Reinco, Inc. v. Thompson

Decision Date17 August 2006
Docket NumberNo. 197, 2005.,197, 2005.
Citation906 A.2d 103
PartiesREINCO, INC., Appellant Defendant, Below, v. Gary THOMPSON, Appellee Defendant, Below.
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County. C.A. No. 01 C-04-076.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. VACATED and REMANDED.

William J. Cattie, III, Rawle & Henderson, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.

Shakuntla L. Bhaya, Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz & Bhaya, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, constituting the Court en banc.

STEELE, Chief Justice.

On May 18, 1999, Gary Thompson, the plaintiff below and the appellee here, operated a twenty-eight year old Reinco, Inc. manufactured hydroseeder. An upright pipe on the hydroseeder broke during the operation causing a "slurry" of water, mulch, and seed to exit the pipe rapidly. The break caused Thompson to fall to the ground eleven feet below and suffer serious injury. Thompson brought suit alleging that Reinco negligently designed and manufactured the hydroseeder. The case went to a trial before a jury. In response to a question on a special verdict form, the jury found that Reinco did not act negligently in any respect.

Thompson filed a Motion for a New Trial claiming, among other things, that the trial judge's end of trial ruling removing Thompson's alleged comparative negligence from the jury's consideration was inadequate to avoid jury confusion over the role of comparative negligence in the case. The trial judge agreed and granted Thompson's Motion for a New Trial.

Reinco appeals that decision. Because the record supports the jury's finding that Reinco was not negligent in the first instance and does not support a finding that the jury's verdict was "clearly" the result of confusion, we find that the trial judge abused her discretion by granting a new trial. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand with instructions to reinstate the original jury verdict and to enter judgment for Reinco.

I.
A. Facts

Martom Landscaping employed Thompson. Martom owned a hydroseeder that Reinco manufactured in 1971. This hydroseeder mixed water, mulch, and seed in a 1500 gallon tank until it formed a "slurry." To apply the "slurry" to an area, an individual stood on the hydroseeder's platform, or operating deck, and used a spray nozzle. The spray nozzle was attached to an upright pipe on the operating deck that moved the "slurry" from the 1500 gallon tank. The upright pipe on the operating deck was "Schedule 40 pipe" made of carbon steel.

On May 18, 1999, Thompson operated the hydroseeder. Thompson was working with William Wilson, Mark Thompson,1 and Howard Mahan. While Thompson was standing on the operating deck,2 the upright pipe on the operating deck broke, causing the "slurry" to rapidly flow out of the pipe. The slurry rushed out of the broken pipe, went thirty feet in the air, and caused Thompson to fall to the ground eleven feet below. Thompson suffered permanent impairment to both of his feet as a result of the fall. Thompson brought suit against Reinco for negligently designing and manufacturing the hydroseeder and the case went to a trial before a jury.

B. Procedural History

At trial, the primary issue relevant to this appeal was whether the upright pipe broke because of Reinco's negligent manufacture or design. Thompson's expert, Colberg, testified, among other things, that Reinco negligently designed the hydroseeder by using "Schedule 40" carbon steel for the upright pipe rather than stainless steel.3 Reinco's expert, Clauser, testified that there were several "downsides" to using stainless steel,4 and that Reinco did not negligently design the hydroseeder by using carbon steel for the upright pipe because "the engineering turned out to be a fail safe part, a part that would leak before it would break and tell you that it was wearing out."

As a part of its defense, in addition to simply denying that it acted negligently in any way, Reinco wanted the jury to infer that Thompson himself acted negligently because he fell while carelessly removing a clog in the upright pipe. Reinco wanted to develop this theory based on coworker Wilson's deposition testimony that Thompson was on the operating deck removing a clog immediately before the accident. Reinco's counsel attempted to inject the clog issue into the trial during his crossexamination of coworker Mahan. Counsel asked Mahan, "Would you get clogs in the area of the tower that is shown in exhibit 4?" Thompson's counsel objected, claiming that clogs were not an issue in the case because both Thompson's and Reinco's experts agreed that the mere existence of a clog would not have caused the pipe to break. Reinco's counsel explained that he was not offering the evidence to show that the clog itself caused the pipe to break, rather, he wanted to suggest that Thompson slipped when he removed the clog and grabbed onto the upright pipe to catch his fall, causing the pipe to break.5

