Reilley v. Keswani

• Decision Date: 11 December 1975
• Citation: 350 A.2d 74,137 N.J.Super. 553
• Parties: Lenora REILLEY and Andrew Reilley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Satty Gill KESWANI, M.D., et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 553

137 N.J.Super. 553

350 A.2d 74

Lenora REILLEY and Andrew Reilley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Satty Gill KESWANI, M.D., et al., Defendants-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted Dec. 1, 1975.

Decided Dec. 11, 1975.

Michael A. Querques, P. A., Orange, for plaintiffs-appellants (Alfred I. Bernstein and Larry Bronson, Orange, on the brief).

Shanley & Fisher, Newark, for defendant-respondent Keswani (Thomas F. Compion, Newark, of counsel, Joseph L. Cook on the brief).

No brief was filed on behalf of defendants-respondents Marco & Son, Inc. or the XYZ Manufacturing Co.

Before Judges ALLCORN, KOLE and COLLESTER.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ALLCORN, J.A.D.

Fundamental to, if not the sole purpose of, the administration of our system of justice is the search for truth. An essential correlative to that end is the proposition that all evidence relevant to the issues in controversy be admitted, unless its admission would transgress some paramount policy of society and the law. Evid. R. 7(f). Thus it is that in criminal prosecutions evidence inculpatory of the accused is excluded where it has been obtained by law enforcement officials in contravention of one of the constitutional protections of the accused.

We are unaware of and discern no like overriding rule or policy of the law that would warrant or justify the exclusion of any relevant testimony or other evidence resulting from the discussion between Dr. Diamond and Dr. Keswani, under the circumstances here present. True, DR 7--104(A)(1) proscribes an attorney for one party from communicating or causing another to communicate concerning the matters in controversy with another party he knows to be represented by counsel, without the prior consent of counsel for the other party. It is to be doubted, however, that said disciplinary rule constitutes an expression of policy of such general force and significance as to bar evidence obtained as a result of a violation of that disciplinary rule; more likely, given the philosophy and purpose to be served by the disciplinary rule, it merely would subject the offending lawyer to professional sanctions in an appropriate disciplinary proceeding. See Barbetta v. Sciaraffa, 135 N.J.Super. 488, 343 A.2d 770 (App.Div.1975); Contra, Obser v. Adelson, 96 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup.Ct.1949), aff'd 276 A.D. 999, 95 N.Y.S.2d 757 (App.Div.1950). See also, In re Kent, 39 N.J. 114, 187 A.2d 718 (1963); Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 269 F.2d 478 (4 Cir. 1959); In re O'Neil, 228 A.D. 129, 239 N.Y.S. 297 (1930); Muhlhauser v. Becker, 76 N.D. 402, 37 N.W.2d 352 (Sup.Ct.1948); Annotation, 'Attorney's dealing directly with client of another attorney as ground for disciplinary proceeding,' 1 A.L.R.3d 1113 (1965).

However this may be, we are not called upon to resolve that issue here. On the hearing of the motion before the trial court, counsel for Dr. Keswani conceded and the trial judge found that pl...