Reinert v. Industrial Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 20 March 1956
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Joanne REINERT, by her Guardian ad litem, William Reinert, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of California, Central Orange County Girl Scout Council, a corporation, Globe Indemnity Company, a corporation, Respondents. L. A. 23954.

Page 713

294 P.2d 713

46 Cal.2d 349

Joanne REINERT, by her Guardian ad litem, William Reinert, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of California, Central Orange County Girl Scout Council, a corporation, Globe Indemnity Company, a corporation, Respondents.

L. A. 23954.

Supreme Court of California.

March 20, 1956.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 1956.

Hennigan & Ryneal, Riverside, for petitioner.

Everett A. Corten, San Francisco, Edward A. Sarkisian and Herlihy & Herlihy, Los Angeles, for respondents.

CARTER, Justice.

This is a proceeding to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission which denied an application for compensation for personal injuries on the ground that said injuries were not suffered in the course of employment.

Petitioner, Joanne Reinert, a minor, was employed by the Central Orange County Girl Scout Council at a camp which it conducted for Girl Scouts in the San Bernardino Mountains. Mrs. Mary K Scholler was Executive Director of the Council, Camp Director of the summer camp and was in charge of employment for the Council. Although the Council had conducted summer camps in previous years, this was the first time at this particular location which had been leased for the season from a church. The leased camp grounds comprised about five acres on which were located the main lodge, kitchen facilities, and barracks type sleeping quarters. Almost all of the recreational facilities were located off the camp grounds.

In May, 1954, when petitioner and Mrs. Scholler discussed her employment, Mrs. Scholler explained that horseback riding as an assistant counselor accompanying younger Girl Scouts would be part of her duties; that while on such duty she would pay no charge for the horse; that when she had any free time she would be privileged, upon obtaining permission from Mrs. Scholler, to go riding. Petitioner was told by Mrs. Scholler at the time of the interview that part of the compensation for the work was the availability of recreational activities as a counselor which would not otherwise be available to her. Petitioner was engaged as assistant waterfront director by the Council by a written contract covering the period from June 30, 1954, to July 30, 1954, at a wage of $40 for the period. She was informed that this wage would not come 'close' to paying for all the services she rendered but it was hoped that while at camp she would be able to take advantage of all the recreational facilities available; that it was hoped that 'you will also have been compensated to some extent' by those recreational facilities. The fact that petitioner enjoyed horseback riding and intended to engage in that sport was discussed at the interview.

Each employee was on duty 24 hours a day except for one 24-hour period each week. During the on-duty hours if the employee was not needed for the actual work of the camp she could, upon obtaining permission, engage in recreational activities of her own choosing. When her duties so permitted, she was required to obtain permission for the precise recreational activity away from the camp in which she wished to engage.

Prior to her injury, petitioner had gone horseback riding some six times, three of them without charge to her because she rode as a counselor accompanying Girl Scouts and three times for her own recreation for which she was charged a reduced rate of $1 per hour by the stable. Horses were procured at Wilson's Stables located a half mile from the camp through an arrangement whereby the campers and counselors could ride at a lower rate than that charged the general public.

On July 30th, the day petitioner received her injuries, the last group of Girl Scouts had left the camp at around noon. Some of the counselors also left at that time, but petitioner and other counselors stayed to close up camp, pack the equipment and prepare it for loading into trucks which were to depart the next day. Petitioner and some of the other counselors, including Mrs. Scholler, had made plans a day or two earlier to go for a final horseback ride and swim during the afternoon of the 30th after which they were to return to camp for the final packing and clearing up prior to loading. Mrs. Scholler received a call elsewhere and was unable to go on the ride but granted permission to petitioner and the other younger counselors to go on the horseback ride.

At Wilson's Stable, petitioner mounted a horse chosen for her by the attendant at the stable and started off to ride along a bridle path nearest to the camp. After a few minutes the horse bolted and petitioner was thrown to the ground and rendered unconscious. She was discovered later and taken to a hospital.

Petitioner's injuries are not in dispute. She is paralyzed and will remain so for the rest of her life. In addition to the transection of the spinal cord, she suffered broken ribs, broken maxilla, traumatic heart demage and lung damage.

The only question involved here is whether petitioner's injuries were suffered in the course of her employment. Respondents argue that they were not because of two factors: (1) That the accident occurred while petitioner was riding for her own recreation; and (2) that it occurred at a location off the premises of the employer and not under its control. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that an injury is compensable even though it arose from an activity not primarily for the benefit of the employer, provided that such activity is related to the employment or contemplated as part of the employment, and that the fact that the injury occurred on premises not directly owned or controlled by the employer is immaterial so long as the injury arose out of the employment.

The day the accident occurred, July 30th, was covered by the terms of the written contract entered into between petitioner and her employer and is sufficient to show that her employment had not terminated despite the argument of respondents that petitioner 'volunteered' to remain and assist in the closing of the camp and the packing and loading of the equipment. We have then to determine whether the recreational horseback ride for which petitioner was granted permission was contemplated as part of her employment.

It is apparent from the evidence heretofore set forth that recreational horseback riding during her free time was considered as part of the compensation to be paid by the employer for petitioner's work; that she was both encouraged and permitted to go horseback riding in her free time during working hours at lower rates arranged by the employer with the stable. In addition, it appears inferentially, that the Wilson Stables was the only one in the area available to the Girl Scouts and their counselors.

In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 26 Cal.2d 509, 513, 159 P.2d 625, 627, where an employee was drowned while washing in a reservoir while on his way to his employer's office to collect his pay, we held: 'The mere fact that an employee is performing a personal act when injured does not per se bring him without the purview of the Compensation Law. The test is stated in Employers', etc., Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 37 Cal.App.2d 567, 573, 99 P.2d 1089, 1092: 'The true rule to be derived from the cases is that the injury is compensable if received while the employee is doing those reasonable things which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him to do. " In Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 31 Cal.2d 856, 861, 193 P.2d 745, 747, where a pilot was killed while taking his young daughter for an airplane ride, we held that: '* * * although it may be conceded that Hamilton was deriving a personal benefit from the flight by determining his daughter's aptitude for flying, this 'does not per se bring him without the purview of the Compensation Law. * * * 'The true rule * * * is that the injury is compensable if received while the employee is doing those reasonable things which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him to do.'' Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 26 Cal.2d 509, 513, 159 P.2d 625, 627. Benefits to the employer, or to the employee, are not mutually exclusive, and 'where the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the time of injury, unless it clearly appears that neither directly nor indirectly could he have been serving his employer.' Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 28 Cal.2d 756, 758, 759, 172 P.2d 1, 3.' In California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Comm., 21 Cal.2d 751, 758, 760, 135 P.2d 158, the injured employee had the implied consent of her employer to go on personal errands during working hours. The court there said that it was not indispensable to recovery that the employee be rendering service to his employer at the time of the injury if the act was contemplated by the employment. It was there held that any reasonable doubt as to whether an act was contemplated by the employment, in view of this state's liberal policy of construction in favor of the employee, should be resolved in favor of the employee. See, also, Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal.2d 716, 720, 166 P.2d 857; Employers', etc., Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 37 Cal.App.2d 567, 99 P.2d 1089; Western Pipe, etc., Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 49 Cal.App.2d 108, 121 P.2d 35. The record here clearly shows that petitioner's wage was low; that it had been difficult to procure counselors for the camp; that it was specifically contemplated by the employer that the use of the available recreational facilities was considered 'compensation' for the long hours and exacting work.

The present case, although a much stronger one factually, is very like that of Winter v. Industrial Accident Comm., 129 Cal.App.2d 174,...