. The stipulations recited that Jackson's injuries had caused "permanent disability" of 62 1/4 percent "for which indemnity is payable ... in the sum of $48,359.00...." The stipulations further stated: "The parties mutually agree that Applicant is under a work restriction as follows: [p] a) no heavy lifting, repetitive bending and stooping and quick back movements and strains (Dr. Kroeger 9/10/92). [p] b) work environment free from emotional stress and strain and no heavy work (Dr. Low 4/16/92)." The stipulations were signed by Jackson, his attorney, and a representative of the County. ² On April 8, 1993, a workers' compensation judge issued an award based on the stipulations. The award expressly incorporated the work restrictions set forth in the stipulations.

By letter dated April 19, 1993, the County's workers' compensation administrator informed Adele Harris, who worked in the County's "return-to-work" unit, of Jackson's work restrictions. Subsequently, Jackson's superiors decided that his work restriction mandating a stress-free environment precluded him from continuing to serve as a safety police officer and that there were no accommodations that would permit him to continue in that job.

On April 23, 1993, Jackson's supervisor told him that he was being relieved of his duties as a safety police officer because there were no positions that were free from emotional stress. In an effort to accommodate Jackson's work restrictions, the County attempted to find another position for him at the Medical Center or in a different safety police division within the department of health services. The County also provided Jackson with vocational rehabilitation services through Anami Rehabilitation Services, Inc. However, Jackson withdrew from the rehabilitation program after a few weeks. The only position he wanted or would consider was that of safety police officer III. Beginning on or about April 23, 1993, Jackson was placed on a medical leave of absence. At that time, the County still considered him to be an employee.

In October 1993, Jackson filed a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that the County had violated the ADA. In July 1994, he received a right-to-sue letter from the United States Department of Justice authorizing him to file a civil suit under the ADA within 90 days. The department did not make any determination regarding the merits of Jackson's claim.

In October 1994, Jackson filed this action, alleging that the County had violated the ADA by failing to accommodate his disability and by terminating his employment on April 23, 1993. Jackson also alleged that the County had treated him as if he had a disability when in fact he did not.

In May 1996, Jackson filed a motion for summary adjudication, seeking to establish the County's liability under the ADA as a matter of law. For its part, the County moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had not unlawfully discriminated against Jackson. On July 24, 1996, the trial court continued the hearing on both motions and instructed the parties to file supplemental

                memoranda discussing the effect, if any, of the workers' compensation award on Jackson's lawsuit.  The parties complied.  After the presentation of oral argument, the trial court granted summary judgment for the County.  The trial court concluded that, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Jackson's workers' compensation award precluded his ADA claim.  Judgment was entered accordingly. 3  Jackson filed a timely appeal. 4
                

DISCUSSION

The County contends that the work restrictions imposed on Jackson by the workers' compensation award rendered him unqualified for employment and that, as a result, the County did not unlawfully discriminate against him because of a disability. We agree.

Summary judgment is appropriate if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any...