MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING HABEAS-CORPUS
PETITION
DAVID
NUFFER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
In this
federal habeas-corpus case, pro se inmate Donald
Raymond Reigelsperger,[2]attacks his Utah state convictions.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2022) ("[A] district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.").
Having
carefully considered the Petition, (ECF No. 1), State
response, (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner's Reply Brief, (ECF
No. 12), the Court concludes Petitioner has not overcome the
federal habeas standard of review on any of his challenges.
The petition is therefore denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
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2
II.
PETITIONER'S ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL-HABEAS RELIEF
..................... 3
III.
MERITS ANALYSIS
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4
A.
Standard of Review
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4
B.
Application of Standard of Review
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8 1. Jury-Instruction Challenges
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8
a. Allegation that jury instructions did not match up with
the State's theory of the case presented in the
information, preliminary hearing, and trial. .
............................................ 8
b. Allegation that jury instructions about four sexual
assault offenses erroneously led jury to think Petitioner
could be convicted of the sexual crimes without a culpable
mens rea particularly as to consent. .
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15
2.
Motion to Suppress
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19
a.
Challenge to state court's factual determinations. .
........................................................ 20
i. Federal standards governing review of factual
determinations and evidentiary sufficiency. .
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20
ii. Utah Court of Appeals recitation of facts. .
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22
b.
Challenge to Utah Court of Appeals's legal analysis and
conclusions. . ....................... 28
i. Utah Court of Appeals' legal analysis and conclusions.
. ........................................... 28
ii. Utah Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply clearly
established federal law. 36
iii. Summary
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40
IV.
CONCLUSION
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41
ORDER
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41
A jury
found Petitioner guilty of aggravated kidnapping and four
sexual-assault counts, perpetrated against his then-wife.
Reigelsperger, 2017 UT App 101, ¶ 1. Petitioner
was sentenced to one term of fifteen-years-to-life, to be
served consecutively to concurrent two five-to-life sentences
and two one-to-five-year sentences. (ECF No. 1, at 1.)
Petitioner
pursued these issues on appeal: (A) the allegation "that
he was given an incomplete Miranda warning and
therefore the trial court should have suppressed the
statements he made during his interview in the
hospital," which he identifies as a "custodial
interrogation";
(B) the contention "that the State improperly expanded
the scope of its prosecution at the close of trial" by
impermissibly broadening "the jury instructions
addressing the assault offenses" beyond "the
State's asserted theory of the case, with regard to both
nonconsent and the intent required to commit forcible sexual
abuse"; (C) the assertion that "the jury was not
adequately instructed that the State was required to prove he
possessed (1) a culpable mens rea as to Wife's
nonconsent, for purposes of the sexual assault offenses; and
(2) intent or knowledge with respect to the elements of the
aggravated kidnapping offense." Reigelsperger,
at ¶¶ 36-37, 40, 60 (alteration in original).
Analyzing these issues on the merits, the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions. Id.
at ¶¶ 40-97. And the Utah Supreme Court denied
Petitioner's certiorari petition. State v.
Reigelsperger, 409 P.3d 1048 (Utah 2017) (table).
II.
PETITIONER'S ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL-HABEAS
RELIEF
Petitioner
raises the following issues on federal habeas review:
(a) An allegation that the information was
"constructively amended when, after the trial, the jury
was instructed on elements which impermissibly modif[ied] the
state's theory of the case presented in the information,
preliminary hearing, and trial." (ECF No. 1, at 8.) More
specifically, Petitioner asserts that "the court
impermissibly instructed the jury that it could base guilt on
different theories of non-consent . . . as well as theories
of specific intent."[3] (Id. at 8, 18.)
(b) An allegation that the "jury instructions failed to
properly define mens rea." (Id. at 10.) More
specifically, "[f]or each of the four sexual assault
offenses, counts 2-5, Petitioner was
convicted of . . . 'the jury [was led] to believe he
could be convicted of the sexual crimes absent a culpable
mens rea specifically regarding consent.'"
(Id. at 20.)
(c) An allegation that the jury instructions regarding the
aggravated-kidnapping offense were "ambiguous and
confusing." (Id. at 11.) More specifically, the
instructions here "were written in such a way that it
was unclear which of the . . . [crime] elements [that] the
mens rea instruction was linked to . . . thus relieving the
state of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that" Petitioner had the necessary intent during the
kidnapping. (Id. at 21-22.)
(d) An allegation that "the trial court erred in failing
to suppress statements obtained during an illegal [custodial]
interrogation." (Id. at 13.) More specifically,
while Petitioner was in a "mental facility,"
"involuntarily confined," police officers
interrogated him to gain a confession leading to his arrest.
(Id. at 23-25.)[4] On this issue, Petitioner attacks
the state court's factual and legal determinations. (ECF
Nos. 1, 12.)
III.
MERITS ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review
The
standard of review to be applied in federal habeas cases is
found in § 2254, under which this habeas petition is
filed. It states:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant
shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2022).
The
Court's inquiry centers on whether the Utah Court of
Appeals's[5] rejection of Petitioner's claims
"was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law." 28
U.S.C.S. § 2254(d)(1) (2022). This "'highly
deferential standard,'" Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citations
omitted); see also Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d
817, 824 (10th Cir. 2013), is "'difficult to
meet,' because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that
federal habeas relief functions as a '"guard against
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems,"' and not as a means of error
correction." Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38
(2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
102 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment))).
The Court is not to determine whether the court of
appeals's decision was correct or whether this Court may
have reached a different outcome. See Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). "The role of
federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that
constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and
limited." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
887 (1983). And, "[t]he petitioner carries the burden of
proof." Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1398.
Under
Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), the first
step is determining whether clearly established federal law
exists relevant to Petitioner's claims. House v
Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 2008); see
also Littlejohn, 704 F.3d at 825. Only after answering
yes to that "threshold question" may the Court go
on to "ask whether the state court decision is either...