The trial judge, hesitant to allow Mahan to be questioned about clogs, stated:

Here is the problem, counsel, without knowing all the facts through all the testimony, because obviously they haven't come in, it is difficult for me to decide the 403 analysis in a vacuum. I'm concerned for potential for confusion with the jury and I'm concerned about the prejudicial nature of this testimony, because it is the only thing that injects clogs into the case. I don't draw the inference and I don't believe it would be fair to the jury to draw the inference that a clog in the hose existed because there has been no expert testimony on that point. I'm going to allow your inquiry into this area. If I get the sense that the jury is getting confused I will stop the questioning and try to craft a curative.

I will tell you that I made an error on the 403 analysis as the rest of the testimony unfolds and expert opinions come in. I won't hesitate to rectify anything that this will cause with the jury reaching a verdict not in favor of the plaintiff. I know that this is little solace for the plaintiffs. Although, it is hanging by a thread, [counsel] gets to question about this. It is relevant that Mr. Wilson says he heard the plaintiff say it. It is not inadmissible hearsay, it is unfortunate that Mr. Wilson isn't subject to vigorous cross-examination on this issue. I have a lot of reservation about it coming in, but at this point, based on what I know so far it would be error not to. So I'm going to give you a leash. I do not want any suggestion, no matter how subtle, from the defense that somehow you are going to be able to prove that the clog caused what transpired here. There is no testimony to support that here. The only relevance of the clog is to explain your theory of why he was up there and why he caused this accident.

Reinco's counsel then continued to question Mahan. Mahan acknowledged that he had experienced clogs and that when that happened he would clear the clog by removing the nozzle and placing a metal rod into the pipe.6

Later in the trial, the trial judge again returned to the issue raised by the specter of the clog. On crossexamination, Reinco's counsel asked Thompson the following: "What could you do to get rid of that jet clog?" Thompson's counsel objected, claiming that the question "went beyond the scope of direct."7 The trial judge called counsel to side bar and stated:

This is what my concern is, you are injecting, repeatedly, references to clogs. And my idea of limiting the evidence to allow you to say what Wilson said the plaintiff told him did not mean to open the door to sending the jury off wondering if there is a clog. I'm sitting here listening to the repeated references to clogs and I'm worried sick that the jury is focusing on that. And the only relevance is, as you initially proffered, that puts him on top of the truck. I think prejudicial value is getting greater and greater. I want you to stick to what Wilson said and not hypothetical situations.

The trial judge again did not find it necessary to give a cautionary or limiting instruction, nor did Thompson's counsel ask for one. Reinco's counsel did not ask Thompson any further questions about clogs.

At the close of the evidence, Thompson moved for a directed verdict on the issue of Thompson's comparative negligence. The trial judge granted Thompson's motion and "declined to charge the jury on comparative negligence with respect to the plaintiff."8

When instructing the jury, the trial judge properly defined negligence and clearly explained that Thompson's alleged comparative negligence was no longer an issue in the case. The trial judge then sent the jury to deliberate and gave the jury a special verdict form with the following questions: (1) Do you find that the Defendant Reinco, Inc., was negligent?, (2) Do you find that Martom was negligent and the Martom's negligence was a superseding cause of plaintiff's injuries?, (3) Do you find that Reinco, Inc., was negligent in a manner proximately causing plaintiff's injuries?, (4) State the full amount of your award of damages to the plaintiff, Gary Thompson. The jury answered the first question "No." That response obviated the need to answer the remaining questions.

After the jury's January 28, 2005 finding that Reinco did not negligently design or manufacture the hydroseeder, Thompson's counsel sent a letter to the trial judge requesting permission to exceed the normal four page limit for a Motion for a New Trial. The trial judge granted the extension and also stated, "please specifically address inter alia the issue of whether plaintiff's comparative negligence (which was later dismissed by the court) confused the jury." On February 11, 2005, Thompson filed his Motion for a New Trial. The trial judge granted Thompson's motion in a letter opinion:

I...

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